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Chapter 1:  
Introduction to the dissertation 
1.1: Question and three hypotheses 
 
Margaret Thatcher was Britain’s premier for an impressive period of 11 years and is probably 
the best known British premier since Winston Churchill.1 Her fame can be said to be 
indisputably related to Britain’s success in the very short Falklands War in 1982 and also her 
role as a state leader together with the American President Ronald Reagan and USSR 
President Mikhail Gorbatchev in the late 1980s in their effort to introduce democracy in 
Eastern Europe; thus contributing to end the Cold War. According to Paul Sharp in Thatcher’s 
Diplomacy, Thatcher acted as a potential ‘third force’ together with Reagan and Gorbachev in 
world affairs during the years 1987 and 1988. 2 Her reputation as ‘the Iron Lady’ originated in 
the USSR, and although this soubriquet probably was not intended as flattery, Thatcher used 
it as her trademark.  
 She won three successive general elections as leader of the Conservative Party, and 
she was subject to exceptional portions of both repulsion and acclaim. Some fundamental 
reforms were carried through by the Thatcher governments, which paved the way for 
extensive privatization in the public sector, a reformed tax system, limitations to the welfare 
state, weakened trade unions and a more assertive foreign policy. Apparently she became 
progressively unpopular because of two big issues that dominated British politics from the 
late 1980s: The introduction of the poll tax and the increasingly Eurosceptic view that 
Thatcher proclaimed in the House of Commons and abroad. Her dominant and abrasive 
personality made her many political enemies, since she did not hesitate to criticize or 
condemn her cabinet members in public. Several prominent ministers resigned during the 
years of her government, for instance Michael Heseltine, Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe. 
Their resignations attracted publicity because of their ferocious attacks on Thatcher’s policies. 
Howe’s resignation speech in November 1990 prompted a party leadership challenge that 
eventually forced Thatcher to resign. 
                                                 
1
 Winston Churchill was prime minister 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. 
2
 Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, first ed. 1997),  
p. 243. 
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The term ‘Thatcherism’ is directly related to Margaret Thatcher, although it has been 
defined in several ways. The article “Thatcherism and the Conservative Party” by Paul 
Whiteley et al is cited in two short texts below:  
 
Her approach has revolved around a number of themes – a belief in Britain’s greatness and the assertion 
of national interests, a prejudice against the public sector (at any rate in economic and industrial affairs), 
a backing for the police and the authorities in fighting terrorism and upholding law and order, a strong 
dislike of trade unions, a general commitment to the virtues of sound money, a preference for wealth 
creators over civil servants and commentators, and a support for the rights of the individuals to make 
their own provision for education and health.3  
 
The quote illustrates Thatcher’s ideas and values that dominated her political view and 
policies. Thatcherism can be seen as a mixture of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism; in 
other words it has many of the same characteristics as ‘The New Right’4. The successes of the 
Thatcher governments are debatable, which the next quote by Whiteley et al. illustrates: 
 
The success of Thatcherism can be explained in factors which lie outside the theoretical concerns of 
spatial models of party competition, such as the weakened Labour party; the importance of leadership 
styles, particularly the appearance of decisiveness and conviction; and to a certain amount of good 
fortune, exemplified by the ‘Falklands factor’. Her final election victory as Prime Minister in 1987 was 
considerably aided by a pre-election manipulation of the macroeconomy.5  
 
Politicians and scientists of today in the UK still discuss Thatcherism and what impact 
Margaret Thatcher had and still has on British politics today. Some claim that New Labour 
has adopted many policies that Thatcher introduced, so that Thatcherism still is in operation to 
a certain degree, at least, in the policies that Tony Blair and now Gordon Brown advocates.6  
Another claim is that John Major, Thatcher’s successor, was a better Thatcherite than 
Margaret Thatcher herself ever was. The claim will be commented upon later.  
 From November 1990 she continued travelling overseas a lot – her popularity was still 
very high and she was giving lectures and speeches in the US, in several Asian countries and 
former East-bloc countries. Newspapers and TV broadcasts gave her extensive coverage, and 
her biting criticism echoed in the UK, wherever she travelled on the globe.  
Shortly after her resignation Thatcher was very busy holding speeches all over the 
world and managed to write two comprehensive volumes of memoirs within five years. Her 
third book Statecraft was published in 2002. All her books attracted a lot of publicity when 
                                                 
3
 Paul F. Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, Jeremy Richardson and Paul Bissell,”Thatcherism and the Conservative Party” 
in Political Studies, (1994), XLII, p. 195.  
4
 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. First 
published 1989), p. 96. 
5
 Whiteley et al, “Thatcherism and the Conservative Party”, p. 202.  
6
 Richard Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave, 2001, first ed. 2000); Simon Jenkins, Thatcher & Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts (London: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 2007, first publ. 2006). 
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they were launched. Thatcher continued to represent her Finchley constituency until summer 
1992, when she accepted a peerage and took a seat in the House of Lords. She participated in 
some debates and occasionally gave speeches there. There were frequent newspaper reports 
about her during the years since her resignation, and it seems that she managed to set the 
agenda through her often indignant or abrasive utterances.  
Many organizations that shared her views about the EU or had a more general 
‘Thatcherite’ ideology presented her with honorary offices. These organizations constituted a 
network of people with a political ambition to influence the general public as well as 
politicians and the media. Given her status as former world leader and her personality, it was 
to be expected that she wanted to continue to influence politics, even without the formal role 
as prime minister. After 15 years as leader of the Conservative Party and 11 years as prime 
minister, she enjoyed an extensive network of politicians, former and present state leaders, 
prominent leaders in various political organizations in addition to right-wing journalists and 
newspaper proprietors. These people shared the same political views and associated with each 
other, at least to a certain degree.  
The broad spectrum of political activities that Thatcher undertook since 1990 has been 
studied to some extent in this dissertation. The research question which will be analyzed is: 
To what extent – and through what channels – did Margaret Thatcher influence the course 
of British politics in the twelve years following her resignation as Prime minister in 1990? 
The role of a former premier is not easy to define, or in some cases, to shape. The 
theme was briefly discussed by Kevin Theakston in his article “After Number Ten: What Do 
Former Prime ministers Do?” Thatcher’s predecessor Edward Heath was bitter and launched 
attacks on Thatcher’s policies in the House of Commons. A few former prime ministers have 
continued their political life in a less prominent position as an MP or a peer in the House of 
Lords. When Thatcher resigned as prime minister, she had to return to her seat as an MP and 
backbencher, since she was not invited to sit in John Major’s cabinet. Theakston said: 
‘Thatcher was also unable of unwilling to play the role of the dignified, supportive, loyal-but-
worried elder stateswoman, exercising occasional influence.’7 She had been in politics for so 
long, and she did not intend to occupy herself with anything else. Theakston also stated: 
‘Most ex-PMs seem to mellow with age, but as she got older, she actually got more 
                                                 
7
 Kevin Theakston, ”After Number Ten: What Do Former Prime ministers Do?” in Political Quarterly, Vol. 77, 
4, p. 449 (2006). 
 8 
ideologically radical and fundamentalist, playing a destabilising role in her party.’8 It seems 
that Thatcher wanted to pursue her political goals almost at all costs.  
Several areas regarding British politics during the last two decades are interesting to 
examine closely. One area is the history of the Conservative Party, and why the party 
experienced such a defeat in the 1997 general election, after having been in power since 1979. 
Another area of study is party leadership; from John Major to William Hague, Iain Duncan 
Smith, Michael Howard to the present leader David Cameron. A third area is the party’s near 
division over Europe. The reasons for the party’s seemingly preoccupation with the European 
Union (EU) including the contentious issues of a single currency and referendum are 
presumably many.9 Another field to examine is how Margaret Thatcher attempted to continue 
her political life in the limelight without having the formal function as prime minister.10 These 
themes seem to be intrinsically connected.  
The research question has led to the establishment of three different hypotheses which 
provide a backdrop for the empirical analysis. Hypothesis number one is that Margaret 
Thatcher influenced the Conservative Party in general and the parliamentary Conservative 
Party both directly and indirectly. The term ‘influence’ is discussed together with other key 
concepts and obviously these concepts are important to clarify. Leach, Coxall and Robins 
have interpreted the meaning of ‘influence’ to include the tacit or subtle ways of persuading 
people in order to shape their views in addition to the vocal and explicit form of persuasion.11  
It is vital to establish what constitutes the Conservative Party in Britain in order to 
discuss potential influence within the party as well as on the party. In the House of Commons 
the party leader plays an important role, especially when the party is in power. This 
dissertation attempts to prove how Margaret Thatcher contributed to change her successor’s 
policies in the House of Commons to become more Eurosceptical. Further, the thesis attempts 
to prove that Major was influenced indirectly by frequent attacks on his authority and 
decisions. The backbenchers were also presumably influenced by Thatcher to display 
disloyalty to the party and the party leader, which resulted in many rebellions against the 
government in important debates. This study attempts to prove Thatcher’s influence on the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 The European Economic Community (EEC) changed its name to the European Community (EC) in 1965 and 
again to the European Union (EU) on 1 November 1993. In order to simplify matters, the EU generally used 
whenever the EC or the EU is discussed, although this is strictly not correct.  
10
 As a general rule in this dissertation, all titles describing party functions are not written in capital letters. 
Hence: party leader, chairman, prime minister, chancellor, and secretary of state.  
11
 Leach, Coxall and Robins, British Politics, p. 5. See also ch.2 in this dissertation.  
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party programme and also how the annual party conference was influenced by her presence. 
Controversial statements may also have induced the party to policy changes.  
Since Thatcher was very active outside Parliament after her resignation, a substantial 
study had to include other areas where political debates took place. She obviously attracted a 
lot of media attention whenever she travelled and gave speeches worldwide. This leads to 
hypothesis number two: Margaret Thatcher influenced public opinion through her public 
appearances, books and articles. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that public 
opinion is the opinion that is expressed publicly – it is the voice of the people. Arguably in a 
representative democracy the elected representatives in Parliament express the political views 
of the citizens of the country. The politicians make decisions on behalf of the voters. The 
electorate is entitled to express their opinion publicly, as participants in an open debate. 
Public opinion can be voiced through various channels, for instance in elections, in mass 
media or at public meetings. In this dissertation an event such as the annual Conservative 
party conference is regarded as public. It might be a contentious claim that public opinion is 
expressed by people who are not elected politicians. In this dissertation, however, this 
distinction is practical, although it is disputable. If a politician participates in for instance a 
televised debate, she arguably does so to influence public opinion. 
 Ideas and ideology can constitute an important part in public debate in addition to 
party manifestos. Andrew Geddes claims:  
 
… ideas about the nation, the state and sovereign authority mattered intensely and were particularly 
evident in the period between Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988 and the June 1995 leadership 
challenge to John Major, after which the Conservative government entered a period of stasis prior to 
their ejection from office in 1997. During this period government policy toward the EU remained fairly 
consistent with what had gone before. What changed were the tone and rhetoric with the emergence of a 
Eurosceptic critique. Ideas and the use made of them mattered.12 
 
Since Thatcher’s Bruges Speech in 1988, ideas and ideology apparently became more 
important in the Conservative Party, at least for the Eurosceptic MPs. Jim Buller discusses the 
impact of the EU-question in Britain in his book National Statecraft and European 
Integration.13 Currently there are discussions going on regarding the Europeanization of 
British institutions, and how the debates about further integration in the EU have affected 
Britain. It is a well established fact that these issues dominated the Conservative Party during 
                                                 
12
 Andrew Geddes, “Europe” in Kevin Hickson, ed., The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 114. 
13
 Jim Buller, National Statecraft and European Integration: The Conservative Government and the European 
Union, 1979-1997 (London and New York: Pinter. A Continuum Imprint, 2000), p. 2. 
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most of the 1990s. Jim Buller emphasizes the need to clarify what institutions were affected, 
and he quotes researchers P. Hall and R. Taylor:  
 
According to ‘New Institutionalism’, analysis of institutions encompasses more than dry, old 
constitutional studies of various organs of the state under review. Instead, this approach has increasingly 
called for the study of: ‘informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy.14 
 
These discussions are relevant, but too comprehensive to be given a full analysis in this 
dissertation. The issues that Thatcher sought to discuss after her resignation, for instance a 
single currency or the Maastricht Treaty, did have an effect on the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords. The second hypothesis assumes that political influence can be exercised 
in several ways outside the traditional policy-making institutions outside Parliament. This 
idea leads to other potential areas of influence. Jim Buller quotes Jim Bulpitt when he 
describes ‘the Court’. This is defined to be the ‘the formal chief executive plus his/her 
political friends and advisers.’15 ‘The Court’ are acknowledged to be the most influential 
people governing Britain, in other words the prime minister and his/her cabinet in addition to 
the unelected advisers. The influential advisers can be academics or members of think-tanks 
and other groups.  
Jim Buller has indirectly inspired the last hypothesis in this dissertation. The third 
hypothesis is: Margaret Thatcher’s indirect influence of right-wing think-tanks and 
Conservative or Eurosceptic organizations contributed to increased Euroscepticism in Britain 
in the 1990s. There were a huge amount of different right-wing think-tanks and organizations 
that fought against the Maastricht Treaty, the single currency or for a referendum in the 
1990s. In addition there were single-issue parties, like the Referendum Party and the UK 
Independence Party. Some of these organizations were explicitly Thatcherite or Eurosceptic. 
Thatcher and other Eurosceptic politicians in Parliament were members of several think-tanks 
or groups at the same time, which gave them an enhanced opportunity to benefit from a 
resourceful network of likeminded people with the expressed goal of influencing politicians 
and the electorate. Dennis Kavanagh discusses right-wing think-tanks in his book The 
Reordering of British Politics: Politics After Thatcher. He mentions a few names: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute and Centre for Policy Studies. It is quite possible 
that his examples better support his ideas about the right-wing think-tanks than the 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Thatcherite and Eurosceptic groups that have been studied in this dissertation. However, he 
claims that the functions of the right-wing think-tanks are: 
 
 
1. Influencing the climate of opinion. 
2. Reinforcing the instincts, values, and policy agendas of politicians. 
3. Supplying a vocabulary for politicians. 
4. Providing networks and mutual support. 
5. Flying kites. 
6. Supplying a take-off for a career in politics and government.16 
 
 
These functions will naturally vary with the different group, but they might be true for most 
think-tanks in general. The fourth function listed here is especially interesting in this 
dissertation. Kavanagh’s quotes Graham Mather, an interviewee, when he discusses his claim 
about networks. Kavanagh says:  
 
The offices of the groups are located within a few square miles of each other in Westminister, close to 
Parliament, Whitehall, and Conservative Central Office. Regular lunches, seminars, and other social 
gatherings provide social and intellectual support for participants. …Some of the key think-tank figures 
were appointed in Whitehall as advisers and were able to provide a direct input to policy. There has 
been a remarkable degree of overlap in the memberships of the boards and study groups and authors of 
the pamphlets of the various think-tanks.  The close links between the activists have helped to develop 
what has been called ‘a free enterprise solar system’.17  
 
 
The activities that take place in the networks of think-tank employees are not easy for 
outsiders to observe. If people socialize with each other, it is conceivable that they have an 
opportunity to influence each other politically as well. Politicians who are related to different 
political organizations or think-tanks are presumably very interested to discuss political issues 
with others, although they do not necessarily only occupy themselves with serious political 
exchanges.  
 One issue that has become prominent for right-wing think-tanks in the 1990s is 
Europe, according to Kavanagh.18 Presumably their New-Right ideology clashes with the 
ideas behind the increased pressure for integration of the European Union members. Several 
conservative newspapers also supported the resistance to further integration within the EU. It 
can be claimed that the combined efforts of the Thatcherite groups and Eurosceptic editors 
and journalists gave them a substantial possibility to influence policy-making. This was some 
                                                 
16
 Dennis Kavanagh, The Reordering of British Politics: Politics After Thatcher (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp.160-163. 
17
 Ibid., p. 162. 
18
 Ibid., p. 167. 
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background to explain the research question and discuss the three hypotheses. The next part 
discusses the sources that have been studied. 
 
  
1.2 Sources 
 
There is a multitude of books written about Margaret Thatcher and her years in government, 
as well as about Thatcherism and the Thatcher legacy. Apparently few political scientists have 
attempted to study the broad range of Thatcher’s political influence since 1990. The following 
authors have written about Thatcher’s contribution to British politics after she resigned to a 
smaller or larger degree: Hugo Young in This Blessed Plot, Anthony Seldon in Major: A 
Political Life, John Campbell in Margaret Thatcher. Volume Two: The Iron Lady, John 
Sergeant in Maggie: Her Fatal Legacy, Dennis Kavanagh in The Reordering of British 
Politics, Norman Fowler in A Political Suicide and Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon’s edited 
book Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867. These authors and 
books are discussed in some detail below.  
The mentioned authors have different backgrounds and different motivations for 
writing about Margaret Thatcher. Hugo Young and John Sergeant are political journalists and 
as such might be inclined to write somewhat biased, often in a critical way, but not 
necessarily objectively. On the other hand, their observations can provide helpful analyses 
especially when seen together with a variety of other sources. Their books might offer 
credibility and verification alongside the more academic analyses, if they are used critically. 
Norman Fowler was a member of Thatcher’s government from 1979 and served in her 
cabinet from 1981 to 1990. He was also a chairman of the Conservative Party 1992-1994. The 
title A Political Suicide suggests that his opinion about the party is somewhat biased, and that 
he has a possible political agenda when he uses this title. On the other hand, his experience as 
a secretary of state and party chairman is quite unique and his book is very interesting because 
he has worked so many years close to Thatcher.  
John Campbell is a political biographer, whereas Anthony Seldon and Dennis 
Kavanagh are presumably more objective in their analyses with their background as political 
scientist and scholar/historian. These authors have apparently spent a considerable amount of 
time doing thorough research, based on the number of extensive list of references. Campbell 
and Seldon present some information about Thatcher’s political life after her resignation, and 
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they both have critical remarks about her. However, they also try to balance this in giving 
credit to Thatcher’s achievements. Seldon’s main focus is John Major’s life in politics, and 
more than four fifths of the book deals with the time after 1990. Thatcher is one of several 
people who influenced Major’s government negatively, and she played a very important part 
from 1990 to 1997. Campbell’s book is devoted primarily to Thatcher’s premiership. The last 
chapter is about Thatcher after her resignation.19  
There are numerous books and articles that discuss the European issue, the 
deliberations over the Maastricht Treaty and the single currency in particular seen in relation 
to British institutions. Here Thatcher is mentioned occasionally, but the focus is primarily on 
the Conservative Party and cabinet ministers and how the different issues have been debated. 
Primary sources for this dissertation were Thatcher’s books and speeches, in addition to John 
Major’s autobiography.20 During the years 1990-2002 she held nearly 150 speeches, so 
naturally a selection had to be made. The Thatcher Foundation has publishe all Thatcher’s 
speeches that she gave and public statements that she made on the Internet. They have been 
categorised, presumably by Margaret Thatcher herself, as minor, major and key speeches. 
This study has focused on four of the 13 key speeches. In addition has the election rally 
speech in 2001 been included because of the publicity it attracted both before and after it was 
held. Three articles written by Thatcher that were published in newspapers and magazines 
have also been studied. Thatcher did not write a lot of articles, but these three are presumably 
those which led to most debate both in the Conservative Party and in the parliamentary 
Conservative Party.  
 It has not proven difficult to find secondary sources about Margaret Thatcher and the 
Conservative Party in general in addition to the ones already mentioned. The challenge was to 
find reliable sources regarding the third hypothesis regarding the think-tanks and 
Conservative organizations. The third hypothesis is based on the assumption that the different 
Eurosceptic and Thatcherite groups had overlapping memberships, and that several prominent 
Conservative MPs and peers supportive of Thatcher’s Eurosceptic ideas were influential in 
more than one of these groups simultaneously. Consequently, it has been important to 
establish the membership from the 1990s and later.  
In some cases the only available source about a certain group has been published by 
Wikipedia, which is not a totally reliable source for scientific research. However, when 
                                                 
19
 Chapter 18, ”Afterlife”, consists of about 50 pages. 
20
 Thatcher wrote three books after her resignation: The Downing Street Years (1993), The Path to Power (1995) 
and Statecraft (2002).  Major’s autobiography was published in 1999.  
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prominent politicians are identified as members or supporters of a legitimate policy 
community, presumably this information will quickly be corrected if it is found untrue by 
Wikipedia users, since it is a very popular source of information and measures have been  
introduced to ensure the validity of the information that is published. Some of the Thatcherite 
groups or think-tanks have published their own pages on the internet, which supposedly make 
them more trustworthy or reliable. Even so, it has been difficult to establish the exact date for 
the publication and author of a booklet or paper which has been published by the group (this 
is the case for the Bruges Group, for instance, relating to papers produced in the 1990s).  
In other cases, the odd member of a group is mentioned by one author or the other – 
very seldom do authors produce lists that include all the members of a political group or 
organization. The exception is the ‘Fresh Start’ group which has been listed in Teresa 
Gorman’s Bastards. Some books have included lists of all the party rebels voting against the 
government in the Maastricht debates, although these lists may not be identical to the 
membership of the ‘Fresh Start’ group. Many Eurosceptic supporters of the Fresh Start groups 
were forced to vote for the government by the whips or did so for a number of other reasons.21 
Thus, the number of rebels in any given vote would probably consist of fewer people than the 
total number of ‘Fresh Start’ sympathizers.    
The sources which have been used in the research are basically books and articles 
published in newspapers and periodicals. Two particular libraries have briefly been visited in 
order to find material. The Conservative Party Archives at the Bodleian Library in Oxford 
hold leaflets and brochures that are not available anywhere else, issued by the Conservative 
Central Office (CCO), the Conservative Political Centre (CPC) and the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) among others. The Newspaper Collections of the British Library situated at 
Colindale in North-London gives the researcher an opportunity to acquire a fairly detailed 
account of what went on in political life in the 1990s and later. Generally, the great majority 
of sources used for the study in this dissertation are not from Wikipedia, but rather more 
reliable sources written by acknowledged scholars and commentators. 
 
1.3: Political science research and qualitative method 
 
                                                 
21
 David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Steve Ludlam, and David Seawright,  ”Backbenchers with Attitude:  A 
Seismic Study of the Conservative Party and Dissent on Europe” in  Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and 
Richard S Katz, eds., Party Discipline and parliamentary Government (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1999), p. 76.  
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This dissertation has studied a broad spectrum of the British society over a period from 1990 
to 2002, which is when Thatcher declared that she would not be able give any public 
performances due to bad health. Areas of study include the British political system and the 
Conservative Party, as well as Britain’s relationship to the EU during the 1990s, therefore no 
policy area can be said to have been studied in great detail. The premiership of John Major 
was very important, but also the Conservative party leaders William Hague, Iain Duncan 
Smith and Thatcher’s potential influence on them has been studied. Contemporary history and 
analyses of political development during the last two decades also constitute a part of the 
literature that has been studied.  
 Interviews or surveys could have provided very useful sources of information. 
Margaret Thatcher herself is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, so she is probably not able 
to discuss her political past activities at the time of writing. John Major and his successors as 
party chairman would have been very interesting sources to interview, as they presumably 
have firsthand experience regarding the former premier and her attempts to influence British 
politics. Other prominent Conservative politicians would naturally also have been valuable 
sources to interview. 
 Historians or political scientists studying Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative 
Party since 1990 have produced a considerable amount of articles and books. Historian E. H. 
Carr quoted Lytton Strachey in an article and said: ‘… ignorance is the first requisite of the 
historian, ignorance which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits.’22 This is hard to 
accomplish when there is a lot of material available about a certain topic. According to 
Charles R. Ragin one of the social research goals is to assess significance of empirical 
findings.23 This implies that the conclusions will be incorrect if the data are of insufficient 
quality, have been wrongly interpreted or do not tap the theoretical concepts which they are 
supposed to measure. The more complex an issue is, the harder it is to carry out objective 
research. Ragin also states that the qualitative method should focus on a limited number of 
cases in order to acquire an in-depth study.24 The study of Margaret Thatcher is undoubtedly 
only one case; on the other hand the number of different instances when she tried to influence 
British politics is high. Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon pinpoint the problems that the 
study of recent history entails in their book The Major Effect. They say:  
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The writing of contemporary history labours under certain handicaps. These include lack of access to 
key documents, over-reliance on oral sources, a dearth of published literature and lack of perspective: 
only with the passage of time can the consequences of events be fully assessed.25  
 
 
The aim of the dissertation is to find out where Thatcher exerted influence and whether she 
was successful in influencing British politics. The issue of Euroscepticism in relation to 
Britain has been the theme for a number of books published in later years. If the field of study 
was narrowed down to one issue only, it might have produced more clear-cut conclusions. Jim 
Buller discusses the problems related to doing research on ‘a subject with a broad analytical 
focus’. He refers to Jim Bulpitt in this discussion, and Buller says:  
 
One immediate problem was that this type of analysis required a little knowledge about a lot. At the 
same time, it demanded some conception of how the various parts of this system were related and how 
these relations changed over time. When it is remembered that macro-analysis also necessitated that 
attention be paid to the external dimension, the need for theoretical parsimony became self-evident.26  
 
This dissertation is intended to give an overview of different policy fields where Margaret 
Thatcher exerted her influence. The study should also reveal some of the consequences of 
Thatcher’s political influence on the Conservative Party, on Parliament, and on public 
opinion; although the scope of the discussions has to be rather limited with such a broad 
analysis.  
1.4: Outline of dissertation 
 
The three hypotheses are dealt with in three separate chapters. It is however, vital to discuss 
key concepts that are used in the dissertation question and related terms; for instance 
‘politics’, ‘influence’, ‘democracy’ and ‘power’. Included in the second chapter is also a brief 
look at the Conservative Party, the functions of the backbenchers and the party leader, since 
these functions are important in later discussions.  
Chapter 3 is about Margaret Thatcher and her influence on the Conservative Party as 
well as in Parliament. Since her Bruges Speech in 1988, Thatcher had voiced her strong 
opposition to further European integration within the European Union. Britain had signed the 
Single European Act in 1985, but apparently Thatcher did not realize the implications of the 
stated aims for political as well as economic integration then. Before the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed in December 1991 by all the EU members, Thatcher protested against it in the 
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House of Commons. She was joined in her vociferous attacks on the treaty during the 
ratification process that took more than one and a half years by likeminded politicians. The 
Conservative government had great difficulty in getting the treaty through both houses in 
Parliament, and the Conservative backbenchers rebelled several times and voted against their 
own government. Wincott, Buller and Hay wrote in an article about Thatcher: ‘… her hostility 
(and the conflict with Major) deepened in her maiden speech to the Lords on 2 July.’27 Even 
though many voters did not find the issue of the EU of major importance, it gained 
momentum in the House of Commons. Wincott, Buller and Hay stated: ‘Where the rebels 
have had some impact is on changing the terms of political discussion, influencing the views 
of the Party and dragging the leadership along behind them.’28 Thatcher encouraged and 
supported the Tory rebels, and they continued until the general election in 1997 to attack John 
Major and his government. She also voiced her support for the leadership candidates in the 
following two leadership contests, and contributed to negative publicity on party conferences 
and rallies. 
Chapter 4 is about Thatcher’s activities outside Parliament and is related to several 
things: Speeches, books, articles and television interviews as well as newspaper reports. In 
order to narrow down the extent of material, only a limited number of speeches and articles 
were selected for a closer scrutiny. Thatcher’s books are very important. The Downing Street 
Years and The Path to Power are not only memoirs, but they also include Thatcher’s 
reflections on the current political situation mixed with harsh criticism. The third book 
Statecraft was Thatcher’s commentary on a few chosen topics. It sums up her experience as 
statesman. The chapter focuses on how Thatcher’s appearances affected public opinion and 
the Conservative Party. 
 Chapter 5 looks at several Thatcherite organizations and think-tanks that Margaret 
Thatcher had an indirect influence on. The chapter also takes a very brief look at the right-
wing conservative newspapers during the 1990s and how they might have provided a 
sounding-board for Margaret Thatcher because of the proprietors’ increasing Eurosceptic 
attitude.  
Finally, the concluding chapter sums up the empirical data gathered and evaluates 
whether the evidence can be said to prove the research question. 
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Chapter 2: 
British politics and political influence in general 
 
 
This dissertation is about how Margaret Thatcher tried to influence politics since her 
resignation in 1990. It is essential to clarify some key concepts before examining how the 
former prime minister continued her political influence in Parliament and elsewhere. This 
chapter is a more general discussion of the terms politics and influence seen in relation to the 
British political system today. 
2.1: What is politics? 
 
Britain is a ‘developed’ country with a complex structure for how society is organized with 
political institutions on many levels to govern. Most people agree that they have to pay tax on 
their income in order to solve different certain important tasks that they need to co-operate on: 
taking care of the sick and the elderly, providing schools, transport systems, to provide law 
and order and many more. The task of the politicians is to decide how the generated revenue 
is to be spent for the benefit of all the inhabitants in the country. There are lots of different 
definitions of the term politics, and many can be worthwhile and true. In this text three 
different definitions are discussed in some detail.  
Leach, Coxall and Robins defined a lot of key concepts in their book British Politics.29 
They say that politics is ‘about choosing between alternatives’.30 They claim that the scope of 
politics has to do with the state, whereas the civil society has to do with a person’s private 
life.  
Another definition of politics has been introduced by the Norwegian political scientist 
Øyvind Østerud, which is rendered in Politics and Democracy. Østerud’s definition is: 
‘Politics includes all activity which is related to public decision-making.’31 According to 
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Østerud, this definition acknowledges that those who govern the country are influenced by the 
electorate in elections, by mass media, by political actions and demonstrations, by different 
political organizations and much more. In other words, the things which are conducive to 
form and change people’s opinion, also contribute to the political policy-making. Feedback 
from the electorate plays an important role for the policy output.  
Political parties compete before an election for the power to govern the country. 
Leach, Coxall and Robins define ‘power’ as ‘the capacity to achieve desired goals’32. 
Dedicated politicians probably regard power as the ultimate aim for their party with the 
chance to improve society and to decide what aspects of society they want to give preference 
to. In a democracy, power in itself is not the only important criterion in order to get something 
done. Another criterion is that a person needs to be recognized as having the right to govern – 
in other words, he needs authority. Leach, Coxall and Robins define ‘authority’ as ‘the 
rightful or legitimate use of power’33. This concept is of great importance to a political leader 
of a party, and especially if the party has got the plurality of votes in the ‘first past the post’-
system in a general election in Britain. The leader must have the authority to lead, otherwise it 
becomes very difficult or near impossible. The concept ‘legal-rational authority’ is described 
as authority which is based on formal rules, as opposed to the other main types of authority in 
Max Weber’s vocabulary; which are described as traditional and charismatic authority.34  
Sandkjær Hanssen, Helgesen and Vabo discuss the different dimensions of power, 
based on the work of Steven Lukes. They talk about ‘visible power’, ‘agenda-setting power’ 
and ‘strucural power’. Visible power is the easiest to observe and acknowledge, and is often 
related to certain jobs or functions. Agenda-setting power is exercised by actors in society that 
have the choice of what to highlight or discuss in public. 35 The role of mass media is here 
very crucial. People in general are not aware that journalists in radio and television have 
chosen what kind of news they present, what perspective they chose and what they have 
chosen not to say or discuss. Some newspapers are openly biased, whereas others presumably 
are neutral when it comes to party-political issues. Even the so-called party-political neutral 
papers can have a particular slant in their presentations, for instance due to the proprietor of 
the paper. The agenda-setting power is exercised by other ‘operators’ as well. Structural 
power is exercised in many ways, in the political institutions, in our physical surroundings, 
and also through our ideology and ideas that shape our conceptions about morality or 
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society.36 Our ideology influences how people interact with each other and also shape our 
public institutions.  
A very short definition of power is: ‘The ability to make people (or things) do what 
they would not otherwise have done.’37 Lincoln Allison in Oxford Concise Dictionary of 
Politics also says: ‘Power is often classified into five principal forms: force, persuasion, 
authority, coercion and manipulation.’38 These forms include politicians’ power as well as any 
individual’s potential power that can be exercised in personal interaction with one or several 
individuals.  
 Leach, Coxall and Robins see authority and power closely related to the term influence 
and state: ‘Influence involves the ability to shape a decision or outcome through various 
forms of pressure.’39 They also add: ‘influence suggests the ability to shape outcomes 
indirectly, to exert pressure on those who are taking the decisions, persuading them to change 
their opinion and behaviour.’40 In other words, people who exert influence do not necessarily 
have the legitimate power to do so – they do not have the authority to initiate any action, but 
still they are able to contribute to the decision taken by the legitimate person or party in 
charge. Two examples that are described in later chapters can be mentioned here. In the years 
after her resignation as premier, Margaret Thatcher exerted influence on MPs in the House of 
Commons, by trying to persuade them to vote against the government. This happened after 
Thatcher had accepted her peerage in the House of Lords. An even better example is perhaps 
that Margaret Thatcher telephoned foreign secretary Douglas Hurd when she practically 
demanded that he should deploy British troops in Bosnia in the early 1990s. She no longer 
formally had any power to do this, but nevertheless acted as if she still had. 
Hanssen, Helgesen and Vabo talk about two dimensions of politics in their recently 
published Norwegian book called Politikk og Demokrati (the translated title Politics and 
Democracy refers to this book in what follows). The first dimension is about deciding ‘how to 
share scarce goods and even out burdens’41. The second dimension has to do with values or 
priorities.42 You can discuss what kind of welfare the state should offer for its inhabitants, or 
also what values should dominate the state-initiated services. This has been a theme for 
discussion in recent years in many countries, especially since the financial crisis that 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
37
 Lincoln Allison, s.v. ‘power’ in Iain Mclean and Alistair Mcmillan, eds., Oxford Concise Dictionary of 
Politics, p. 425 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Leach, Coxall and Robins, British Politics, p. 5 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Hanssen, Helgesen and Vabo, Politikk og demokrati, p. 26.   
42
 Ibid., pp. 26-27   
 21 
developed in the US in 2008. This crisis had implications for most of the world’s countries to 
a larger or smaller degree, and the state’s role suddenly became pivotal to companies and 
citizens that were facing bankruptcy and ruin. In the aftermath of this financial crisis several 
issues have been raised in public discussions, for instance: Is it legitimate for the state to 
spend money (revenue) to save insolvent private companies? Why should some companies be 
singled out to get extra support when others are left to fend for themselves? Elected 
politicians have to handle the crisis and it is a long time since the governments in 
industrialized countries have experienced such deep-rooted problems on a similar scale. In 
Britain the number of unemployed people soared because companies were forced to cut their 
expenses and politicians were faced with demands for money and initiatives to create new 
jobs. 
It can be argued that the boundaries between the public and the private sphere are 
crumbling, and that many areas of society actually have a political aspect. One example 
illustrating this can be that consumers support the so-called Fairtrade companies that ensure 
that food and other products that are imported from other parts of the world are produced and 
manufactured with proper working conditions for people employed in those companies. 
Another example is that consumers consciously choose organic food that is produced without 
chemical pesticides or fertilizers. Customers who chose the more environmentally-friendly 
lifestyle can be said to exert some kind of political influence and they make a political 
statement if they buy certain products. 
 Another aspect of politics is to discuss how new ideas spread, or how people are 
influenced by political ideas. This was discussed in Dennis Kavanagh’s book The Reordering 
of British Politics, where he said:  
  
We do not know a great deal about how ideas germinate in the so-called policy communities of relevant 
officials, interest groups, and specialist commentators in a particular field, or how the climate of opinion 
influences decision-makers.43 
 
 
Kavanagh also referred to political scientist S. Finer and described how political influence is 
exerted through ideas. Here is a quote:  
 
These included irradiation, through personal contacts at salons and clubs, suscitation, or stirring public 
opinion through the press, Royal Commissions, and parliamentary select committees, and permeation, 
through the appointment of sympathizers to commissions and committees.44 
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Several of these possible channels for influence are discussed in later chapters. Many 
organizations work purposefully in order to convince people about specific issues. Several 
think-tanks and organizations were established in Britain in the early 1990s to avoid further 
integration within the EU. These are discussed in chapter 5. 
   
2.1.1: The British polity 
 
Politics and Democracy distinguishes between politics, polity and policies:  Politics has to do 
with the discussion or deliberation about what action is needed, polity includes the system 
itself; where people have agreed that political decisions take place, and the term policies 
includes the results of the political discussions – the agreed plan for action and the formal 
laws that are made.45 The British polity includes a variety of institutions and other meeting-
places for people to discuss politics and exert their influence. The British polity thus consists 
of different political parties and Parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords), 
local government with elected councillors, elected representatives to the European Parliament 
and national assemblies for Scotland and Wales as well as a wide range of political 
organizations and interest groups. In addition there are other influencing factors that do not 
have formal power to make political decisions, but all the same contribute to discussion like 
traditional mass media and the new media channels like the Internet with the expansive 
growth of chat groups, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and a myriad of similar online meeting 
places where people exchange views and influence each other. The traditional institutions 
have undergone big changes during the last decade, and the new forums for discussion 
transform the political landscape. 
If British voters strongly disagree with their elected representatives they can also take 
part in political demonstrations, as many people did in 2003 when Britain decided to join the 
US in a military attack on Iraq to destroy their alleged weapons of mass destruction and to 
overthrow President Saddam Hussein. Some people exert their influence by directly writing a 
letter or an e-mail to the local MP expressing their concern or opinion; others join an action 
group to support a cause or to protest against something. There have been repeated actions 
against fox-hunting or against mink farms on the grounds of animal cruelty. The traditional 
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political parties have seen a rapid decline in membership in the last two decades in Britain.46 
Party-initiated activity has been replaced with other types of political activity related to single 
issues that people engage in. Parties may find that voters no longer are willing to support them 
whole-heartedly, and that they have to adjust in order to attract voters’ attention. Political 
scientists talk about ‘new politics’ and ‘issue-voting’ which has replaced the traditional party 
politics and the tradition of voting for the same party for generations, which used to be the 
norm for most of the 20th century in Britain.47 Many people have established their own blog 
on the internet, and although this does not need to be political at all, it is also a channel for 
some to express their political view to others. 
 Political influence might also be exerted through informal network. Business leaders, 
members of different clubs and societies that are not explicitly political, can still be very 
influential even though their activities are hidden to the general public. A politically interested 
business man or woman who ventures into politics is presumably very attractive to any club 
or organization with a political agenda, because he knows his way in the system and is 
expected to be able to ‘pull some strings’ – in other words, use his influence in order to 
achieve something for the company that he would not otherwise have been able to do. 
Another concept that recently has been introduced is ‘multi-level governance’. This 
includes a variety of factors that contribute to policy-making in Britain today.48 There are 
many levels of governance and Parliament, think-tanks and mass media are included in this 
concept. 
 
 
2.1.2: The British parliamentary system and democracy  
 
The legal-rational authority in Britain is primarily exercised in Parliament. Britain is a 
democracy, which basically means that the inhabitants of the country have the right to decide 
who they want to govern the country, and that no-one can govern without people’s consent. 
Britain is also a monarchy, but the formal powers of the reigning Queen are reduced 
compared to the powers of kings and queens centuries ago. The Queen’s role is basically to be 
head of state and to summon the leader of the majority party after a general election in order 
to install a new government. A monarchy is in itself undemocratic, since the king or queen is 
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not elected by the people but inherits the throne. Formally the Queen appoints the prime 
minister and ministers in the new government, and she also has a formal role in signing new 
laws that are made by Parliament. Most people seem to be in favour of retaining the monarchy 
as an institution, even though some claim it to be an anachronism – an outdated model which 
does not fit in a modern democracy.  
 The political scientist Robert Dahl defined the term ‘democracy’ as ‘a political system 
one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely 
responsive to all citizens’49. His argument was that true democracy is hard to accomplish, and 
introduced the concept ‘polyarchy’, which is a modified version of a democracy. 
Dahl stated that polyarchies are ‘regimes that have been substantially popularised and 
liberalised, that is highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation’.50 In his book 
Dahl focused on the vast majority of different groups that are influential in the decision-
making in their claims to the politicians in a country like the United States. The politicians 
have to bargain with each other in order to agree on a policy. Elected representatives with 
formal power have to take into account the informal power of the un-elected groups and 
lobbyists in their policy making. The distinction between democracy and polyarchy is relevant 
in the discussion about political influence in Britain, and this is the theme for chapter 5, where 
different organizations and groups are looked at. 
 
2.1.3: Different democracy perspectives 
 
According to Sandkjær Hanssen, Helgesen and Vabo there are three main democracy 
perspectives, and they are: ‘competitive democracy’, ‘participant democracy’ and 
‘deliberative democracy’.51 Competitive democracy is found in a state where elites compete to 
govern the country, and the electorate votes for the party that they think is best fit to do so. 
Participant democracy involves the electorate to a larger degree. Voters increase their 
understanding and skills through participating in democratic processes. Before political 
decisions are made nationally a whole range of different actors are invited to take part in 
‘hearings’, where the effects of different policy alternatives are discussed. In a deliberative 
democracy policy-makers attempt to consider the minority’s views as well as the majority’s 
view. Traditionally, immigrants, poor, handicapped, and children have few elected politicians 
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who represent their views. Many do not engage in party politics and they tend to be 
‘forgotten’ in the elitist democracy, where the party who wins most votes represents the 
majority – and the majority of people are traditionally the most resourceful and are most 
likely to be heard in political debates. The deliberative democracy tries to make amends for 
the lack of representation in any legislative institutions.52  
2.1.4: The British Parliament  
 
The British Parliament consists of two different bodies: the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords in addition to the sovereign. There are 646 elected politicians in the House of 
Commons, and the House of Lords has 669 peers in all.53 Most of the policy-making takes 
place in the House of Commons, but the House of Lords has the power to veto a law or to 
suggest amendments to a law. Other functions are, according to Emma Crewe: ‘Holding the 
government to account, influencing policy, protecting the constitution and constituting the 
highest court of appeal’. The last function is now performed by twelve peers who are judges.54 
Tony Blair initiated a reform of the House of Lords in 1999 and the power and functions of 
the peers are still under some debate. Some want to abolish the House of Lords completely. 
The British electorate does not have a say in the election of the hereditary peers, so the House 
of Lords can be said to be fundamentally undemocratic.55 
 The House of Commons is part of the parliamentary state. David Judge claims: “The 
importance of Parliament does not derive therefore from its ‘powers’ but from the very 
process of representation and the legitimation of government and governmental outputs 
flowing from that process.”56 The elected politician represents the voters and their interests, 
and the rules ensure that the majority party has the right to govern. Consequently, if the leader 
of the majority party no longer has the confidence of the party’s representatives, he or she will 
have to resign. David Judge offers a quite nuanced definition of the concept ‘the 
parliamentary state’:  
 
What the parliamentary tradition in Britain has been concerned with is the transmission of opinion 
between ‘political nation’ and governors, the controlling of government to the extent that governmental 
actions require the consent of the representatives of that ‘nation’, and the legitimation of changes of 
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governors. These have been the essential characteristics of the British state and the reason why it 
warrants the title of ‘the parliamentary state’.57 
 
Judge accents the legitimation of change. Government must be legitimate in the electors’ 
eyes, and the representatives themselves must also stand the test of legitimacy within 
government. These are premises for the system of representative democracy.  
Jack Brand in his book British Parliamentary Parties: Policy and Power claims that 
there is a distinctive difference between the Conservative and the Labour Party when it comes 
to the deference enjoyed the party leaders. Brand argues that leaders of the Labour Party often 
have been met with a somewhat hostile attitude from Labour MPs when the party has been in 
power in the House of Commons, whereas the Conservative Party leader usually enjoys less 
disruptiveness and tends to avoid open confrontation with Conservative MPs in Parliament. 
Jack Brand’s observation does not seem to be valid if you examine House of Commons 
debates after the general election 1992. The alleged ‘assumption of consensus’ seems to have 
deserted the party since then. Jack Brand also states that ‘the potential for factionalism and 
open internal argument in the two parties is quite different.’58 Again, this seems to have 
changed during John Major’s governments especially from 1992 to 1997. This is the theme of 
chapter 3 in this dissertation.  
One important aspect of the House of Commons is the election and function of the 
select committees. An MP can opt for sitting in a committee that works with an issue that the 
MP has an interest in. Every department has its own select committee and the chairmanship is 
an elected position together with other functions, which you have to compete with others to 
get. A select committee is ‘a legislative committee which deliberates upon complex issues 
and/or scrutinizes the executive on issues broader than legislation’, according to Jonathan 
Bradbury in Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics.59 The committee’s composition reflects 
the strength of the different parties in the House of Commons, and it is supposedly non-
partisan. However, these committees have been influenced by the whips’ wishes to some 
degree, Bradbury argues. There have also been claims that MPs who have rebelled against the 
governing party are excluded from the select committees. There were 34 different select 
committees at work in the House of Commons in 2007.60 Select committees have quite a lot 
of influence on the policy-making because they define the premises for new laws to be 
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proposed or for old laws to be abolished. Already in 1958 W. Bagehot commented on the 
importance of the select committees, and said: ’The elective is now the most important 
function of the House of Commons.’61 The select committees seem to be of relatively high 
importance today, although their membership is not often a feature in media coverage.  
It is quite difficult to prove any attempt to influence policy-making, or ‘pressure group 
intervention,’ because it can be an informal conversation or a meeting in the lobby. Different 
sources might try to influence politics, and even though it is relatively easy to establish that a 
politician has changed his mind on a subject over time, it is a much more demanding task to 
decide why this happened. A rebellion against a government proposal is not necessarily the 
result of pressure group influence.62 Generally there are disparate factors at work 
simultaneously. Both MPs and possibly also peers receive a lot of attention from pressure 
groups representing different parts of the country. Jack Brand described in his book British 
Parliamentary Parties a study that highlighted attempts to influence backbenchers’ decisions 
from pressure groups from 1959 to 1990. The study was carried out by two scientists covering 
different time spans and apparently, in Brand’s words ‘… there is a relation, not only between 
pressure groups and departments, but also, on several occasions, between pressure groups and 
backbenchers.’63 Brand added:   
 
In 14 out of the 19 examples on the Conservative side, the interventions were successful. Working with 
MPs of the governing party seems to have been very worthwhile. Many of these cases concerned the 
National Farmers’ Union and the runner-up was the Confederation of British Industries.’64  
 
 
Apparently several pressure groups enjoyed access to politicians in Parliament also after 
Margaret Thatcher resigned. Thanks to the mandate of the different select committees, groups 
are invited to the House of Commons to present their views on different matters and thus take 
part in the policy-making by doing so. Parliamentary consultants represent many different 
interests, both firms and private organizations. This potential influence is examined in some 
detail in chapter 5. 
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2.2: Power in Britain: different perspectives and models 
 
The British polity and the different alternatives that exist for people to influence politics have 
been briefly discussed earlier. It is necessary to highlight a few other key concepts as well. 
The concepts ‘elite’, ‘the establishment’ or ‘the ruling class’ are used to describe people who 
have political power in Britain. Some claim that there is a fairly small number of people who 
actually have most authority to govern the country, in other words they constitute an elite. 
Even though Britain is a democratic country, there are relatively few who actually get the 
chance to involve themselves in government.65 The ‘establishment’ is a somewhat deprecating 
term about people with an affluent family back-ground and a superb education from one of 
the top universities who are seen to dominate most of the British governing institutions.66 This 
would probably also include civil servants that seldom are named in public discussions, who 
can be quite influential as well. Marxists talk about the ruling class, which is defined as 
people who have political power as well as money and property, in other words economic 
power. This category includes business leaders, directors of big corporations and companies. 
Marxists claim that people belonging to the working class are excluded from power because 
they are poor. Leach, Coxall and Robins claim that in a capitalist society the ruling class ‘is in 
a strong position to influence or condition the thinking of the subordinate classes, through for 
example the education system and the mass media’, seen from a Marxist perspective.67 
 British society changes over time as do the actors who have power. Journalist Anthony 
Sampson has studied the development in Britain from 1962 to 2004 regarding who has power. 
He found that the power seems to have been restricted for the previously powerful trade 
unions and former independent university teaching staff. Members of cabinet and civil 
servants also seem to have less influence, while the prime minister has become more 
powerful. Sampson thinks the role of the media has been enhanced over the years. This 
observation is not a scientific study, but it might still prove to be quite correct.68  
There are several models on British society today that take into account the influence 
of other actors than the formal institutions. The pluralist model looks at the importance of 
pressure groups. Pluralism is ‘a theory of society as several autonomous but interdependent 
groups’.69 Not only do you have many powerful actors, but they also rely on each other. The 
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neo-pluralist model emphasizes that even though power is distributed on several actors, some 
are more important than others. Business can for example represent a key interest with a lot of 
power.70 Democratic elitism is a third model which is a modification of the elite-term. 
According to this, the democratic perspective is safe-guarded because the different parties 
compete in elections, and the voters give the parties a mandate to govern on their behalf.71  
 Leach, Coxall and Robins claim that politicians that were associated with the New 
Right would emphasize the power of the free market and the individual’s power to choose, 
rather than the power of a collective group. Producers and consumers should have most power 
and the state as limited power as possible. Those who inspired the thoughts of the New Right 
in Britain were among others Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman.72 The 
free market ideology was important in Thatcher’s governments and led to for instance 
privatization of nationalised industries, tendering of public services to achieve better value for 
money and the pronounced aim of cutting taxes as well as reducing public spending.  
 The concepts that are used to describe a society depend on the political views, or 
ideology, of the person or scientist who studies it. 
2.3: Pressure groups and lobbying 
 
In the US professional lobbyists who represent hundreds of interest groups are recognized as 
both inevitable and somewhat problematic. If an interest group with strong financial backing 
actually wins political support for its case, you can discuss whether this is fair to the other 
interested parties or groups who are not so financially strong – in other words whether it is 
democratic.73 Kernell and Jacobson in The Logic of American Politics discuss the claim that 
‘successful lobbying subverts the basic principles of democratic equality and majority rule.’74 
Britain has had pressure groups for a long time, and David Judge claims that their importance 
was ‘rediscovered’ in the 1950s. Even so, in Judge’s opinion, pressure groups’ influence on 
Parliament have not been properly been taken into account in discussions about pluralism 
during the last decades. 75  
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Political scientist S. E. Finer talked about the ‘law of inverse proportion’ that could be 
used to describe an escalating level of co-operation between different public and private 
interests in the 1950s.76 Some groups had access to civil servants in Whitehall and worked out 
secret deals for the benefit of these groups. Groups that sustained a unique relationship with 
the bureaucrats did not have to go through the elected politicians in order to be successful.  
Another scientist, Keith Middlemas, described the ‘corporate bias’ that existed 
between politicians, trade unions and employers’ associations in 1979. These lobby groups 
became very closely linked to the government and took on a new role as ‘governing 
institutions’.77 Then during the governments of Margaret Thatcher corporatism was phased 
out for the benefit of an enhanced role of Parliament. The importance of the trade unions and 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) was reduced during the 1980s.  
Judge refers to teachers and doctors who were organized in their respective policy 
communities that failed to be heard by the Tory politicians in the 1980s under Thatcher. 
These policy communities tried to organize petitions, rallied in the lobby of the House of 
Commons and wrote letters, all to no avail. Presumably several policy communities have had 
quite a considerable political influence in Britain, especially since 1990. Some of these 
communities have been organized outside Parliament, with a parallel group in the House of 
Commons. Other groups were extra-parliamentary, but were still dominated to a large degree 
by former and present politicians (MPs and peers alike). Their main aim has been to have a 
political influence directly on the House of Commons.  
 
 
2.4: The Conservative Party 
2.4.1: The Conservative Party leader 
 
The leader of the Conservative Party does have a very influential role when it comes to 
leading the party and deciding its policies. When the party is in majority, the party leader 
appoints the members of his cabinet as well as the party chairman, who is in charge of the 
Conservative Central Office and the Advisory Committee on Policy, which has monthly 
meetings. This constitutes the party ‘head-quarters’. When the party is in opposition, the party 
leader appoints the shadow cabinet (also called the leader’s consultative committee). Jack 
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Brand says: ‘Among the Conservatives, the Leader is the fount of policy.’ 78 William Hague 
(party leader 1997-2001) introduced a reform which gave the party members some more 
power when it comes to party leader elections. Since 2001 the extra-parliamentary party has 
had a say when the number of proposed contestants had been narrowed down to two 
candidates,79 wherea previously the leader was elected by MPs only. Jack Brand claims that 
the Conservative Party tends to treat its leader with more respect than the Labour Party. ‘The 
crucial difference between the parties seems to be the greater stability of loyal support for its 
leaders on the Tory side,’ Brand claims.80 Recent parliamentary history might prove that this 
has changed during the last two decades.  
 
2.4.2: The role of the backbenchers and the party whips 
 
Two other aspects need some scrutiny as well when it comes to the Conservative Party: The 
role of the backbenchers and the Conservative peers. When the party is the governing party, 
the MPs on the front benches in the House of Commons constitute the government, including 
the members of cabinet. The backbenchers constitute the 1922 Committee, which also is in 
charge of the party whips. When the party is in opposition, all Conservative MPs except the 
party leader belong to the 1922 Committee. When the Conservative Party is in charge, the role 
of the whips is especially important. The 14 party whips have to try to secure that government 
proposals acquire the majority of votes in the House of Commons, and they produce a weekly 
document where they indicate the importance of the different divisions that MPs have to 
participate in. A three-line whip is the most important and then MPs are expected to be there 
and cast their votes, preferably to support the government if the Conservative Party has 
initiated the proposition. David Judge says about the 1922 Committee:  
 
It has developed into a relatively sophisticated conduit for the articulation and transmission of 
information between backbenchers and party leadership, as well as an incisive surgical instrument for 
amputating the careers of those leaders whose policy programmes fail to secure, or threaten, electoral 
support.81 
 
In other words, a party leader depends on the support from the backbenchers. The 1922 
Committee is crucial in its role of mediator between the front-benchers and backbenchers. No 
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leader will survive any prolonged dispute with the backbenchers. The whips have traditionally 
been rumoured to also play a crucial role for the future careers of the backbenchers. Those 
MPs who rebel and vote against the whips’ instructions may not be proposed for advancement 
in the next cabinet reshuffle. The whips are rumoured to resort to both cajoling as well as 
threatening behaviour in order to provide the requested result. Party discipline is not 
necessarily easy to achieve – which has been illustrated quite frequently both before and after 
1990. However, many commentators have pointed at the high number of rebels in various 
divisions during the Major governments in the 1990s.82  
 Until 1997, the whips also had an influence on the choice of party leader. The chief 
whip would receive proposals for a new leader from MPs and with ten per cent backing the 
leadership contest would be initiated. Since 1997, the officer in charge of instigating the 
election for a new party leader is the chairman of the 1922 Committee. The new rules 
introduced by Hague had set a minimum of 15 per cent of the MPs to back the demand for a 
new leader.  
 The role of the backbenchers has been disputed for several hundred years, 83 and how 
they see themselves has certain implications for how they behave in the House of Commons. 
One role is the backbencher as a representative or a delegate: He has to vote on behalf of the 
people who elected him or her. If he is a Conservative Party representative, then he is obliged 
to vote with the party irrespective of his own personal conviction. The opposite role is to see 
the backbencher as a trustee. The elected MP has to vote according to his conscience and 
personal opinion. He has to take decisions based on careful consideration of any matter that is 
up for discussion and is free to vote as he sees best. According to Judge, this is actually how 
many MPs saw their role in the 1990s.84  
This view almost makes the party superfluous. Any MP who takes the role of trustee 
and who feels strongly about an issue is probably willing to disregard the party whip and vote 
for what he feels is the best option. The Conservative Party decides its policy through careful 
deliberation in order to determine its manifesto before a general election. The mandate of a 
Conservative MP in relation to the party’s manifesto and how the voters see the mandate of a 
Conservative MP are issues that have been raised for instance in connection with the repeated 
rebellions during John Major’s governments, especially from 1992 until 1997. The reaction in 
the constituency regarding an MP who rebels in Parliament is not always the same. In some 
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cases an MP gets deselected, which means that the MP is not selected to represent the 
constituency at the next general election. However, this is necessarily not always the outcome. 
It might depend on several circumstances, for instance whether the MP rebelled in support of 
a certain local interest or whether the MP has kept in touch with his local constituency by 
frequently visiting the local party workers.85 These local considerations are important and 
might oppose the whips’ wishes for disciplinary measures to be taken. The infamous 
‘Whipless Nine’ were not deselected after their frequent rebellions in the 1990s, and their 
position in the Conservative Party seemed to be strengthened when they lost the whip.86 This 
is discussed in a later chapter. 
 If backbenchers strongly disagree with their party leader and actually vote against the 
party in an important division where the whips have claimed the urgency of support for the 
party, they know that the result may lead to a vote of confidence in the government and the 
claim for a new general election if the party does not have support from at least the majority 
of MPs. This is the ultimate choice that backbenchers face. The result might be that their party 
is voted out of power and the backbenchers who are responsible for an election defeat might 
lose their seats. However, the disagreement and the discussions that take place in Parliament 
are essential parts of the parliamentary system. Political scientist B. Crick argues that the 
electorate together with the backbenchers constitutes an important feed-back on the 
government. By reporting the discussions that take place, government is kept in check by the 
backbenchers. Parliament is a ‘forum of publicity’.87 The electorate can withdraw their 
mandate to the party if they are unhappy with the performance of their MPs. The politician 
William Gladstone (1809-1898) explained the function of the House of Commons: ‘Your 
business is not to govern the country, but it is, if you see fit, to call to account those who 
govern it.’88  
 Philip Norton differentiates between ‘policy-making’ and ‘policy-influencing’ 
institutions in different countries, and states that the British Parliament ‘has a reactive and 
thus largely policy-influencing role’,89 according to Jack Brand. These are the activities of 
legislatures, in Brand’s words: 
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Preparing and introducing legislation; 
 Modifying legislative proposals introduced by the executive; 
 Scrutinizing the performance of the executive in general; 
 Dismissing an executive or member of an executive who does not stand up to this scrutiny; 
 Recruiting new leaders from its own ranks or, in some cases, from elsewhere; 
 Bringing problems and injustices to the attention of government and public; 
 Bringing the opinion of the public or a significant section of the public to public discussion; 
 Legitimation, upon which the other functions depend.90 
 
The key word is legitimation. Without this, the whole institution becomes undemocratic and 
worthless.  
 Jack Brand argues that the role of a Labour backbencher is different than the role of a 
Conservative backbencher. This has to do with network and the hidden influence on the Tory 
MPs who traditionally have been recruited to a political career in the House of Commons. 
Even though this is not necessarily true today, it seemed to be true to a certain extent until 
recently. Many MPs had gone to prestigious public schools and universities or that they were 
born into families with high-ranking positions as business leaders, military careers or leading 
jobs as lawyers, bankers or company directors. A Tory MP traditionally came from a more 
affluent family that often had enjoyed the powerful network for generations. Brand claims 
that this background influenced the way people behaved as backbenchers, and that an MP 
with influential network background expected to be listened to and respected for his opinion, 
whereas a Labour MP without this network was treated differently and consequently did not 
have the same expectations of being taken seriously as his Tory colleague. 91 This argument 
says something about the perception of Britain as a class-divided society, and there have been 
claims that class is no longer so important when it comes to how people vote and how the 
parties define their policies. However, even though distinct class divisions are less significant 
today, it seems that networks still play an important role, both in politics and in private 
companies in general. This is the theme for a later chapter of this dissertation.  
 
2.4.3: The Conservative peers 
 
Tory peers are presumably regarded as subordinate politicians who seldom cause any 
rebellions in the House of Lords. This is not always the case. D. Shell and A. Adonis who 
studied how Conservative peers voted in the 1980s claim that  
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… in the 1979-83 Parliament the large Conservative majority seems to have encouraged Tory Peers to 
be particularly critical of their own side. … In the first year of the next Conservative government alone, 
Shell identified twelve major defeats of the government in the Lords.92 
 
Political scientist Jack Brand thinks that this is somewhat sensational and distinctly different 
from what had been observed before Margaret Thatcher became Prime minister. One reason 
for ‘allowing’ Tory rebellions in the House of Lords could be that towards the end of a 
parliamentary session time is very limited and this might explain why Conservative peers 
were not reprimanded. However, another factor that might influence the rebellions is that it 
was seen fairly harmless to protest when the party had a large majority in the House of 
Commons.93 
2.5: Conclusion 
 
Politics is about ‘who gets what, when and how,’ according to the American political scientist 
H. Lasswell. 94  Power is closely related to authority and influence. The British polity includes 
all the formal institutions as well as other influencing factors. There are several models that 
explain how power is distributed, and they might all say something which is right about 
Britain today. The pluralist model acknowledges the influence of pressure groups, and the 
elitist model emphasizes the hidden network that exists due to education and affluence. The 
market model’s ideology highlights the individual’s power to produce and consume, and that 
the government’s role is to carry out the fundamental duties, but to limit this as much as 
possible.  
The politicians in the House of Commons and the House of Lords have different 
possibilities to influence politics. When a party has a majority, the backbenchers of this party 
fulfil the important role of legitimizing the government. If backbenchers refuse to support the 
party, the party leader faces a legitimacy crisis and might lose a vote of confidence. This leads 
to a new general election if the party does not win enough votes. In the case of election defeat, 
the backbenchers might lose their seats in the House of Commons. The House of Lords 
underwent a big reform in 1999, which reduced the number of peers and almost abolished the 
hereditary peers. Studies of British society in the 1980s and 1990s seem to have ignored the 
influence of pressure groups or policy communities, according to political scientists David 
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Judge and Jack Brand, as well as the actual influence of backbenchers that are members of the 
governing party when it comes to influence policy-making in the House of Commons.95 
 
  
Chapter 3: 
How Margaret Thatcher influenced Parliament and the 
Conservative Party since 1990  
 
3.1: Backbenchers and peers: How politicians and debates were 
influenced 
3.1.1: Thatcher in the House of Commons 
 
Just a few weeks after moving into 10 Downing Street, Thatcher accused Major of ruining 
several of her accomplishments.96 This accusation was repeated in March 1991 on American 
television as well, when Thatcher claimed that her efforts were now being undermined by 
Major’s centralisation of power in Whitehall.97 Thatcher’s unease with her successor was due 
to disagreement regarding the appointment of Michael Heseltine as environment secretary, the 
abolition of the poll tax and a new approach to Europe.98 Maybe it was the sudden de-
thronement as a leader that made Thatcher so intent on voicing her concerns. Talking about 
her forced resignation in a TV series on BBC in 1993, she described it as ‘treachery with a 
smile on its face.’99 
On 28 November 1990 Britain had a new prime minister, and a former premier who 
did not look forward to a quiet life as back-bench MP in the House of Commons. ‘Retirement 
was not an option,’100 she said. Even though she was 65 years old, she definitely wanted to 
continue working. She was a ‘political animal’; being used to working long hours with little 
sleep and hardly anything else than politics on her agenda. Realizing that she was no longer 
the nation’s leader, it seems that she hoped to exert influence on the new prime minister. She 
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talked about being ‘a good backseat driver’ at the time of the second leadership ballot.101 John 
Major had served in Thatcher’s cabinets as chief secretary to the treasury, foreign secretary 
and chancellor of the exchequer since October 1989.102 Thatcher supported him in the second 
round of the leadership challenge against Douglas Hurd and Michael Heseltine. She probably 
expected him to lead the country much the same way as she had done; he was her protégé and 
believed to be a right-wing politician.103 John Campbell claims that Major not necessarily 
won the leadership challenge for being the best qualified to serve as prime minister. Willie 
Whitelaw, for instance, did not see Major as a Thatcherite, but thought that many others 
did.104  Several MPs that had voted for Thatcher in the first round were persuaded to vote for 
Major, not least by Thatcher herself.  
She had many loyal supporters, both in the parliamentary party, as well as among the 
electorate. Thatcher was aware of the devastating effect that her criticism could have on 
Major – she herself had experienced attacks on her policies when she won the leadership 
challenge over Edward Heath in 1975. John Campbell argues that her attacks on Major were 
more harmful, since she still had a lot of support in the House of Commons after 1990. The 
embittered attacks from Heath on Thatcher’s government in 1979 did not achieve the same 
effect as Thatcher’s more potent criticism in 1991 and later. Her popularity with many 
Conservative MPs could be said to give her the mandate to continue her criticism, and many 
of her supporters were eager to see to that her policies were carried through, even though she 
was no longer in charge.105  
It seems that Thatcher was regarded almost an icon to some people. She had many 
qualities of a strong leader; she had led the country to victory in the Falklands War against 
Argentina, and she had established strong measures to curb inflation and strengthen economy. 
She was the first woman to lead the Conservative Party, and she had been one of the very few 
female state leaders in the world. Her achievements during eleven years as prime minister had 
been outstanding, and many MPs felt that she had been stabbed in the back in the leadership 
contest. Maybe her strong personality was also a trait that her supporters found admirable – 
she never hesitated in saying anything, even though it might be harshly delivered and 
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perceived. Peter Hennessy described her ‘A Tigress Surrounded by Hamsters.’106  She had a 
very strong will to have her way, and she expected people to be well prepared to voice 
opposition. Characteristically she could be impatient and extremely rude if someone did not 
express himself clearly.107 
Her preoccupation with justifying her own actions and denouncing Major’s efforts can 
seem to be one of several reasons for her repeated attacks. This trait can maybe be seen as 
constituting a part of her personality, and it could be observed when she was in charge of 
cabinet meetings. Nigel Lawson, her chancellor for seven years, described how she managed 
to achieve the desired outcome of several cabinet committees or ad hoc groups. He said: 
‘Thus what began as a method for the most expedient conduct of business ended as a means 
of getting her own way irrespective of the merits or political costs.’108 John Campbell 
described her way of debating, after hearing what a number of her secretaries of state had said 
about her: ‘… she was extraordinarily difficult to argue with, because she would never admit 
to losing an argument, … ‘.109 Furthermore, she was preoccupied with the Thatcher legacy, 
what people would say that she had achieved during her years as prime minister.110 Having 
been in power for such a long time possibly also had the effect that she still expected to be in 
charge.  
Thatcher sought to influence the House of Commons in a few debates where the 
recurring theme was the European Union.111 The Single European Act which Britain ratified 
in 1986 had set targets for further European integration –its aim was political, monetary and 
social union. The EU members discussed proposals in their respective national Parliaments in 
preparation for the meeting scheduled to take place in Maastricht (Holland) December 1991. 
There were several critical issues, according to Thatcher. In a House of Commons debate on 
26 June 1991, she voiced her concerns about the consequences if the EU should become a 
federal union. 112  She feared that Britain would have to give up her foreign policy, defence 
policy and her security policy in order to transfer power to a European super-state. The British 
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sovereignty was threatened by the European Union, Thatcher claimed. She also spoke against 
common social policies as well as a single currency and she wanted a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty. All these issues were highlighted during the following years by Thatcher 
and Eurosceptic MPs. 
Quite early on in his premiership, John Major sought a more friendly approach to his 
European colleagues in the European Union than Thatcher had displayed. Whereas Thatcher 
and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany clearly did not get along well, Kohl and Major 
struck a friendly note early on. Major spoke on 11 March 1991 to the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung in Bonn about Britain being ‘at the very heart of Europe.’113 This phrase was derided 
and used on many occasions by Thatcher and other Eurosceptical politicians, apparently 
believing that Major actually had a different policy on Europe than Thatcher had voiced. John 
Major says in his auto-biography that the Eurosceptics believed that he favoured a federal 
Europe,114 which he claimed to be incorrect. However, once this accusation had been voiced 
about him, it was almost impossible to shake off. The Bruges Group produced a pamphlet 
which followed up the idea of a federalist Major, and the Daily Telegraph gave the pamphlet 
good coverage. Nicholas Ridley, who had served in Thatcher’s cabinets, also contributed with 
comments. He shared Thatcher’s sceptical view of the EC, and it was claimed that the 
pamphlet in reality carried Thatcher’s views.115 This might well be true; as the Bruges Group 
was founded in the first place to support Thatcher and her views on Europe expressed in the 
Bruges Speech in 1988. However, it is hard to actually prove that Thatcher was the ghost 
writer of the Bruges pamphlet in question.  
The debates in the House of Commons were fierce on the European issue, both before 
the Maastricht conference in 1991 and especially afterwards, when the Maastricht Treaty had 
to be ratified in order to become British law. Three outspoken Eurosceptics were serving in 
Major’s first cabinet; namely Peter Lilley, Kenneth Baker and Michael Howard. Thatcher had 
joined the backbenchers and egged them on to voice their resistance to the EC.116  The 
Eurosceptics in the House of Commons made the debates increasingly difficult for the 
government and John Major throughout 1992 and also during the first half of 1993, before the 
Treaty had passed through the House of Commons. 
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In the 1992 general election the Conservative Party received the plurality of votes, and 
maintained their parliamentary majority of 21 MPs in the House of Commons. After 9 April 
Major depended on the support of all his MPs to win a division unless MPs from Labour or 
the Liberal Democrats voted with the Conservative MPs in the case that some MPs voted 
against the government. The Eurosceptics increased their power because the Conservative 
majority was so small, compared to the result in the general election of 1987, when Thatcher 
had a majority of 102 MPs in the House of Commons. 
The Conservative Party whips tried their best to convince the Eurosceptical MPs to 
vote with the government. They had a fairly good idea as to who might be likely to rebel 
against the government. Margaret Thatcher talked to ‘Fresh Start’ MPs and persuaded 
wavering rebels to disregard the whips.117 Teresa Gorman reports of one incident when John 
Whittingdale was summoned to see Thatcher before the paving debate on the European 
Communities Amendment Bill on 4 November 1992. Thatcher scolded him because he had 
said he considered abstaining in the forthcoming vote. According to Gorman, Thatcher had 
suggested to him that his brain was unconnected to his spine.118 Even though Thatcher had 
taken a seat in the House of Lords from July 1992, she continued to influence MPs, helped by 
a few other peers as Norman Tebbit, Ralph Harris, Robert N. W. Blake and David Ivor 
Young.119 Observing what Thatcher did in order to persuade MPs as well as constituency 
volunteers in her old Finchley constituency, Edward Heath was reported to be furious about 
what his successor was doing: 
 
Commenting on Lady Thatcher’s behind-the-scenes lobbying, Mr. Heath said ‘This is unbelievable … 
I’ve been 42 and a half years in Parliament. I’ve been Chief whip. I’ve been leader of the Party for 10 
years, I’ve been Prime minister – I’ve never known anything like it before.’ He also criticised Tebbit’s 
activities as ‘absolutely appalling.’120  
 
Obviously, Heath was no objective observer, since his dissatisfaction with Thatcher had been 
known for many years at the time of the Maastricht debates. However, other sources report of 
different instances of Thatcher’s interference in trying to persuade and control. William 
Wallace, for instance, states in Kavanagh and Seldon’s book The Major Effect:  
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Lady Thatcher was now a brooding presence in the background, encouraging ‘her’ partisans to resist the 
drift of government policy, attracting not only old loyalists, but many of the new 1992 intake of MPs 
who had become into politics during her long period of political hegemony.121 
 
 
The first defeat occurred on 21 May 1992. The vote regarding the European Communities 
Amendment Bill was about the Committee of the Regions amendment. 26 Conservative MPs 
voted against the government, while 18 abstained. The government was defeated by 22 votes 
in total. At the time the Conservative Party had only a majority of 21, while 44 Conservatives 
actually chose to rebel. 
The second defeat happened on 22 July 1993, when the House of Commons voted on 
the so-called Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. 23 Conservative MPs voted against the 
party whip and one abstained from voting (this time 24 Conservatives rebelled). Now the 
Conservative majority was down to only 18, due to the death of two Conservative MPs and 
the loss of a seat in a by-election. The government lost by a number of 8 votes. It was 
immediately followed by a vote of confidence the next day, which ended with a majority of 
40 votes for the government. The abstaining voter (Rupert Allason) had the whip removed. 
Stephen George argues that no British government has suffered any worse defeat in the 20th 
century.122 The defiant effort from the Eurosceptic backbenchers destabilized the government. 
Then the third defeat took place on 7 December 1994. This time it was a vote on a 
Labour amendment to Finance Bill regarding increased VAT on gas and electricity. 7 
Conservative MPs voted with the Labour Party and 10 abstained (17 rebelled). The 
government lost by 8 votes. The previous month the whip had been removed from 8 MPs, and 
a ninth MP had resigned the whip. 7 of the whipless MPs voted for the amendment (against 
the government).123 The Conservatives in the House of Commons technically were 4 votes 
short of a majority without the ‘Whipless Nine’.   
  All the rebellions had a devastating effect on the prime minister and the government 
in general. Anthony Seldon describes in Major: A Political Life some of the consequences: ‘A 
persistent feeling of rebellion on the backbenches meant his authority was being ground 
away.’124 The backbenchers’ power to influence policy-making seemed to increase. Seldon 
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continues: ‘Many agreed with Peter Riddell that contempt for Major personally was as 
important in the rebels’ action as hatred of the EU.’125 In November 1994, the ‘Whipless 
Nine’ received more attention than ever before. Journalists followed in their footsteps, and 
they gave interviews willingly whenever they had a chance. After months of intense media 
publicity, the whip was restored on 24 April 1995 to the 8 that had been excluded from the 
party whip, without any repercussions for the rebels. Richard Body had the whip restored on 
17 January 1996. 
Many of the new Conservative MPs in 1992 were more Eurosceptical, as well as more 
willing to draw attention to open disagreement in the Conservative Party than what had 
previously been the case. They disobeyed the party whip in many debates and thereby 
displayed open defiance and disloyalty, both to the prime minister and the government.126 
According to Andrew Geddes, the Conservative MPs that were Eurosceptical, were 
‘Thatcher’s children.’127 The phrase describes right-wing politicians who shared Thatcher’s 
increasing scepticism about the development in the EU and the implications for Britain, as 
they saw it. Many of the Eurosceptics had not wanted Thatcher to resign as prime minister, 
and they felt shock and resentment at the result of the leadership election in 1990. Since 
Thatcher apparently found the Maastricht Treaty and the future of the European Union so 
fundamentally important to the future of Britain, she was intent on voicing her concerns in the 
House of Commons and elsewhere – even though this undermined John Major.128 Anthony 
Seldon and Stuart Ball are very critical in their description of how Thatcher behaved towards 
Major: 
 
Never in the Party’s history had a leader been so undermined by the machinations of his immediate 
predecessor. Mrs. Thatcher’s Eurosceptical voices ‘off’ and her palpable derision for Major fortified his 
critics to more open displays of defiance.129  
 
 
It seems that Thatcher saw the Maastricht Treaty and the European Community as a potential 
threat to British sovereignty. Her Bruges speech which she held on 20 September 1988, 
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spelled out her worries about the EU and the development towards further integration. 130 She 
made it clear that she wanted Britain to be a part of the European Union. However, she feared 
increased bureaucracy taking place in Brussels by people that were appointed and not elected. 
She talked about a European super-state that probably would be run from Brussels and that all 
the member states would be dominated by the centre. The Single European Market, which 
was scheduled to be in full operation by 1992, was in principle something Thatcher supported, 
as well as the common currency ECU. Thatcher dismissed the discussion of a European 
Central Bank. These were her conclusions about the EU in September 1988, and it seems that 
she relentlessly fought for this Eurosceptical point of view for the next 15 years or so. 
 Thatcher signed the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, which actually described the 
way to a fuller European integration. When the Luxemburg summit discussed the proposals 
for a new treaty in 1985, there were only 10 members of the EU, with Spain and Portugal 
soon to become members. Ultimately, the SEA was making way for increased co-operation in 
Europe; in matters economic, monetary, and political. The SEA came into force by 1 July 
1987.131 Some MPs voiced opposition to the treaty before it was ratified in the House of 
Commons, and several Conservative politicians who had supported it in 1986 later changed 
their minds and turned against it. Thatcher seems to be one of them, writing in 1995: ‘The 
Single European Act, contrary to my intentions and my understanding of formal undertakings 
given at the time, had provided new scope for the European Commission and the European 
Court to press forward in the direction of centralization.’132 The lady who was ‘not for 
turning’ apparently had done just that regarding the EU and the implications of the SEA. The 
Iron Lady image did not imply that she never changed her mind, although this is conceived to 
be part of the stereo-type image of her.  
3.1.2: Thatcher in the House of Lords 
 
Thatcher stayed on in the House of Commons for about a year and a half, before she decided 
to accept a peerage in the House of Lords in late June 1992. She claimed that she did not feel 
free to speak out as a backbencher, because she would be said either to support or attack her 
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successor in every statement the made. She said enthusiastically: ‘I felt newly liberated to 
continue the argument about Europe’s future.’133  
Thatcher continued to voice her opposition to the increasing bureaucracy of the 
European Union. Her speeches stressed many of the same elements as in her House of 
Commons speeches: A referendum on the single currency and on the importance of Britain’s 
sovereignty. Her main focus was on foreign policy; in particular anything related to the EU, 
but also on what was going on in Yugoslavia. Thatcher criticized the government for not 
committing British troops to Croatia and Bosnia. This argument was repeated in most of the 
speeches she held on her world-wide tours, as well as in the last two of her books that were 
published in 1995 and 2002. Many different nationalities, with their own culture and religion 
met in the Yugoslav melting-pot. As several of the previous East-European countries were 
liberated from Soviet rule, many of the Yugoslav republics also wanted to become 
independent countries. The dominating republic Serbia was led by an aggressive nationalist, 
Slobodan Milosevic, from 1987, and the other ethnic groups feared the Serbian dominance.134 
Serbian forces attacked Slovenia on 27 June 1991, just two days after Croatia and Slovenia 
declared independence. In February UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in Croatia. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina declared her independence shortly afterwards.  
 John Major and the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd were very reluctant about getting 
involved in the Yugoslav civil war. Anthony Seldon says about Major’s predecessor: 
‘Influencing policy in the background was Thatcher, who had become incensed by the West’s 
failure to act to protect the Muslims in the face of Serb aggression.’135 As early as August 
1992 Thatcher warned about the ‘ethnic cleansing’ that was taking place in Bosnia in an 
article in The New York Times. Maybe she had hoped to influence the American government 
to get involved in the fighting. Thatcher’s article made both Hurd and Major angry.136 This 
was an extremely complicated issue, both for British politicians as well as for the EU, the UN 
and NATO. Cabinet members disagreed strongly whether Britain should get military 
involved, and presumably Thatcher’s involvement broadened the rift.137  
Thatcher attacked the British government’s line of policy on Bosnia in a TV interview 
on 13 April 1993, and the next day Bosnia was debated in the House of Lords. Thatcher called 
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for action to prevent the atrocities taking place in this region. She deplored the consequences 
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and told about millions of refugees on the run as well as thousands of 
innocent people being massacred.138  The civil war in Yugoslavia went on for several years, 
and proved almost insolvable, despite the efforts of NATO and the UN international forces, 
and received widespread condemnation from a lot of countries all over the world. A truce was 
called in 1999. In her book The Path to Power Thatcher claimed that Europe’s failure to stop 
the Serb aggression against the other Yugoslav republics proved the Maastricht Treaty to be a 
step in the wrong direction. A common European foreign policy is too difficult to come to 
terms with, she argued.139 
On 6 July 1999 Thatcher managed to attract more attention than in a long time, when 
she spoke about former president in Chile, Augusto Pinochet, in the House of Lords. She 
warmly defended Pinochet, who had been in Britain for a back operation, but then had been 
arrested and held in warrant because Spanish courts wanted him extradited. Thatcher referred 
to the Falklands War in 1982, and claimed that Chile had actually helped Britain secure their 
win over Argentina. Thatcher also brought up Pinochet’s destiny when she addressed the 
Conservative Party conference for the first time since her resignation as prime minister on 6 
October 1999.140  
Thatcher’s engagement in Yugoslavia’s destiny was arguably more important in 
influencing public opinion than influencing decision-making in Parliament. Foreign Secretary 
Hurd and Prime minister Major were seriously concerned about the civil war in Yugoslavia 
and actively involved in discussions both in the House of Commons as well as international 
organizations. Thatcher’s demand for immediate action was probably not positively 
contributing to solve the matter, rather the contrary.  
It has been claimed that the Single European Act transferred more of Britain’s 
sovereignty to the EU than the Maastricht Treaty did in 1992 and 1993. This point of view 
was severely contested by Margaret Thatcher, who declared in a House of Lords debate that 
she never would have signed the Maastricht Treaty.141 The Maastricht Treaty was finally 
ratified in both Houses by August 1993, despite all protestations from Margaret Thatcher and 
her Eurosceptic supporters.   
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3.2: Wavering support for the Conservative Party 
 
In the middle of all the debates about the Maastricht Treaty was the general election. It was 
held on 9 April 1992. Obviously, journalists were eager to have a comment from Margaret 
Thatcher about her successor before the general election. She refused to praise John Major or 
endorse his policies publicly before the event and she was hard pressed for any evaluation of 
the election campaign. She gave the very brief comment: ‘Mr. Major is prime minister. I am 
an ex-prime minister.’142 This might be interpreted as a serious disapproval of John Major and 
his policies. Failing to say anything positive can be seen as a very serious statement, and 
Thatcher could have dismissed reporters quite differently had she wanted to support John 
Major.  
Thatcher’s influence on the annual party conferences was observable, even if she did 
not utter a word. Her role at some of these conferences, in addition to the role she played in 
general elections and party leader elections are discussed here. Both actions and statements 
can be interpreted differently in most cases. The image of Thatcher is not one-dimensional. It 
is conceivable there was a conflict between the public and the private role. Politicians that are 
used to leading a life in the limelight might experience some difficulty in trying to 
differentiate between the various roles.  
Thatcher started out quite bitter about her resignation in 1990 and felt quite at a loss 
about her situation and how she now should proceed. She had planned that she could lead the 
Conservative Party to win the fourth general election, and then maybe resign after two more 
years as premier. She actually had planned to stay in power for about 15 years in all, and had 
thought that it was up to her to decide when to quit.143 When John Major announced the time 
for the 1992 general election, Thatcher had criticized Major and his government for about a 
year, and she had been given ample attention due to speeches abroad and interviews. She kept 
a low profile during the election campaign, but within a week after the general election, 
Thatcher’s harsh criticism of John Major was published in the American magazine Newsweek. 
It is possible that she did not expect that the Conservatives should win the election, as all the 
opinion polls predicted a Labour Party majority as the expected outcome. The 1992 general 
election was a success for the Conservative Party, albeit a small success considering the tiny 
majority in the House of Commons. Commentators claimed that the election result was not 
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caused by Major and the Conservative Party by doing such a brilliant job; it was rather the 
fact that Neil Kinnock as the Labour Party leader was not seen able to govern the country.  
Kinnock resigned as party leader and let John Smith take over. Incidentally, George Urban 
wrote in his book: ‘The Thatcher factor was proving distinctly dispensable. This was not what 
she had been hoping for.’144 It is conceivable that she had hoped for an election defeat, with a 
return to office at the next general election.  
Thatcher was busy writing her memoirs during the first half of the 1990s as well as 
engaging in some behind the scene-activity through the ‘Fresh Start’ group and other 
Eurosceptic organizations that worked to prevent the Maastricht Treaty ratification. The 
election for the 1994 European Parliament was held the year between the book releases. This 
election was a big disappointment for the Conservative Party, since they received only 27 per 
cent of the votes and got only 18 out of 84 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The 
result was a lot worse than it had been five years earlier, when they got 32 out of 78 MEPs (33 
per cent of the votes). According to Steve Ludlam, the dismal result ‘was the worst for the 
party in a national election this century.’145 The party chairman, Norman Fowler, asked 
Thatcher to campaign for the party before the election. Fowler was very concerned that the 
Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party should manage to win many votes from Conservative 
voters, but Thatcher did not want to get directly involved in the campaign. She was full of 
sympathy for the difficult situation for the Tories, but declined to issue a statement to caution 
Tory voters about voting for the Liberal Democrats. Her reason for keeping such a low profile 
was that she regarded MEPs as being too much in favour of a federal Europe.146 This example 
illustrates how Thatcher used her influence by declining to participate for the benefit of the 
party. It is possible that she could have other reasons for not wanting to engage in the last 
weeks of the campaign as well, but it seems a little peculiar to turn down the modest wish of 
the party chairman.  
It can seem quite astonishing that Thatcher consciously encouraged another party and 
a think-tank like the European Foundation in 1996. She appeared to be careless about future 
of the party she had led for 15 years. This could be due to disillusion, or that she thought that 
the European issue was more important than anything else. Her pronounced fight for British 
sovereignty had become her number one issue, and her increased fear for the EU-bureaucracy 
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had superseded her belief in co-operation within a friendly European community with 
common goals. Possibly Thatcher feared that socialists, presumably French, German or 
maybe Italian, should take control of the EU decision-making institutions.147   
In 1996 she had evidently had some sympathy for the Referendum Party, and she had 
claimed that she would not campaign for the Conservatives in a constituency with a 
Referendum Party candidate running for office.148 Thatcher also voiced her support for James 
Goldsmith who founded the Referendum Party, according to the Guardian on 31 August 
1996.149 Her donation to Bill Cash and his European Foundation simply infuriated Major, 
who now condemned her behaviour publicly. On the front page of the Independent on 14 June 
1996 the whole row regarding the Referendum Party, the European Foundation and the 
Conservative Party was described in some detail in the article “Thatcher jabs Major; he 
wallops back”.150 Apparently journalist Donald McIntyre thought that Major overreacted to 
Thatcher’s donation to the European Foundation. Cash had received money from Goldsmith, 
but he had been told that this was regarded improper by the Conservative chief whip Alastair 
Goodlad, since Goldsmith led a competing party and might pose a real threat in some 
constituencies at the forthcoming general election. Thatcher then decided to pay a 
contribution to Bill Cash and became an honorary patron for the European Foundation. 
Journalist McIntyre described her payment as a ‘calculated and defiant piece of snook-
cocking’, thus implying that she consciously chose to do something that she knew would have 
an annoying or upsetting impact on people in the Conservative Party. Major stated angrily that 
he would have preferred that her money had been donated to the Conservative Party 
instead.151  
In a speech held at the Dorchester Hotel in London in November 1996 Thatcher stated 
her support for the Conservatives, and Labour was criticized for its tax and spending plans.152 
Thatcher’s fear of a socialist Britain was maybe boosted as the Labour Party performed well 
in opinion polls, and it seemed quite likely that the next general election might be won by the 
Labour Party. When the next general election was announced, on 18 March 1997, she quickly 
arranged a press conference outside Chesham Place, where she lived. Here she declared her 
support for the Conservative Party and for John Major as prime minister. Hypothetically she 
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was prompted to do this by party colleagues, or perhaps she felt the need to restore some faith 
in her own party; after her enthusiastic praise of Tony Blair several times in different media. 
She insisted on coming with Major on a few campaign tours, even though this was hardly an 
activity suggested by Major. The outcome of the general election hardly surprised anyone, but 
for the scale of the enormous majority of votes for the Labour Party. Thatcher’s ambivalence 
was quite apparent when she commented on the results. On one side, she was sorry that the 
Conservative Party had lost; on the other side she almost took malicious pleasure in stating 
that this could only have happened since she was forced to resign in 1990 – and that the 
election defeat was bound to happen in 1997.153  
Thatcher was very supportive of Tony Blair when he replaced Major as prime minister 
in 1997 with regard to the British-American operation in Kosovo. She was summoned to 10 
Downing Street for private consultations with a Labour premier154 – an event that attracted a 
lot of attention from politicians and others.155 In 2003 they also discussed Britain’s 
involvement in Iraq. This seems to indicate that she was able to offer some advice about 
warfare and public relations, rather than the actual policy-making of the Labour Party. This 
example adds to the rather complex picture of Margaret Thatcher and her exertion of 
influence a long time after her forced resignation.  
Thatcher had put on a brave face on the Conservative Party conference in October 
1996. According to John Campbell, Thatcher gave ‘… another cloyingly insincere 
endorsement of Major at Brighton …’156 Publicly it was important for the party to stand 
united behind their leader. This might not have the intended effect when it was a well-known 
fact that Thatcher privately admired Tony Blair.   
 It seems a little confusing that Thatcher as soon as the general election date was 
decided arranged a spontaneous press conference, pledging her support for John Major and 
the Conservative Party; definitely not the Labour Party.157 She insisted on joining Major in his 
campaign on two occasions in April. 158 It is possible that she did this because she had a bad 
conscience about her apparent lack of support for her successor. Another plausible 
explanation is that she just wanted to get back into the limelight and saw this as a splendid 
opportunity. The impact of her appearances is hard to establish. Anthony Seldon did not think 
that John and Norma Major wanted Thatcher to come along on the campaign outings. 
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According to Seldon, her presence created a rather tense atmosphere.159 It is rather doubtful 
whether her presence could contribute to making more people vote for the Conservative Party 
after almost seven years out office and having been so critical of John Major and his 
government most of the time.  
 
3.3: Thatcher’s influence on different leaders of the Conservative 
Party 1990-2003 
3.3.1 Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
 
Anthony Seldon talks about the ‘poisoned relationship’ between Thatcher and Major. 
According to an anonymous source, quoted in Major: A Political Life, Thatcher did not 
behave nicely towards Major. This source said:  
 
She behaved very badly at every level: she gossiped, she put out messages, she withheld support. She 
used all her political cunning to knife him and stab him and demoralise him and weaken him. Above all 
she was thinking: ‘He is doing my job. How dare he?’160  
 
 
On a personal level, she probably made his life and his role so much more difficult than it 
could have been. Undoubtedly he would still have faced many difficulties in the House of 
Commons and in the media, but his predecessor could have helped and supported him instead 
of doing the opposite. She had been a prime minister for 11 years and could have given him 
both indirect and direct support and valuable advice. 
It is hard to pinpoint exactly what the effect of Thatcher’s speeches or statement was 
on most of these issues. When it comes to the effect on Major, an isolated attack on his 
personality or how he was perceived as a leader could be perceived as bothersome or 
annoying, maybe disappointing. Persistent attacks from the former premier might have a 
devastating and cumulative effect. Major experienced repeated attacks from Thatcher, and 
their relationship was described as a nightmare by the party chairman.161  
The Sunday Telegraph had a big headline on its first page on 2 June 1991, saying “I’m 
disappointed in Major, says bitter Thatcher.” It was six months since her resignation, and 
Thatcher was not happy about her successor at all. In the article she was also quoted to have 
said to an unnamed source: ‘He is grey. He has no ideas. I have been totally deceived.’  
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 Only a few weeks after this article, on 28 June 1991, Thatcher was interviewed by 
Michael Brunson, ITN, about losing office. Brunson asked whether she realized that she 
might appear to be second-guessing John Major. She denied that this was true, but quickly 
changed the subject. Later on she talked about her future role. She said: ‘I am now free to live 
another life of very practical use, both to the people of this country and internationally. I have 
a passion for Britain, for the spirit of the people, for their character. It’s done wonders for the 
world in the past. It can still do wonders for the world into the future.’162  
The Major government was criticized on American television only three months after 
her resignation, where Thatcher said: ‘I see a tendency to try to undermine what I achieved 
and to go back to more powers for government.’163 Admittedly, she might not want to harm 
Major’s reputation or hurt his feelings at this point; it is possible that she just felt so hurt by 
the turn of events that she just wanted to give prominence to her own achievement. 
Norman Fowler, the party chairman (1992-1994) described how Major reacted to 
Thatcher’s criticism. The strains of critical remarks were making their toll on the new 
premier. Besides, how to handle Thatcher became an issue for the party chairman and the 
prime minister to discuss and continued to be an issue for the rest of his premiership. 164 The 
party did not want internal disagreement or fight ruin the chance of a good election result. If 
Thatcher advocated a different opinion than Major, this might confuse the electorate and 
endanger the vote; as it might secure a vote for another party.  
Thatcher commented on what she was unhappy about. Around the time of the 1992 
general election, Thatcher was quoted in the Sunday Times to have commented to an unnamed 
source about the campaign, that it ‘did not have enough oomph, enough whizz, enough 
steam.’165 This could be interpreted as criticism of the Conservative Party, the Central Office 
administration or possibly of the party leader, John Major.  
Peter Hennessy characterizes in his book The Prime Minister the influence of Thatcher 
on Major and his government. He writes:  
 
… Black Wednesday unleashed tidal waves of criticism and attack, not least from within the 
Conservative Party, the most damaging assaults soon coming to be associated with the lady likened by 
Douglas Hurd to ‘the Queen over the Water’, Mrs Thatcher – an image which in Hurd’s view ‘she did 
nothing to discourage and certainly made his [Major’s] very difficult.166 
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In other words, Thatcher was among Major’s most fierce critics together with other Tory 
politicians.  Norman Tebbit joined Thatcher in her disparagement of Major’s policies.167 Their 
combined efforts were evident both in the House of Commons and on party conferences. This 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3.3.2: Margaret Thatcher and William Hague 1997-2001 
 
Thatcher actually intervened in the leadership contest in 1997, when she publicly supported 
the candidacy of William Hague, and urged people to vote for him. He was her preferred 
candidate, even though she had been somewhat hesitant to flag her support, and her pressing 
approval could be seen as a somewhat dubious advantage for Hague. He was labelled 
‘Thatcher’s heir’, which is not necessarily how he would have wanted to portray himself, and 
the characterization stuck to him throughout his four years as Conservative Party leader. John 
Campbell says in his book that ‘… the memory of Mrs. Thatcher was a millstone around 
Hague’s neck, as it had been around Major’s.’168 The other candidates for the party leadership 
in 1997 were Michael Portillo, Kenneth Clarke, and the trio Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and 
John Redwood. Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon argue that Hague was elected party 
leader ‘… as demonstrably the least offensive and ideologically charged candidate on 
offer.’169 They also state that Hague’s campaign was ‘aided by Thatcher’s ringing 
endorsement’.170 Those MPs who had wanted Thatcher to continue in 1990 could have voted 
for her candidate in 1997 out of loyalty to their former prime minister, or they simply did not 
want to see Kenneth Clarke or John Redwood as the next leader.  
Thatcher’s intervention was not necessarily an advantage for William Hague or the 
Conservative Party. However, there were even more Eurosceptics in the House of Commons 
after the 1997 general election, even though they might be sceptical to the EU-issue for very 
different reasons.171 Anthony Forster commented: ‘After 1997 at least three-quarters of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party embraced a form of Euroscepticism, and the party’s choice 
of leaders along with its 1997 and 2001 general election manifestos reflected this.’172 
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The EU-issue was important in Britain yet again in the election for the European 
Parliament in 1999. Hague decided to leave the centre ground, and go for a more right-wing, 
Eurosceptical attitude in the campaign before this election in June 1999.173 A new party had 
been formed, which was called the ‘Pro-Euro Conservative Party’. This party advocated its 
support for the single currency and had been established to compete for conservative voters. 
This could also have induced the Conservative Party under Hague to choose a Eurosceptical 
slogan to front their campaign, namely ‘In Europe: Not Run by Europe’.174 Since James 
Goldsmith died shortly after the 1997 general election, his Referendum Party did not 
represent any danger to the Conservative Party in this European election. However, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party was capable of attracting Conservative voters who wanted a 
strong anti-EU party. Hague chaired several ‘Keep the Pound’ meetings and once more the 
Eurosceptic Conservative MPs believed that this was the right approach to win votes up and 
down the country.175 The result of the European election in 1999 gave the Conservative Party 
a boost, because they managed to get 36 out of the 84 seats (about 36 per cent of the votes). 
 Hague stated that the Conservative Party did not want to join the single currency 
during the time of the next Parliament if the party won the general election in 2001. This 
apparently only reminded the electorate of the deep split in the Conservative government 
during the 1990s, and the Labour Party profited from the continued disagreement over this.176 
Three Conservative MPs resigned from the shadow cabinet in 1998 because of Hague’s 
Eurosceptic stance, and two more defected to other parties in 1998 and 1999.177 Apart from 
the Euroscepticism it proved difficult for the party to settle its policy on other issues, and this 
proved to be a challenge for the party leader to tackle. Some politicians, among them Francis 
Maude and Michael Portillo, wanted a more liberal attitude towards gay people and to people 
of different ethnic background. These sentiments were maybe too radical for many 
Conservatives and controversial for true Thatcherites, who would like to see ‘family values’ 
restored.   
With such a large group of Conservative Eurosceptic MPs in the House of Commons 
since 1997, it is presumably not surprising that Margaret Thatcher’s Eurosceptic ideas were 
cherished and promoted. Seven years after Thatcher resigned as prime minister, there had 
never been so many Eurosceptic MPs in the House of Commons.  
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3.3.3: Margaret Thatcher and Iain Duncan Smith 2001-2003  
 
When Labour won another landslide victory and got a majority of 165 in the House of 
Commons in the general election in June 2001, Thatcher again sought to to voice her opinion 
regarding party politics. Hague resigned as party leader immediately after the election, and 
now the most likely successors were Kenneth Clarke, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael 
Portillo.178 Seldon and Snowdon state in the book Recovering Power: ‘Once again, the issue 
of Europe and figure of Mrs. Thatcher returned to haunt the leadership contest.’179 Thatcher 
published a letter in the Daily Telegraph that warned against Kenneth Clarke as the next 
leader for the Tories, on 21 August 2001, because he supported the single currency. This 
annoyed the editor of the Daily Mail, who on the following day reprimanded Thatcher for her 
intrusion in the newspaper, and warned against the consequences if the party yet again elected 
an unsuitable leader.180 The editor stated: ‘… the Tory party … is so obsessed with Europe 
that if it risks the wrong leader again it risks the very real possibility of political extinction.’181 
In a way this could reflect the belief that Thatcher actually was in a position to influence 
Conservative voters. It could also be interpreted to say something about how serious the state 
of the party seemed to be in. 
The Labour Party used the combined image of William Hague and Margaret Thatcher 
on their poster to warn the electorate of the Conservative Party.182 It is quite telling that her 
picture was used even though it was 11 years since she had retired. John Campbell claims that 
the Labour Party ‘exploited her unpopularity’, as they also had done previously.183 
During the election campaign, Michael Portillo said that he had Thatcher’s approval in 
the leadership contest, which Thatcher rebuffed when she was asked to confirm this.184 
Consequently, the Eurofriendly Kenneth Clarke and the newly liberal Michael Portillo were 
turned down as prospective leaders of the Conservative Party by Thatcher. Only the fiercely 
Eurosceptic Iain Duncan Smith was given her blessing.  
In the 2001 leadership election the next leader of the Conservative Party was to be 
voted on by the Conservative Party members, when the choice of candidates was narrowed 
down to two, according to the new rules introduced by Hague. Even though the matter was 
decided by the party members, Thatcher’s preferred candidate won the contest. Iain Duncan 
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Smith had proven himself a true Eurosceptic since he was given a seat as an MP in 1992, and 
he was described as one of ‘Thatcher’s children’. He had rebelled against the government in 
the Maastricht Treaty votes. The other candidates were either too integrationist (Clarke) or too 
liberal (Portillo). Michael Ancram and Michael Howard were candidates as well in the first 
ballot. In the second ballot there were only three contestants: Clarke, Portillo and Duncan 
Smith.185 This is not to say that Thatcher dictated how the party members should vote. It 
could be a coincidence that Duncan Smith won the leadership contest. Arguably the other 
candidates proved too controversial for the rank and file of the party. However, 
Euroscepticism seemed to dominate a considerable part of the parliamentary party. 
The election on 7 June 2001 did not improve the Conservative Party’s situation in the 
House of Commons – as the Labour Party won with a second landslide majority of 165, and 
the Conservatives only got 166 out of the 659 seats. The policy shift towards a more 
Eurosceptic stance had not been successful. Iain Duncan Smith did not want to condemn 
Thatcher’s views on the EU in 2002, when her Statecraft book was published. Duncan Smith 
was a right-wing politician and a dedicated Thatcherite, but he did not imitate his mentor’s 
leadership style – on the contrary, he did not assert much authority in the House of Commons 
or in shadow cabinet meetings. If Thatcher’s health had been better, she might have stepped in 
and defended him, but she declared that her public appearances had to be avoided due to her 
declining health in March 2002. One of her last political acts had been to endorse his 
candidacy as the next party leader. This approval could unfortunately not help Duncan Smith 
much. His position as party leader was challenged in October 2003. Michael Howard was the 
only candidate nominated to succeed him.  
 
3.4: How party conferences were influenced by Thatcher and her 
ardent supporters 
 
The Conservative Party conference in October 1992 intensified the division of the party and 
Margaret Thatcher could be seen as one of the chief architects behind the cleavage that was 
getting wider and more profound. Thatcher was by now a member of the House of Lords and 
still condemning the Maastricht Treaty. She did not want it to be ratified because it would 
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mean transferring power to ‘unelected bureaucrats.’186 The Eurosceptical and former minister 
in Thatcher’s cabinet, Norman Tebbit, received a standing ovation from the audience when he 
got up to speak at the conference. He talked condescendingly of the government and its policy 
on Europe and launched a vicious attack on the prime minister, which was applauded heartily 
by parts of the conference. Norman Fowler, the then chairman of the party, described the most 
eager Tebbit-fans as ‘lager louts’ – in other words loudmouthed, young and ‘aggressively 
self-confident.’187 Thatcher and Tebbit did what they could to influence those who were 
present at the conference, although a large number of Conservatives supported the more 
Eurofriendly Douglas Hurd and Michael Heseltine. Hurd made an appeal for unity of the 
party, and Heseltine defended the government’s position to Europe. They both received 
standing ovations.  
 In the middle of the conference week the article “The autumn of our discontent” by 
Margaret Thatcher was published in The European. It was a full-blown attack on the 
Maastricht Treaty, and it received widespread media attention.188 The teaser text focused on 
the ongoing party conference and the split regarding the Maastricht Treaty. In the article 
Thatcher warned about a United States of Europe that is run from Brussels, which would 
entail increased bureaucracy and the introduction of a single currency.189 The editor seemed to 
fully agree with Thatcher, and said: ‘… John Major is presiding over economic and monetary 
collapse at home and a crisis of confidence in his own leadership qualities at home and 
abroad.’190 The newspapers made the most of Thatcher’s attack in their coverage. The 
conference continued the next day, and Thatcher received applause as she entered, but several 
party delegates did not stand in order to salute her. According to Norman Fowler her article 
backfired.191 However, this incident illustrates that Thatcher still had a big standing in the 
Conservative Party, nearly two years after her resignation. She was still highly capable of 
attracting the headlines and she still had a large group of supporters in the Conservative Party.   
 Margaret Thatcher had no formal function at the party conference after her 
resignation; still it was taken for granted that she would be present, and that she was given a 
prominent place as a former prime minister. Norman Fowler described in his book the 
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intricate considerations that the prime minister and he as party chairman undertook in order to 
pay the former prime minister the proper respect, but at the same time not exaggerating the 
importance of her presence.192 It was regarded as a fine balancing act; ensuring that the 
conference greeted her properly with an ovation, but avoiding that she was given a longer 
ovation than the present prime minister.  
 The fact that Thatcher was challenged as a party leader and was forced to resign has 
been described as a prime ministerial coup by some commentators. 193 John Biffen talked 
about ‘the revenge of the unburied dead’ which was launched almost simultaneously.194 The 
men behind this apparent coup were Conservative MPs and the aim of the challenge was to 
provide a new leader of the party. Thatcher had become an electoral liability – several MPs 
thought that she would never be able to win the next general election. It is no surprise that the 
party conferences after her fall were going to be difficult for the party to handle. Thatcher had 
a large following of supporters according to the first ballot of the leadership contest. The last 
thing the chairman and the party leader possibly wanted was to enhance the party’s 
difficulties due to her presence at the conference. Thatcher made it no easier for the party to 
ignore how she behaved out of office, when she early on started to criticize Major and his 
government’s policies. Dennis Kavanagh considers the problem of having a former leader 
trying to influence his or her successor’s policies as if it were a question of giving prompts to 
an actor on the stage. He states:  
 
Mrs. Thatcher’s agenda, largely dictated from political exile, seems wilfully to ignore the problems of 
party management, particularly over Europe, and the pressures which led many colleagues to consider 
that she had outlived her usefulness as party leader.195 
 
After her resignation she had no formal power to decide the policies of the Conservative 
Party. Nevertheless, she was busy trying to make an impact on what the party and the 
government, especially until 1997, ought to do. Her activities included writing her memoirs, 
articles, delivering speeches and showing up at important party rallies and conferences. 
The function of the annual autumn Conservative Party conference is to boost party 
morale and provide a chance for all the rank and file members of the party to gather and meet 
all the prominent party leaders. Members of the cabinet or the shadow cabinet, the central 
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office organization with the chairman of the party and all the members from different levels of 
the national committees have a chance to meet face to face. The conference might also give 
the party leadership some feedback about some issues, whether they are regarded 
controversial or popular. The conference is organized by the National Union of Conservative 
and Unionist Associations, and the party leader presents the direction of where the party is 
going. 
As previously mentioned, one of the controversial issues was the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Thatcher’s article that was published in the newspaper The European 
criticized both the treaty, the direction of the new Major government, and the prime minister. 
Thatcher actually referred to the Maastricht Treaty as a ‘ruinous straitjacket’, quite contrary to 
the Major’s positive mention of the same treaty in the party manifesto published before the 
general election in April that year.196 Consequently, it was quite awkward for the party 
leadership to deal with the previous party leader in these circumstances. It is vital to consider 
the impact of the ongoing debate in the House of Commons and in the Conservative Party. 
Political scientist Andrew Geddes says: ‘… the Maastricht deal lit the blue touch paper 
beneath the Conservative Party, which ignited to cause civil war within the Party and played 
an important part in Labour’s landslide victories of 1997 and 2001.’197  
Since Thatcher had made her resistance of the Maastricht Treaty an issue of paramount 
importance, she continued her fight against other EU-related issues when the Maastricht 
Treaty finally was ratified by Parliament in August 1993. Fowler speaks about the need for 
‘reconciliation’ at the 1993 party conference. He wanted Major to kiss Thatcher on the cheek, 
as a kind of gesture to soften up the Eurosceptic Conservatives at the conference, after several 
rebellious divisions in the House of Commons where Major had to force votes of confidence 
in order to achieve the necessary majority for the government’s motions. After some 
protestation beforehand, Major gave Thatcher the requested peck on the cheek, and the two 
prime ministers had staved off an embarrassing moment. Later during the same conference, 
extracts from Thatcher’s The Downing Street Years were published in a couple of 
newspapers, further straining the relationship between Major and Thatcher.  
On a happier note, Thatcher was celebrated at the party conference in 1995, since her 
70th birthday only was a week away. George Urban referred to the occasion when he quoted 
Hugo Young’s statement in the Guardian: “At the age of seventy, Lady Thatcher ‘reached the 
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fateful condition of being famous for being famous.’”198 She was well received by the 
conference, which provided a good occasion to reconcile political enemies, even though her 
second book The Path to Power might have given her antagonists even more reason to 
condemn her. She was treated to a party at 10 Downing Street by Major, and she also had a 
big celebration at a restaurant with the Queen as one of the guests.199 In the US people paid 
$1,000 to take part in her fund-raising birthday dinner for the Thatcher Foundation.200 
Thatcher’s popularity in the US was substantial, and her standing there was apparently quite 
different than in Britain at the time, even though her birthday was officially celebrated in the 
Conservative Party. 
An example of the somewhat ambiguous honour of having a former premier present at 
a party conference can be related to the party conference in 1999. Thatcher was given the 
opportunity to address the party delegates for the first time since her resignation. The incident 
was recalled by Simon Walters, who said: ‘Hague felt badly let down when she virtually 
hijacked the 1999 Tory conference, using it as a platform to defend General Pinochet – not the 
kind of issue likely to reconnect the Conservatives with ordinary voters.’201 The whole speech 
was dedicated to praising the former Chilean state leader and criticizing the present Labour 
government for detaining Pinochet unlawfully.202 Thatcher’s warm defence of Pinochet, the 
dictator, might just draw unwanted attention to how right-wing she apparently was or had 
become in later years after her resignation. Her reasons for speaking up for the former dictator 
went back to the days of the Falklands War and the support Thatcher received from Pinochet 
then. She also claimed that democracy had been introduced in Chile, which was praiseworthy 
in her opinion. This probably caused embarrassment with the party delegates and was likely to 
be an issue that Conservative Party politicians desperately did not want to be associated with. 
The incident has not been referred to by many of the Conservative politicians who have 
published their diaries or memoirs after this incident. Perhaps it is more likely to be 
mentioned in the diaries of politicians who represent other parties.  
Political journalist John Sergeant had discussions with former MP and a member of 
John Major’s cabinets, Christopher Patten, doing research for his book about Thatcher, 
Maggie: Her Fatal Legacy. Patten claimed that Thatcher was to blame for the ruin of the 
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Conservative Party.203 This was of course a subjective remark from a politician who seldom 
agreed with the former premier on for instance foreign policy. It illustrates that Thatcher 
either seemed to be loved or hated by her former colleagues. Her political legacy is the theme 
in the following part.      
3.5: How Thatcher’s legacy was perceived and how it continued to 
influence the party 
 
Peter Lilley held a Butler Memorial Lecture on 20 April 1999.204 He called for a revision of 
the party’s Thatcherite policies, especially on public services and the issue of privatization. 
He claimed that Thatcherism had its limitations, and that the party should renew its 
ideology.205  Thatcher reacted furiously when she learned what Lilley had said. The speech 
was regarded as a provocation by the Thatcher-friendly politicians in the House of Commons, 
and William Hague, the Conservative Party leader, did not approve its contents. Thatcher’s 
legacy was thus still being safeguarded, nine years after her premiership had ended. John 
Campbell says in his book: ‘Instead of enabling Hague to move out of Lady Thatcher’s 
shadow, the resulting outcry forced him to repudiate any such intention …’206 As a 
consequence of lacking endorsement of his opinion, Lilley left the government quite soon 
after the speech. Other prominent politicians also resigned; Gillian Shepherd, Norman Fowler 
and Michael Howard.207 John Charmley claims that Lilley was sacked by Hague for 
condemning the Thatcher legacy.208 Indirectly, Thatcher strongly influenced the policies of 
the Conservative Party. As Hague proved unwilling to condemn Thatcher, he continued to 
trace her footsteps also when it came to the European issue, or more precisely the European 
Union.  
 The BBC produced a documentary programme called The Curse of the Mummy which 
was shown in November 2001. The title refers to an episode at the Conservative Party’s 
spring conference, when Thatcher had passed a poster which was advertising a film called The 
Mummy Returns. She related the title to herself as a small joke at the conference, unaware that 
this was a horror film. Cartoonists and commentators used the opportunity to feature her as a 
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ghost or a monster, or even a zombie. The Curse of the Mummy, however, claimed that 
Thatcher had seriously damaged the Conservative Party, or that the last two election defeats 
were the results of Thatcher’s negative influence.209  
  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Thatcher had a strong standing in the parliamentary Conservative Party at the time of the 
leadership election in 1990, even though she failed to get enough votes to win. Since she was 
so determined to continue a life in politics as well as keeping up a public role for herself, 
conflicts with her successor seemed unavoidable. It seems that Thatcher thrived in conflicts, 
when she could take a clear stand and criticize her opponent’s views. The issue of the 
European Union and the Maastricht Treaty resonated well with the Eurosceptics within the 
Conservative Party, and gave many Thatcher-supporters the mandate to openly defy the new 
prime minister in a number of debates in the House of Commons. John Major’s views did not 
differ a lot from Thatcher’s point of view on the EU or the Maastricht Treaty. However, he 
had a different attitude to his European colleagues and had a somewhat different approach to 
discussions with them. He was maybe better at negotiating difficult issues and more eager to 
reach a compromise than his predecessor had been.      
 Thatcher’s supporters continued to rebel in many debates regarding the EU after 
Thatcher stood down as an MP and took a seat in the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of 
Kesteven. Here she continued speaking against the Maastricht Treaty and criticized the 
government’s failure to prevent blood-shed and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.  
 Thatcher was able to exert some influence on the succeeding party leaders from 1990 
to 2001. She supported John Major, because she thought he would continue her policies and 
support her legacy. The main reason for her support might have been that she above anything 
else wanted to avoid Michael Heseltine as the next prime minister, because he was seen as a 
Europhile politician and a ‘wet’. William Hague had perhaps secured a win in the leadership 
contest with Thatcher’s help in 1997, but four years later he could not go on, even with 
Thatcher’s backing during the election campaign. Now the next protégé stepped forward, 
described as ‘Thatcher’s son’, Iain Duncan Smith.  
 Thatcher’s presence at the annual party conferences gave the party leadership reason 
to despair and worry, because of her repeated criticism of the party leader and the direction of 
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the government when the party had a majority in the House of Commons. The leadership of 
the party struggled to present a united party, even if the ongoing battles almost split the party 
– and Thatcher did her very best to influence people with her views, whenever there was an 
opportunity. More than once her views were quite controversial, potentially creating a 
damaging image of the party or the Conservative voters. However, she was a highly respected  
former prime minister to many people, as the celebrations of her 70th birthday demonstrated.  
Chapter 4: 
How Margaret Thatcher influenced public opinion by her 
public appearances and books  
 
This chapter deals primarily with many of the public appearances that Margaret Thatcher had 
outside Parliament; on travels abroad and in Britain. Many of these appearances held by 
invitation, others were due to Thatcher’s own initiative. It is vital to remember that Thatcher 
voiced her political views when she appeared publicly on events to speak or to advertise her 
books. It is conceivable that she sought to exert her influence on people in general as well as 
leaders, advisers, consultants, academics, and political commentators in particular. 
The first part is about a small number of key speeches, with some discussion about 
their impact. Part two is about Thatcher’s involvement in Asia – in Hong Kong contributing 
to a peaceful return of the colony to China, and in several Asian countries promoting British 
firms. The third part is all about her three books that were published in the 1990s or later. The 
books had profound consequences for John Major and the Conservative Party. Part four is 
about three selected articles written by Thatcher and published in newspapers or a magazine. 
The last part concerns interviews and articles that reported her views on specific issues.  
 
4.1: Key speeches and their consequences 
 
Apparently Thatcher expected her views to be influential when she was no longer the leader 
of the Conservative Party from December 1990. She was a person who delighted in debate, 
strife and attention. After her 11 years as Prime minister, she was an experienced politician 
used to get her views across on a broad set of political issues. This could be a motive for her 
frequent appearances after her resignation. Thatcher had maintained a loyal set of supporters 
across the country. On the whole, however, she was more popular abroad – for instance in the 
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Eastern European countries, in several Asian countries as well as in the US and some South-
American countries. Thatcher’s reputation as state leader during the 1980s made her a popular 
guest speaker. The ‘Iron Lady’ soubriquet made her quite unique, and this might have 
attracted publicity wherever she went.  
The themes for her many speeches were the EU, the need for Britain to have a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and on the issue of a single currency. She was also very 
concerned about the civil war in Yugoslavia and the need for intervention from other 
European countries in order to avoid atrocities and bloodbath. The following section takes a 
closer look at a few key speeches and their effects. 
 
 
4.1.1 The Hague Speech, May 1992 
 
Margaret Thatcher supported Britain’s membership of the EU and believed in the single 
market as a means to liberalize European trade. She signed the Single European Act while she 
was prime minister in 1985, which set goals for further European political integration. In 1988 
she seemed to have regretted the speed of the integration process and also the intent of some 
of her European colleagues, who were committed to further steps towards convergence 
between member states. In a speech delivered in The Hague on 15 May 1992 entitled 
“Europe’s Political Architecture”, she managed to surprise, alternatively to shock her 
listeners. This event took place only a fortnight after the Second Reading of the Maastricht 
Bill in the House of Commons, when 22 Tory rebels voted against their own party. The bill 
was passed with the support of other parties. In this speech Thatcher brought to light the 
problem of a re-united Germany and voiced her worries about the power of the new Germany 
and the problems this might lead to within the EC.210 She claimed that Germany in fact had 
the power to veto any major decision, and that the Bundesbank could ignore the financial 
problems of other G7 countries.211 Thatcher insisted that American troops had to stay in 
Europe to preserve peace and actually to check the fledgling power of united Germany.  
Her second main worry concerned the direction of the EU Commission – the 
perceived goal of a ‘centralised bureaucratic federal state’ as opposed to Thatcher’s ideal of 
the opposite – a ‘free-market Europe of sovereign states’.212 She accentuated in her rhetorical 
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style the following claim: ‘A half-Europe imposed by tyranny was one thing; a half-Europe 
imposed by Brussels would be a moral catastrophe depriving the Community of its European 
legitimacy.’213 Thatcher’s speech came only in the month after the 1992 general election, and 
it did not diminish the difficulties that Major might have in the House of Commons with the 
Maastricht Treaty ratification. Thatcher commented three years later in her book The Path to 
Power ‘…I found it easier to express even these controversial points about international 
relations abroad than at home.’ 214  She was in other words aware that her views were causing 
debate, although  it might seem a little strange that she felt free to be more critical abroad than 
in Britain. Thatcher probably expected the speech to be reported in British media, and 
potentially to create a heated debate. John Major had established a good relationship with the 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl when he succeeded Thatcher as prime minister. Thatcher’s 
fear of a powerful Germany did little to support the cautious improvement of Anglo-German 
relations with her speech in The Hague. 
  
4.1.2 The CNN speech in Washington DC, September 1992 
 
The preliminaries to the speech ought to be included as an introduction. Thatcher had fought a 
long battle for many years against joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism, before she 
succumbed to the pressure of her chancellor, Nigel Lawson and her foreign secretary, 
Geoffrey Howe and agreed to let sterling join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which 
was a part of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1989. She was adamant that the ERM 
was to be avoided, and Philip Stevens describes her view at that time: ‘Her antagonism 
towards the mechanism had become pathological.’215 
The value of pound sterling was bound to a fixed exchange rate of German mark.  
The actual entry was on 5 October 1990, and Major had by then succeeded Lawson as 
chancellor and Douglas Hurd was foreign secretary. A little more than a month later John 
Major was elected as the new leader of the Conservative Party and replaced Thatcher as prime 
minister. Britain was forced to leave the ERM on 16 September 1992 (‘Black Wednesday’). 
The news about the exit reached Thatcher who was in Washington at the time. Her controlled 
reaction quoted in The Times was: ‘If you try to buck the market, the market will buck 
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you.’216 John Campbell says that she was privately thrilled by the news, which proved her 
anxieties regarding the ERM right. According to Woodrow Wyatt she phoned up friends to 
share the good news.217  
On 19 September, shortly after the ERM-exit, Thatcher delivered a speech to CNN 
World Economic Development Conference in Washington DC. She congratulated John Major 
and chancellor Norman Lamont on the ERM-outcome, and warned against a re-entry at a later 
time. She said that the fixed exchange rate seemed to be regarded as a virility symbol to some 
politicians, and she added: ‘… I must say, for myself, I never felt the need for a virility 
symbol.’218 She referred to the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty that was going to 
take place the next day and she claimed that the British electorate was ‘indignant’ for not 
being allowed their say in a referendum.219 An important qualification of the referendum was, 
according to Thatcher, that it ‘… is not a vote on whether we should have a European 
Community – but on what kind of European Community it should be.’220 
Thatcher stated her vision of the EU in the future and said: ‘We should aim at a multi-
track Europe, in which groups of different states forge varying levels of co-operation and 
integration on a case-by-case basis.’221 It is worth noticing that John Major also talked about a 
multi-track Europe. For him this presented a political solution to the obvious squeeze that 
Britain found herself in: Between the demands for further integration from Britain’s EU 
partners and the Eurosceptical flank in the House of Commons that resisted this.  
In her speech Thatcher envisaged an Atlantic Economic Community for the US, 
Canada, Mexico and the EU countries – a free-trade area consisting of EU and North-
America. She also claimed that other areas would benefit from this co-operation as well; areas 
like defence and culture. She continued: ‘It would, in effect, be the economic underpinning of 
NATO – and make a great deal more sense than the various schemes for giving defence 
identity to the European Community.’222 
Thatcher’s idea of a wide-spread co-operation in an Atlantic Economic Community  
could be seen as somewhat contradictory. She was clearly set against further European 
integration, at the same time as she found an Atlantic Economic Community quite natural for 
increased integration, also when it came to military and cultural areas. It is very difficult to 
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claim that the speech directly prompted the second Early Day Motion (EDM) in the House of 
Commons on 24 September 1992, which called for a ‘fresh start’ for the final ERM- 
withdrawal, and which 60 Tory MPs signed. However, it might have inspired the Eurosceptic 
members of the parliamentary Conservative Party to show their strong antipathy with the 
Maastricht Treaty and the ERM-mechanism that John Major had so strongly advocated.  
In the ensuing House of Commons debate on 24 September Major was given a 
particularly hard time – the Labour Party’s leader, John Smith, attacked the economic policy 
of the government and John Major, saying that he was ‘a devalued prime minister of a 
devalued government.’223 Major presented the plans for the economic policy and the 
continued intentions to have the whole Maastricht Treaty ratified in the House of Commons, 
but was interrupted several times by the Eurosceptic backbenchers Teddy Taylor, Nicholas 
Budgen, John Wilkinson and Michael Spicer.224 
According to Robert Taylor, ‘ …it was the financial crisis of September 1992 that 
intensified conflict inside the party to breaking point over the European issue.’225 It could 
seem that the situation for the Conservatives went from bad to worse. John Major described it 
as ‘… a political and economic calamity. It unleashed havoc in the Conservative Party and it 
changed the political landscape in Britain. On that day, a fifth consecutive Conservative 
election victory, … became remote, it not impossible.’226 The Conservative Party had up until 
then had a reputation for good management of the country’s economy. This reputation 
disappeared together with the astonishing amount of money spent by the government, through 
the Bank of England, in order to avoid devaluation and exit from the ERM. In the House of 
Commons, those who had been sceptical about Britain’s entry into the ERM were now more 
negative towards everything concerning the EU in general and the Maastricht Treaty in 
particular.   
Norman Tebbit, a member of the House of Lords from the summer 1992,227 was a 
Thatcherite politician, attacked Major in newspaper articles and interviews with increased 
frequency, especially after ‘Black Wednesday.’ According to Anthony Seldon, Tebbit was on 
the ‘war path’, claiming that it was ‘Major who had dragged a reluctant government into the 
                                                 
223
  Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life ((London: Phoenix Paperback, 1998), p. 322. 
224
 Seldon, Major: A Political Life, p. 322; Chris Gifford, The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and 
Economy in a Post-Imperial State (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p. 123. 
225
 Robert Taylor, John Major:20 British Prime Ministers of the 20th Century (London: Haus Publishing Limited, 
2006), p. 63. 
226
 John Major, John Major: The Autobiography (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1999), p. 312.  
227
 Several of the politicians included in this study, have aquired a peerage or been enobled. Such titles have been 
excluded here to avoid confusion, since the correct titles have changed from 1990 to the time of writing.  
 67 
ERM.’228 Seldon also insists that Tebbit took on a leading role of speaking for the Thatcherite 
right when it came to criticism of John Major, almost on behalf of Thatcher, who was very 
busy writing her memoirs.229 Another critical voice belonged to Charles Moore, a journalist 
and editor of the Sunday Telegraph from 1992. He described ‘Black Wednesday’ and the 
ERM-exit “a defeat ‘almost as complete as it is possible, in peacetime, to conceive.’”230 
Seven months after Thatcher’s CNN speech John Major spoke to the Conservative 
Group for Europe in London, on 23 April 1993. Thatcher’s vision of an Atlantic Community 
for free trade between European countries and North America was characterized by Major as 
a ‘sugar coated turnip’.231 Major evidently scorned Thatcher’s idea of an Atlantic Community, 
or her clear preference for a wider relationship with North-America to the detriment of the 
EU. He also said that the Maastricht Treaty took on the role of ‘scapegoat for many and 
nameless fears’,232 with a clear reference to the Eurosceptical MPs in the House of Commons 
or in the House of Lords. The question of Britain’s possible re-entry into the ERM continued 
to be contentious for the Conservative Party for many years to come after the speech. 
4.1.3 The Prague Speech, May 1996 
 
Thatcher held a controversial speech on 11 May 1996 in Prague, the Czech Republic, which 
was described by John Campbell as ‘her most frontal attack yet on the European Union.’233. 
She warned against ‘the overall European federalist project’ and ‘the drive towards a 
European superstate.’234 Thatcher talked about her nightmare vision of this future Europe that 
actually might emerge as a rival to the US, and used the failure in the former Yugoslavia on 
the EU’s behalf to end the civil war there and the EU’s dependency on NATO for military 
role in a future conflict.235 Thatcher stated that Europe needed the US for cooperation and 
protection.236  
It can be argued that Thatcher’s Prague speech accentuated the public mood about the 
EU and the dreaded regulations that the Eurosceptic politicians had so often talked about. 
Britain had just experienced that British beef was banned from export to the EU market and 
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also worldwide, due to the mad cow disease.237 Already before her resignation Thatcher had 
decided, according to Anthony Seldon, that ‘she would take on the entire establishment, if 
necessary, to halt the European federalist juggernaut. It had become her last crusade.’238 
According to polls measuring British people’s opinions to the EU, it can be claimed that the 
British electorate gradually became more Eurosceptical. The same shift in a more anti-EU 
direction was also evident with the prime minister and the Conservative press. Thatcher’s 
influence was presumably partly responsible for this shift, although she did not accomplish 
this all by herself. 
 
4.1.4 The Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, January 1996 
 
Thatcher attracted a lot of attention because of her Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture on 11 
January 1996, titled “Liberty and Limited Government”. Keith Joseph (1918-1994) served 7 
years as a member of Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet before he retired.239 He became an 
influential figure within the Conservative Party in the 1980s especially, with his ideas about 
the monetarist economy. He had a huge influence on Thatcher, and he has been credited for 
developing many of the ideas that can be described to constitute ‘Thatcherism’.240  
 Thatcher praised Keith Joseph claiming that Joseph and she had ‘reshaped 
Conservatism’ twenty years earlier.241 They both were sceptical of letting the state take on the 
responsibility for too many tasks in a society, Thatcher said, and if the state alone was 
responsible for the welfare of each individual, the demand for more money would never stop. 
In no subtle language, she described the dangers of the unchecked state and said: ‘… the very 
existence of this State, with its huge capacity for evil, is a potential threat to all the moral, 
cultural, social and economic benefits of freedom.’242 Thatcher argued that the limited 
government had to be the ideal.  
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Thatcher spoke of the ‘ratchet effect’ that would result in the further advancement of 
socialism. This ideology would spread indiscriminately if it was not stopped. She also referred 
to Hayek’s book The Road to Serfdom, which also was about ideologies of different 
civilisations in various parts of the world. In her fairly long speech she commended four 
Conservative MPs: Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley, Michael Howard and John Redwood.243 
Lilley was praised for seeking to reduce the social security payments, Howard for combating 
rising crime figures, Portillo for avoiding plans for common EU military forces, and Redwood 
for denouncing a single currency in the EU.244 John Major was merely given a short mention 
without praise. Towards the end of her Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, Thatcher once again 
criticized the Maastricht Treaty. Here is a short extract: 
 
It wants to regulate our industries and labour markets, pontificate over our tastes, in short to determine 
our lives. The Maastricht Treaty, which established a common European citizenship and greatly 
expanded the remit of the European Commission, shows the outlines of the bureaucratic superstate 
which is envisaged. And Maastricht is the beginning, not the end of that process.245 
  
Two of the most controversial arguments in her speech were probably about devolution and 
the future of the Conservative Party. Thatcher warned about Labour’s plans for devolution, 
and claimed that this might jeopardize the United Kingdom as a union of Scotland, Wales, 
England and Northern Ireland. Moreover, she dismissed the claim that the Conservatives have 
moved too far to the right. There was no need to go back to the ideal of ‘One Nation 
Conservatism’, according to Thatcher. She continued: “As far as I can tell by their views on 
European federalism, such people’s creed would be better described as ‘No Nation 
Conservatism’.”246  
Four days before the Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, John Major had warned of the 
dangers of a divided party. At the Conservative Party conference in October 1995, Major had 
brought up the ‘One Nation’ Conservatism as an ideal for the party to live by. Thatcher’s 
speech highlighted the differences within the Conservative Party, which at the time was doing 
much worse than the Labour Party in opinion polls.247 The Independent rendered an 
abbreviated version of the speech with a quote by Thatcher on the day after the KJ Memorial 
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Lecture with the headline: “Criticism of Tory right is ‘baloney’.”248 The newspaper’s political 
correspondent John Rentoul reported the reactions from several Tory politicians as well as 
MPs from other parties. Their reactions were mixed, but the Conservative MPs were not 
delighted about Thatcher’s views. One said that she certainly would not have allowed such a 
display of open defiance of the party leadership, another said that this was an unwise speech 
from a person who did not have much political impact. John Redwood, who took part in the 
leadership contest in 1995, said: ‘I don’t think splits are very helpful.’249 Spokesman for the 
Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, said: ‘Lady Thatcher in a no-holds barred attack on 
Europe and One Nation Conservatism is further blowing apart any lingering hope of Tory 
unity.’250 Robin Cook, foreign affairs spokesman in the Labour Party, said that John Major 
now had to decide – whether he would publicly support Thatcher’s views or oppose them.251 
The lecture was also commented on by the editor of the Independent, Charles Wilson. His 
editorial was titled “How far would you go, Maggie?”, and here he questioned Thatcher’s 
attack on Britain’s welfare state. Wilson warned about the ‘new strain of English nationalism’ 
which comes from right-wing politicians in Britain.252 Attacks on the welfare state sparked 
public reactions from other politicians as well as commentators. 
The Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture can be said to have had an indirect big impact on 
different political levels. The prime minister was openly challenged by his predecessor, since 
his vision about ‘One Nation Conservatism’ at the party conference was mocked. The future 
of the Conservative Party was also endangered because Thatcher’s views again might lead to 
new trench warfare. The party had fought for so long over the party’s policies on Europe and 
how far they were willing to integrate with the other EU countries. The battle over the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty had damaged the parliamentary party, and had nearly led 
to the resignation of the prime minister. The ‘Whipless Nine’ were back in the party fold and 
John Major had won the leadership contest on 4 July 1995. The last thing the party now 
needed, was someone or something to ruin the frail party unity that they had experienced for 
the last six months or so. The autumn of 1995 had seen the defections of two Conservative 
MPs to other parties (Alan Howarth and Emma Nicholson), and the majority in the House of 
Commons was only 3 in January 1996.  
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The right-wing Thatcherite politicians were presumably more pleased with Thatcher’s 
speech than the other MPs in Parliament. The more Eurofriendly MPs were angry, and Major 
was reported to be furious with Thatcher in the Sunday Telegraph on 14 January 1996. New 
leadership challenges were discussed in the media, to Major’s annoyance.253 The prime 
minister was also interviewed in The Times, where he defended his ‘One Nation’ ideology and 
said: ‘We have been a One Nation party since the beginning of time, and we are now … I will 
not be pushed off what I believe to be right’.254 The Conservative Party continued to struggle, 
partly because John Major never quite mangaged to establish authority over the Thatcherite 
backbenchers and the Eurosceptic cabinet members. The party had been and remained divided 
over several issues, among them the future course of the party and the single currency.  
 
4.1.5 The Plymouth election rally speech, May 2001 
 
Before the 2001 general election in June, Thatcher was invited by Hague to give a speech at 
an election meeting in Plymouth. The reason for inviting her had been to boost volunteer 
party workers, who would have to go out and encourage hesitant voters to participate in the 
election for the benefit of the Conservative Party. Hague was according to Simon Walters 
somewhat anxious about what Thatcher might want to speak about, and he was alerted to find 
out about an interview that the Daily Mail was going to publish on 22 May, which was the 
day of her speech. Thatcher rarely hesitated to speak her mind when she was given the chance 
to talk. In the interview she declared: ‘I want a society of opportunity for all, irrespective of 
colour or ethnic background. But I don’t wish to have what they call a multicultural 
society.’255 This statement presented the party leader with a dilemma. An undistinguished MP, 
John Townend, had just a few weeks earlier caused an uproar with a racist remark when he 
spoke about immigration in Britain. John Taylor, the first black peer in Britain, had reacted 
very strongly and insisted on the importance of a ‘multi-racial, multicultural society’.256 
Thatcher’s remark might trigger furore among Conservatives and the electorate. 
Several people were involved in discussions about Thatcher and her appearance at the 
election rally – whether she should be cancelled or whether the party leader should distance 
himself from her speech. Michael Portillo was advocating that she ought to be stopped, in 
order to prevent the whole election campaign be labelled racist. MPs threatened to resign the 
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campaign if Hague failed to back Thatcher. There was a press conference on the day of 
Thatcher’s speech, and her remark in the Daily Mail about a multicultural society was not 
commented upon. In her speech she did not mention this potentially contentious issue. The 
party workers gave her a solid applause, and Hague’s initiative had paid off. The crisis was 
averted and Hague was equally rewarded with a standing ovation.257   
Whether Thatcher’s appearance at the election rally made a difference on the results of 
the general election is hard to evaluate. However, Labour won the election and secured 
another landslide majority in the House of Commons. Her appearance at the election rally in 
2001, aged 75, also contributed to remind party workers of her former success and popularity, 
even though she had been nearly disqualified from attending due to fears about what she 
might say. 
Margaret Thatcher’s motives for accepting all the different invitations to speak after 
resignation could be many. Her motivation to continue her work as politician has previously 
been mentioned. She did not want to retire and just opt for a quiet life outside Parliament. 
Thatcher stepped down as an MP in June 1992. Shortly afterwards she accepted a peerage and 
became Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven in the House of Lords. Her status as prime minister 
and a well-known statesman changed overnight when she declined to fight in the second 
round of the leadership contest in November 1990 and decided to resign. After a long spell as 
premier, Thatcher was an experienced politician who had a world-wide reputation, both for 
her political achievements as well as her personality. In order to continue her political life, she 
needed to employ staff to manage a private office as well as entertain guests in her new 
London home, which necessarily cost quite a lot to maintain. Several institutions invited her 
to speak for a considerable sum of money, which presumably were welcome contributions to 
enable her to develop her new career outside Parliament. In the US and the Far East she was 
paid to speak, whereas she spoke without gratuity in Britain, Russia, China and Hong Kong. 
According to Clare Beckett, the free speeches were delivered ‘anywhere she felt she could 
have influence.’258 Thatcher was in other words conscious about her potential leverage. 
Another motive for travelling around the world giving lectures and speeches was 
possibly to prove both to herself and others, that she still was popular and a much sought-after 
speaker. Presumably she did not feel the need to prove this; her previous role as prime 
minister and political icon, according to some supporters, gave her the opportunity to just do 
it. The number of speeches that Thatcher held seems to be substantial. However, many were 
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quite similar because they included many the same issues, even though they would to some 
degree seem to be tailor-made for the occasion. On 22 March 2002 Thatcher issued a 
statement announcing that public speaking had to be abandoned due to bad health.259  
 
4.2: Democracy in Hong Kong and support for British firms in Asia 
 
Hong Kong had become a British colony in 1841. In 1898 an agreement between China and 
Britain was signed, stating that Hong Kong was to be handed over to China after a 99-year 
lease. 1997 was the agreed year that China would again be in charge of several islands 
comprising Hong Kong. In the 1992 general election Christopher Patten lost the Conservative 
seat of his Bath constituency. Patten was described to have provided the intellectual 
framework for the policies of the first Major government. The position he agreed to accept, 
was to be the last governor of Hong Kong. Even though Patten was no Thatcherite, he had 
Thatcher’s full support from the moment he had settled in his new job.260  
Patten’s challenge was to secure a smooth transition for the colony and to establish 
democratic institutions to prevent China from nationalizing private companies and 
corporations. In any event, a mass flight of professionals from the colony was not a desirable 
outcome. Hong Kong had become a centre of finance, commerce and industry in Asia since 
the end of the Second World War, and leaders of foreign companies feared the Chinese 
takeover. China had committed herself to maintain Hong Kong’s ‘social and economic 
freedom and capitalistic lifestyle’ for a guaranteed 50-year period, according to the Joint 
Agreement between Britain and China, signed in Beijing in 1984.261  
Since Thatcher had committed Britain in this bilateral agreement, she felt a 
responsibility to see it through. She spent quite a lot of her time to visit Hong Kong and to 
discretly exert her influence. At a critical moment in March 1995 she solved a diplomatic 
crisis that had arisen over the Hong Kong gold reserves. The Chinese government had falsely 
assumed that the British would take the gold reserves with them at the moment of departure in 
1997. Thatcher travelled to Hong Kong to settle the matter, in full agreement with Chris 
Patten and John Major, and managed to do so with some finesse.262 She was still critical of 
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China’s undemocratic ways of treating political opponents, and she did not waver to get her 
point of view across to the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng.263  
As John Campbell points out, this exemplifies that Thatcher still could make an impact 
on a political issue.264 It illustrates that she did not necessarily always behave in a stubborn or 
menacing way when it came to foreign policy matters, which might be the stereotype image 
of Margaret Thatcher that was emphasized by her opponents and rendered in hundreds of 
articles in newspapers and other media. Her efforts in Hong Kong were less controversial than 
her behaviour on the domestic scene.  
Thatcher exerted her influence in several Asian countries that she visited after having 
resigned. The countries with the fastest growing economies, like Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Japan welcomed Thatcher to speak to businessmen and political 
leaders. The American Citibank organized conventions for political leaders and companies all 
over the Far East. Thatcher was invited to join in the conventions from 1992, and she 
managed to divide her time between the formal engagement for Citibank and more personal 
involvement on behalf of British companies based in the Far East. These companies profited 
on her lobbying efforts, while Thatcher enjoyed the extra income.265 If British companies 
abroad are promoted and given publicity in order to win contracts, this can create jobs in 
Britain as well as public revenue and a higher GDP. Indirectly, Thatcher’s contribution to 
British firms based in the Far East might have a political impact, even though it is hard to 
estimate how much this might be worth. If many British companies are successful abroad, 
they pave the way for other companies to establish themselves in other parts of the world. 
 
4.3: Book publications and their impact  
 
The motivation for Margaret Thatcher to agree to a deal to write about her years in 10 
Downing Street could be that she was offered a substantial sum for it. John Campbell argues 
that Mark Thatcher, her son, sought to negotiate an extravagant deal, which failed to 
materialize, and that the final agreed sum of £3.5 million for the two volumes was a lot less 
than originally expected.266 In addition, she was presumably very intent on writing her own 
version of her 11 years as prime minister and making sure that her legacy was properly 
secured for the future. She signed up for publishing two volumes of her memoirs; the first 
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about her years as Britain’s prime minister, the second about her years in politics before she 
was appointed by the Queen to lead the government. The third book which was published in 
2002 summed up her reflections regarding statecraft. 
  
4.3.1 The Downing Street Years 
 
This 900-page book gave a fairly detailed account of what Thatcher had done in the period 
1979-1990, sometimes explaining political processes, occasionally quoting from important 
speeches. Thatcher talked about the fatal leadership election in 1990, and seemed to distance 
herself from supporting John Major as her chosen successor. She spoke of the possible 
leadership candidates that were a generation younger than her, and therefore the most eligible: 
‘… there was a variety of possible candidates who ought to be tested in high office: John 
Major, Douglas Hurd, Ken Baker, Ken Clarke, Chris Patten and perhaps Norman Lamont and 
Michael Howard.’267 Then she rather ruefully added about her cabinet ministers:268 ‘…  I 
believed that they had generally become convinced of the rightness of the basic principles as I 
had. Orthodox finance, low levels of regulation and taxation, a minimal bureaucracy, strong 
defence, a willingness to stand up for British interests wherever and whenever threatened - 
…’
269
 Thatcher stated that she had not been sure about Major as her successor, or at least this 
was the case at the time of the cabinet reshuffle in July 1989, when Major was appointed 
foreign secretary.270 
John Campbell claimed that The Downing Street Years was ‘a shockingly ungenerous 
book’, because nearly all the politicians and staff who had worked with Thatcher, were all 
heavily criticized; except her husband Denis, and her former cabinet members Willie 
Whitelaw and Keith Joseph. Her private secretary and chief press secretary were also spared. 
The BBC had produced a mini-series called The Downing Street Years which was shown in 
October and November 1993.271 This series revealed ‘the unrelenting force of her 
personality’, according to Campbell.272 The book and the TV series was a part of her legacy 
and presumably how she saw herself and her past political colleagues, and it said a lot about 
her personality as well as her achievements.  
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The Downing Street Years was to be published in October 1993, and both Daily 
Mirror and The Times were able to reveal snippets from the book on 5 and 6 October, 
respectively, in the week of the party conference. The conference went quite well for John 
Major, who talked little about the EU and sounded less intent to please his European partners 
than he had been in 1991 in his ‘Britain at the heart of Europe speech’ in Germany. He said: 
‘So let me say to some of our European colleagues, You’re playing with fires. Or, to put it 
more bluntly, Get your tractors off our lawn.’ He also discussed the challenges for 
international trade and stated: ‘At present, Europe, our biggest market, is stuck deep in 
recession. It’s held back by social costs it can’t afford.’273 Major’s Eurosceptic tone was also 
echoed by several others. The Eurosceptic MP Bill Cash had established the think-tank 
European Foundation in 1993, and several members shared their Eurosceptic views at the 
conference.274  
 Several Conservative Party delegates were not too pleased with their former prime 
minister and what she had written in the Downing Street Years. Many of them had a personal 
reason to feel offended, others might have been put off because of the apparent disloyalty 
conveyed in the book – both to the party and also to the present prime minister. As a direct 
consequence of the leaked sections from the memoirs, Thatcher received a muted ovation at 
the conference. Some delegates refused to stand when she arrived, according to Anthony 
Seldon.275 The displeasure was only to become bigger when the whole book was published.  
Thatcher appeared on Breakfast with Frost on 17 October 1993 to promote her book. 
She had criticized Major in her memoirs, claiming that he ‘… intellectually … was drifting 
with the tide’, when she described his views of the EU in general.276 In the interview she 
stated that Major “… was now back on ‘the true path of Conservatism’”.277 Thatcher gave 
many interviews to different media, she signed her book, and she also went to the US and 
Japan to promote her book which sold well, both in hardcover and even better in the 
paperback edition.278 Several former members of Thatcher’s cabinets had already published 
their memoirs; for instance Nigel Lawson, Kenneth Baker, Norman Tebbit, Nicholas Ridley 
and more were to come later on. 279 Prominent former ministers were invited to review 
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Thatcher’s book in newspapers and magazines in November 1993; they were Geoffrey Howe, 
Nigel Lawson and Douglas Hurd.280 This again illustrates the interest for Thatcher’s book. 
However, the criticism and the depreciation asserted in the book was enhanced by the 
publicity that Thatcher got in interviews and on book promotion tours. Many Conservative 
newspapers were sympathetic with Thatcher and her Eurosceptic views. They also tended to 
criticize John Major’s way of governing the country. This was probably a contributing factor 
to explain the publicity that Thatcher was able to enjoy, and the Conservative press presented 
a sounding board for Thatcher’s ideas. This is somewhat discussed in chapter 5. 
 
4.3.2 The Path to Power 
 
The Path to Power was about Margaret Thatcher’s childhood and the start of her career as a 
politician until the 1979 general election, when she became prime minister. When it was 
published in May 1995, it attracted even more attention than the first book had, probably due 
to the fact that Thatcher had included a part about the last four and a half years since her 
resignation. Her criticism of John Major’s policies was reinforced, and the issues that she 
emphasized were the EU policy, Britain’s efforts in the war in Yugoslavia, and the 
government spending that had increased since she left office.281 The Sunday Times printed 
passages from the book, with the headline “Thatcher launches savage attack on Major’s 
misguided policies.”282 The newspaper apparently took Thatcher’s side when reviewing the 
Conservative government’s performance at the time.   
Simon Jenkins in The Times, however, took a different view of the book. His headline 
was “The ghost of Margaret Thatcher is once again howling along the corridors of 
Westminister”.283 He mounted a defence for John Major, claiming that he had carried on 
Thatcher’s policies quite loyally, only changing what needed to be changed, and that Major 
‘had actually been a better Thatcherite than Lady Thatcher herself.’284 Since two broadsheet 
newspapers contributed to a debate on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher and her criticism of 
her successor, it can be seen to illustrate Thatcher’s influence more than four years after her 
resignation. She was still able to initiate a discussion and indirectly this enhanced the sale of 
her book.  
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Thatcher was busy going on book promotion tours and giving interviews at the launch 
of The Path to Power. One of the issues that she felt strongly about was the withdrawal of the 
whip from eight Tory MPs because they abstained in a crucial vote in November 1994, on the 
Second Reading of the European Communities (Finance Bill). This had been made a vote of 
confidence by Major, who wanted to avoid defeat. Major’s decision was regarded as 
controversial, both in the House of Commons and in the media. Those who supported the 
Eurosceptic MPs generally condemned the withdrawal of the whip. The ‘Whipless 
Nine’arranged numerous press conferences and voiced their criticism of the Conservative 
government and John Major’s EU policies, and they continued to pose a threat to the 
government’s survival in the House of Commons. 285  On 24 April 1995 the whip was restored 
to the eight MPs that originally lost it, and they were accepted back as members of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party without any punitive measures from the Whips or their 
constituencies.286 Thatcher had advocated her support for the ‘Whipless Nine’ since the 
incident and for an immediate restoration of the whip.287 
Furthermore, on the book promotion tours, Thatcher claimed that the Conservatives 
suffered defeat in opinion polls because they were ‘not being Conservative enough’.288 She 
also wanted to see law and order restored and she attacked the welfare state system in Britain. 
289
 Thatcher stated her intentions for guiding people to the right policies  ‘…  on Europe, the 
wider international scene, social policy and the economy.’290 In The Path to Power Thatcher 
encouraged those unhappy with Major’s policies and leadership to do something about it by 
saying: ‘I offer some thoughts about putting these things right. It is now, however, for others 
to take the action required.’291 The quotation seemed to echo the words in Geoffrey Howe’s 
resignation speech, when he encouraged someone to act because of his dissatisfaction with the 
then present leader (i.e. Margaret Thatcher). Now Thatcher indicated that the time had come 
for the party to choose a new leader. 292  
On 21 July 1994 Tony Blair succeeded John Smith as leader of the Labour Party, after 
Smith’s sudden death the previous month. In The Path to Power it became clear that Thatcher 
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thought very highly of Tony Blair, to the embarrassment of several Tory politicians. Her 
praise did not exactly make matters easier for John Major, who clearly was not as highly 
esteemed by the former premier. There was speculation in The Times published on 29 May 
1995 about Thatcher’s praise for Tony Blair and her attacks on John Major, resulting in the 
conclusion that she thought it was time for Major to go.293 
However, Thatcher stated on 12 June that she would urge people to vote for Major in 
an eventual leadership challenge in an article in The Times.294 Speculation was ripe in the 
media and among politicians. According to party rules, the party leader can announce a 
leadership contest after the opening of a new session of Parliament or this can take place 
within the first three months after a general election. The opportunity for a leadership contest 
is limited to take place once a year.295 The timing of the next event took many by surprise. 
Only a month after the publication of The Path to Power, John Major did something 
unprecedented in terms of an incumbent prime minister. He resigned and declared a 
leadership contest, where he would be one of the contenders. This can be interpreted as a 
direct consequence of Thatcher’s latest book and all its negative claims about the present 
government. There had been frequent discussions about a possible change of leader since 
Major took office, and Thatcher was only one of many who had criticized him.  
Major launched his ‘Put up or shut up’ campaign, inviting political challengers to step 
forward, or alternatively stop voicing their disapproving comments on the present prime 
minister and his policies. Major had recently met rebellious backbenchers at a meeting with 
the Fresh Start group just before he resigned. According to an article in the Daily Telegraph 
published 3 July 1995, Major blamed Europe to be the cause of the criticism above anything 
else.296 Assumedly he meant the EU and the ongoing debates in the House of Commons that 
nearly split the Conservative Party. Thatcher had contributed to the debate with her new book, 
scorning Major and his policies. 
John Redwood, secretary of state for Wales, resigned his post to stand for election as 
leader of the Conservative Party. Other possible contenders were Norman Lamont and 
Michael Portillo. Alan Clark describes in his book how George Gardiner, chairman of the ‘92 
Group’, changed his mind before the leadership election. He had previously urged Norman 
Lamont to stand, but shortly before the vote he decided to back John Redwood instead. It is 
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quite likely that most members of the ‘92 Group’ voted for Redwood also, on Gardiner’s 
recommendation, and they constituted around 80 members at the time.297 Portillo seemed to 
hesitate whether to stand or not in the first ballot, although it was reported that he actually had 
forty extra telephone lines installed after the leadership contest was announced.298 It seemed 
likely that he wanted to stand, but he apparently had second thoughts about his candidacy or 
participation.  
On 4 July 1995 there were only two contestants; John Major and John Redwood. 
Major received 218 votes, Redwood 89, whereas 22 voters abstained.299 Major won with a 
clear majority, but still there were nearly one third of the Conservative MPs who had not 
voted for him. Major was clearly aware what this number signalled; even though he had 
secured a solid win, his adversaries constituted a solid opposition and could possibly still 
continue their rebellious behaviour in the House of Commons. Alan Clark described the mood 
after the election had taken place: ‘So in the immediate aftermath of the contest the party 
remained unhappy. A large number among them had wanted, and others had deluded 
themselves that they wanted, to displace John Major. But who with? They were never 
agreed.’300 Ian Pendlington wrote about the outcome of the leadership contest, and supported 
Clark’s views on the lack of success in July:’… it did nothing to stifle critics on both sides of 
a European debate that had caused a division too deep within the party to be resolved with a 
change of leader.’301  
Thatcher, who had been fairly ambiguous about who she wanted as party leader was 
perhaps unhappy with the outcome of the leadership election as well. Although she had 
publicly supported Major in June, her Path to Power indicated that she was far from 
impressed by Major, and that she encouraged other politicians to take on the challenge as a 
leader.  
 
4.3.3: Thatcher’s last book Statecraft 
 
Thatcher’s third book, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, was published in 2002, 
and it managed to make the headlines as well. Thatcher stated in the introduction of the book 
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that her motivation for writing it had changed because of the terrorist attacks on the Twin 
Towers on 11 September 2001. She propagated the importance of defence, of national 
security and of vigilance when it comes to intelligence. Again she repeated the claim that 
spending on welfare had been too high.302   
Most of the chapters in the book are linked to foreign policy and issues related to 
different parts of the world. It is a non-fiction book which is based on a lot of facts, although 
it clearly presents a subjective point of view. Two chapters which focus on the European 
Union and Britain’s role in Europe were serialised in The Times. Thatcher wrote admiringly 
about the American support that Europe had enjoyed for a long time, especially since World 
War Two. The real controversy commenced in her descriptions of the EU. She wrote: ’Europe 
as a whole is fundamentally unreformable.’303 Her relentless attack continued: ‘Each new 
global development … has served as a spur to create a politically united Europe. We are at or 
very near the point of no return.’304 The chapter called ‘Europe – Dreams and Nightmares’ 
spelled out the threat of further integration:  
 
What we should grasp, however, from the lessons of European history is that, first, there is nothing 
necessarily benevolent about programmes of European integration; second, the desire to achieve grand 
utopian plans often poses a grave threat to freedom; and third, European unity has been tried before, 
and the outcome was far from happy.305 
 
Thatcher actually advocated that Britain should withdraw from the EU and join the North 
American Free Trade Area instead. This point of view aroused fierce controversy in the 
House of Commons and also in the Conservative Party. The party carried out a poll to 
examine whether Conservative constituency chairmen supported Thatcher or not. A clear 
majority of 71 per cent did not support her, and many claimed that this time she had gone too 
far.306  
 As a direct consequence of the Statecraft publication together with the serialisation in 
The Times, the leader of the Conservative Party Iain Duncan Smith was confronted by Tony 
Blair, then prime minister, to say whether Duncan Smith supported Thatcher’s views. Duncan 
Smith did not denounce Thatcher, but there were others who did, among them Francis Maude, 
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who responded furiously, according to an article in The Times on 22 March 2002. He 
contradicted her anti-EU conviction, and launched a counter-attack: 
 
The ‘negative caricature’ promoted by ‘small-minded, xenophobic and bickering Little Englanders’ 
made it much more difficult for the Conservatives to engage in the great debate about the future of the 
European Union. … We do not believe it was wrong for Britain to join the EU. We do not believe that 
mainland Europe has been the source of all evil.307  
 
A few days later Thatcher retracted from further public debate due to bad health because of 
her doctor’s advice. She continued to make a few appearances, but she refrained from saying 
much. Iain Duncan Smith continued to advocate a Eurosceptic agenda in the House of 
Commons emphasizing the danger of the bureaucratic EU that only spelled disaster if further 
integration was pursued, in other words the same as Thatcher had warned against.308  
The publication of Thatcher’s memoirs in 1993 and 1995, as well as her book 
Statecraft in 2002, all received a lot of attention in the media. The timing of the book releases 
made sure that the books were much talked about. The other aspect that also contributed to 
this was Thatcher’s claims about the present government, her successor, about the 
Conservative Party and many of her political enemies. She could have decided to avoid 
confrontation or to expose the Conservative Party’s internal squabbles publicly. This was not 
on Thatcher’s agenda. On the contrary, she wanted to highlight the discussions and present 
her views and vision for the future, possibly believing that she was in the right and that other 
people would eventually change their minds if they disagreed with her. Presumably she did 
not intend to cause any difficulty to the Conservative Party with her books, it is possible that 
she just wanted to contribute to putting things straight by confronting the controversial issues. 
If her books escalated the Conservative Party’s problems, she probably regarded that as an 
unavoidable consequence; something slightly uncomfortable or undesirable, nevertheless 
worthwhile in order ‘to put matters right’.  
 
4.4: Influential articles, their timing and effect 
 
Only three articles written by Margaret Thatcher have been selected for examination. All of 
them were published in 1992 – two of them in American publications and the third in a short-
lived British newspaper. Thatcher apparently enjoyed making speeches more than writing 
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articles, because she did not have many articles published. The selected articles were arguably 
quite influential when they were published. 
 
4.4.1 “The autumn of our discontent” in The European, October 1992 
 
Coinciding with the Conservative Party conference in 1992 in Brighton, an article written by 
Margaret Thatcher was published on 8 October in the newspaper The European. Its headline 
was followed by this introductory statement: ‘As the Conservative Party conference reveals 
deep divisions over Maastricht, Thatcher says why she sees the treaty as an outdated vision of 
Europe.’309 
Thatcher’s highly critical views on the Major government were given two pages’ 
coverage, and the article soon made the headlines of all the other media.310  The themes of the 
article were the ERM, economic policy, the European Union with its goals of political, social 
and economic union for its member countries. One sentence that has been often quoted is this: 
‘Although the final decision for Britain to cease issuing sterling would rest with the House of 
Commons, we would be on the conveyor belt to a single currency, committed to each stage 
preceding it.’311 Thatcher wrote about the two alternative visions of Europe as she saw it; one 
federalist Europe being run by Brussels – that could be seen as a sort of ‘United States of 
Europe’. The other vision was a Europe that continued to be constituted by independent 
sovereign countries that could co-operate in their trade as well as keeping up a good 
relationship with the United States, ‘Europe’s great friend and protector’.  Thatcher stressed 
the need for the Conservative Party to ‘be united, not torn apart’.  
The timing of this article was probably no coincidence. The conference planned to 
discuss the party’s policies on Europe, and Thatcher stage-managed herself to play a leading 
role, even though she was supposed to stay quiet during the conference week. In addition, she 
managed to create negative publicity over the Conservative Party, and the declared desired 
party unity had been attacked or possibly consciously ruined. Thatcher did not achieve this all 
on her own. There were several other Tory MPs who also did their very best presenting their 
apparent disdain for the Maastricht Treaty in television interviews during the conference 
week.312 
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A part of the article was about the Maastricht Treaty issue which was contentious – 
especially in Parliament, but it gained momentum in the electorate as the years went by. Many 
voters did not care too much about the Maastricht Treaty and the single currency issue in 
1992. Most of the debate seemed to take place in the House of Commons or in the House of 
Lords, and the electorate in general did not think that the issue mattered to them. The 
Maastricht Treaty in itself was regarded as quite complex to understand, and only a small 
number of people bothered to read it thoroughly. Some of the Eurosceptical politicians, on the 
other hand, had scrutinized it and found objectionable implications for Britain. In fact, they 
felt that Britain’s future as an independent and sovereign country was at stake. As previously 
mentioned, on 3 June there was an Early Day Motion for a ‘fresh start’ on the Maastricht 
Treaty, which was signed by 69 MPs as a direct consequence of the result of the Danish 
referendum.313 This was seen as the moment when the whole treaty might be rejected – since 
all the EU countries had to ratify it in order for it to be valid. The Danes had a second 
referendum in May 1993, and this time the majority voted in favour of it.314 Later on, the 
issues of the referendum and the single currency were still strongly debated in the House of 
Commons. The immaculate timing of The European article seems quite shrewd, if the aim 
was to attract media publicity. It might also have influenced the discussions that took place at 
the party conference. 
 
4.4.2 “Don’t Undo My Work” in Newsweek, April 1992 
 
This critical article was published on 27 April 1992 in the American magazine Newsweek. 
The accompanying subtitle was: “I Don’t Accept The Idea That All Of A Sudden Major Is 
His Own Man”. 315 Here Thatcher condemned the economic policies of the government as 
well as the increased controls or powers of the state. She warned Major against government 
intervention in industry and she advocated restrictions in public spending. In regard to 
spending on welfare programs, she wanted to focus on the duties that should accompany 
benefits or support. Thatcher wrote about the spirit of enterprise which according to her 
needed promotion. Thatcher also attacked John Major’s personality and his desire for 
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consensus in the parliamentary Conservative Party. She described consensus as lack of 
principle; which she deplored. Instead she wanted to restore the ‘great principles’. 
Considering the time of publication, Thatcher’s motive for writing this article seems 
somewhat uncertain. It was published just after the 1992 general election, which against all 
odds the Conservative Party had won, getting a small majority in the House of Commons. It is 
possible that she felt vindictive, and possibly a little jealous of Major, who now could 
continue as prime minister. The effect of Thatcher’s attacks on Major was wearing him down. 
A Downing Street employee was quoted in Campbell’s book, describing how Major felt about 
the attacks from Thatcher: ‘The devil was in the drip feed, the constant gnawing away at 
him.’316 Arguably Thatcher still had not come to terms with her new destiny and the way she 
left office. After the general election it is plausible that she felt free to criticize Major, since 
the Conservative Party continued with a majority in the House of Commons.   
 
4.4.3 “Stop the excuses. Help Bosnia now” in New York Times, August 
1992 
 
When Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991 and experienced the call from the different republics 
to become independent countries, civil war broke out. Thatcher by then had resigned as 
premier, but her concern for what happened in Europe was undiminished. She vociferously 
advocated her support for the republics that wanted sovereignty. The first republics in the 
former Yugoslavia to declare their independence were Slovenia and Croatia. Soon afterwards 
Bosnia followed suit.  
According to the article which was published on 6 August 1992, Thatcher was furious 
about the apparent unwillingness by the West to get involved in order to stop the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ that was taking place in Bosnia. An arms embargo had been placed by the UN, 
which Thatcher found intolerable, since this meant that the Bosnians were increasingly unable 
to defend themselves against the Serbs. Thatcher called for American intervention, through 
NATO, since the EU was unable or unwilling to get involved militarily.317 Despite the 
celebrated ‘special relationship’ that Britain and the US had enjoyed especially after the 
Second World War, Thatcher’s article in the New York Times did not lead to the American 
involvement that Thatcher apparently was hoping to achieve. According to Anthony Seldon, 
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Thatcher was naïve in her attempt to influence the Americans. The only concessions that she 
managed to get, were from President George Bush (senior) and former secretary of state 
James Baker, declaring that they regarded the civil war in Yugoslavia to be a matter to be 
solved by the Europeans. They supported Thatcher as far as saying that the Serb aggression 
had to be met by ‘tough action’.318  
Some of the ministers in the Major cabinet strongly opposed British intervention, as 
did some of the Tory backbenchers. The Conservative MPs were divided on the issue of 
Bosnia. John Major and Douglas Hurd reacted strongly against Thatcher’s initiative.319 Maybe 
the resentment stems from the debate that followed in the newspapers and other media, where 
reactions from the British politicians governing the country were called for. The Major 
government was forced to respond to non-governmental ‘interference’ in public from a 
formidable force in the shape of Margaret Thatcher, instead of concentrating on policies in the 
House of Commons. The role of the newspapers will be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
4.5: Interviews and articles about Margaret Thatcher 
 
A few interview and articles have been selected because of the issues they covered, in order to 
further illustrate how Thatcher was given ample media coverage to voice her opinion on 
current political matters. Naturally, she had a lot of valuable knowledge about many political 
aspects, after having spent so many years in government. Usually the themes were related to 
foreign policy or the EU, as other chapters also have demonstrated. 
Thatcher described herself as a conviction politician – presumably she remained as 
convicted when she stepped down as an MP and intended to use all the available channels to 
continue fighting for what she believed was right. Politics had consumed her life since she 
was elected in 1959 as an MP for Finchley. She was probably aware that her statements were 
put under close scrutiny by British journalists and commentators, in addition to local media on 
her many travels. Her speeches and public statements were not necessarily exclusively 
tailored for the British press, but on the other hand it is quite likely that she was aware of the 
attention she commanded also after her resignation in 1990. Several journalists appreciated 
that she frequently gave them clear policy statements in addition to the occasional hint of 
criticism about her successor, John Major.  
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The issue of a British referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and a single currency was 
recurring quite frequently in statements by Thatcher, both in Parliament and in other forums. 
On the TV-show Frost on Sunday on 28 June 1992 Thatcher called for a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty. She echoed Michael Spicer and described the Maastricht Treaty as a treaty 
too far. Spicer had written A Treaty Too Far: a new policy for Europe the same year. In 
Denmark the Maastricht Treaty was subject to a referendum on 2 June 1992, and the result 
was a narrow defeat (50.7 to 49.3 per cent voted against).320 Thatcher insisted on the need for 
a British referendum and announced her intention of voting against the treaty in the House of 
Lords.321 There was actually a vote in the House of Commons whether a referendum should 
take place in Britain on 22 April 1993. The motion was defeated 363-124.322  
The referendum issue became pivotal for Thatcher, as for a number of Eurosceptic 
politicians. On 28 July 1996, her affection for the Referendum Party was cited in the Sunday 
Telegraph, in addition to a claim that she would not fight for the Conservative Party in the 
next general election in any constituency where the Referendum Party also fought for a 
seat.323 On 31 August the Guardian had an article which stated that Thatcher actually 
intended to defect the Conservative Party and support the Referendum Party instead. Rumours 
were rendered about Thatcher’s high regard for James Goldsmith, founder of the Referendum 
Party. It later turned out that the last article had no valid source.324 
Thatcher was asked on 18 April 1997, shortly before the 1997 general election, 
whether she supported the single currency. Her answer was short and decisive: ‘Good 
heavens. No! I was the one who invented the answer, no, No, NO!’325 Thatcher had promised 
the party chairman to avoid controversial statements in the count-down to the general 
election, but was tempted to react spontaneously when she was interviewed while she was out 
shopping. The millionaire Paul Sykes took part in the election campaign, supporting 
constituencies that were pronouncing their stand against the single currency. He did not 
necessarily do this because Thatcher had stated her aversion against it. However, his 
contribution weighed in, persuading people in a manner that could be compared to paying a 
bribe in order to support a political course. 
There were several ministers in Major’s cabinet who were seen as ‘Europhile’, or 
more in favour of the increased European integration as well as a single currency, among 
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them Michael Heseltine (deputy prime minister 1995-97) and Kenneth Clarke (chancellor 
1993-97). The Conservative Party conflict was out in the open once more, with the old 
wounds from the Maastricht debates and the division evident for all to see. Clarke had an 
outburst on 19 April 1997, where he spoke of the controversy over the EU, “ … calling the 
idea that the EU posed a threat to Europe ‘paranoid nonsense’.”326 There were others too, who 
joined the debate in the newspapers. Teddy Taylor, a dedicated Eurosceptic, talked about the 
battle against European federalism.327 In the election campaign the Labour Party decided that 
they were in favour of a referendum on the issue of the single currency, and this made it even 
harder for the Conservative Party not to have a clear stand. Thatcher was not the only 
contributor in this fight, but she was in no doubt about her view on the subject. The 
Conservative government was led by a divided cabinet, with a seemingly wavering prime 
minister who did not want to cause any ministerial resignations over the issue. Thatcher’s 
speeches in Washington, Prague and The Hague together with her TV interview and her 
European article added to the controversy in the Conservative Party with strong disagreement 
regarding the British EU policy. 
Thatcher was invited to present her views by the BBC on television on several 
occasions. She appeared on 13 April 1993, when she criticized the British government in 
general, and foreign secretary Douglas Hurd in particular.328 He had previously stated that if 
the arms embargo was lifted, it would create ‘a level killing field’. Thatcher dissociated 
herself from this phrase, labelling it ‘terrible and disgraceful.’329 She again condemned the EU 
and said: ’We have been a little like an accomplice to massacre.’330 Martyn Lewis asked 
whether she would pinpoint this characterization to John Major personally, but this she 
refused to do.331 The choice of words used by Thatcher is somewhat typical of how she often 
spoke publicly, both in office and later. It seems that she relished in conflicts where she could 
take a clear stand for or against, and then she could advocate her views without paying too 
much attention to the small nuances or reservations that experienced politicians often learn to 
include when they argue something in a public debate.  
The impact of her TV interview in 1993 could be that she actually managed to 
highlight the terrible situation in Yugoslavia. However, some people think that simplified 
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characterizations and hyperbole only serve to intensify a conflict, since the issue probably can 
be seen from different sides and can be argued differently.. When Thatcher talked about 
people being ‘accomplice to massacre’ it was a statement probably intended to shock. Most 
people would strongly reject the proposition that they are indirectly supporting that a 
massacre is taking place, and they react at strong accusations like that. Thatcher’s contribution 
could be seen to make it harder for the government to find a long-term solution in agreement 
with other European countries as well as elsewhere. Thatcher saw easy solutions where others 
saw a number of long-term consequences of their policies. 
A year later, on 30 November 1994, Thatcher also gave a TV interview on BBC. This 
time she was interviewed by John Simpson. Simpson referred to her conversation with the 
American Senator Robert Dole, where she had discussed with him the issue of ‘safe havens’ 
for people in the region of Bihac. Thatcher had been very critical about NATO and the 
organization’s loss of credibility in relation to Bosnia.332 Again she repeated her disagreement 
with Douglas Hurd and the foreign office on the Bosnia issue. She rounded it off by claiming 
that she had tackled aggressive conflicts better (than Hurd) when she was in charge. 333 
Thatcher’s confrontations with Hurd started shortly after her resignation, disregarding the 
differences they might have had while she was still prime minister. Hurd comments on 
Thatcher in his book Memoirs: 
 
Throughout the four years of war in Croatia and Bosnia Margaret Thatcher impressed on me in letters, 
telephone calls and meetings her strong conviction that the question was a simple one of aggression by 
one country, Serbia, against the others; we should deal with Milosevic the aggressor as she had dealt 
with the Argentines and as all of us had dealt with Saddam Hussein.334 
 
 
On 27 June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, Thatcher tried to 
tell Hurd what to do, as if she was still in charge.335 Thatcher apparently quite fervently 
advocated that the Americans should act; Hurd described her frequent interference like this:  
“ … for the American administration, which was under constant pressure from senator Bob 
Dole, Margaret Thatcher and other partisans of ‘lift’.”336 Thatcher was characterized as one of 
‘Bosnia’s warmest partisans’ by Hurd.337 One of the reasons for involving herself so whole-
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heartedly for Bosnia, could be that she wanted to avoid a communist government in the newly 
independent states in Eastern Europe.  
The British government had frequent conversations with state leaders in the other 
European countries, as well as in NATO and world-wide organizations like the United 
Nations. Finally the Americans engaged themselves more whole-heartedly and brokered the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1995. This was hardly a consequence of Thatcher’s efforts to 
establish peace in the region. It is conceivable that she contributed to put Bosnia on the 
agenda in the media very early on, or that she raised the issue in newspaper articles and 
interviews when the atrocities were reported in a variety of news channels. Since her view of 
the conflict was somewhat simplified, her calls for military involvement might not have 
benefited the Major government. 
Thatcher’s high regard for Tony Blair was also commented upon shortly before the 
1997 general election by Paul Johnson in the Sunday Telegraph on 16 March 1997. “Tony is 
the ‘good son’ Margaret never had”, he stated in the headline. Johnson argued that Tony Blair 
had quite a lot in common with Thatcher in terms of ideology and personality. Thatcher had 
previously assured the electorate ‘we have no reason to fear a Blair Government’.338 The 
reasons for this trust in Blair were many, but above all he was ‘a British patriot’, and he 
would be able to tackle the European federalists, according to Thatcher in Johnson’s article. 
Her unrestrained admiration for Blair presumably contributed to John Major’s chagrin before 
the general election, even though this article was written by somebody else. 
 Thatcher’s TV appearances and the newspaper reports about her gave her an excellent 
opportunity to set the agenda for debate. Often this opportunity was used to diminish John 
Major’s authority when she criticized what the government did or should have done. 
4.6: Conclusion 
 
Thatcher always said that she was a ‘conviction politician’. It is possible that she through her 
speeches and articles just emphasized her engagement in the different issues, instead of 
thinking about what was best for the Conservative Party or what was best for the new prime 
minister. An important quality of her speeches and articles were that they displayed how 
disunited the party had become and how serious the divisions were. In addition, her 
deprecatory view of John Major ruined his chances to unite the party. He did not have the 
authoritative streak of Margaret Thatcher, which could have enabled him to strike back more 
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forcefully; Major’s cautious approach to leadership was in fact seen as one of the reasons he 
was chosen as her successor in 1990. Thatcher tried to make an impact on Bosnia and foreign 
policy, but her contribution in the Hong Kong controversy before the handover of the past 
colony to China in 1997 made a lasting positive impact. When it comes to other issues, 
Thatcher’s insistence to voice her concerns and her opposition to the present policies was 
presumably very harmful to the Conservative Party in the 1990s. 
Thatcher contributed to a fervent discussion about former and present politicians and 
her own legacy. The media gave her a lot of attention when her books were launched, and the 
promotion of her books was generously helped when the controversy was spelled out on the 
front pages of several newspapers. In numerous interviews Thatcher could broaden her attacks 
on the present government and its policies. John Major’s leadership was one of the issues that 
was criticized, as was his attitude towards the EU and the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, 
Thatcher wanted to influence the direction of the Conservative Party, claiming they had not 
been conservative enough. This claim would probably be denied by many party members, 
who felt that the party already had moved to the right in their political agenda. 
Some of the themes in Thatcher’s books can be said to promote British nationalism 
and the importance of the British sovereignty as well as a British currency. Thatcher 
maintained that the relationship with the US was of prior importance, and that the Atlantic co-
operation should be preferred to further integration of the EU countries. Thatcher fought 
relentlessly for her legacy through her books, and she remained as convicted as she had ever 
been that her point of view was the superior one. She did not regret much; she declared that 
some things had not turned out as she had expected. Her examples here were the Single 
European Act, which she signed in 1985, and her perception of John Major, that she 
encouraged as her successor in 1990. It is difficult to know what would have happened if The 
Path to Power had not been published in 1995, but all the speculation about a leadership 
contest was emphasized and enhanced with the book. Even though Major won with a clear 
majority, it did not restore his authority as a party leader.  
Thatcher’s views found a lot of support with the Conservative newspapers; that is to 
say their proprietors and editors in general, even though there was the occasional journalist 
who supported John Major and actually questioned Thatcher’s legacy. Her influence in the 
public debate was enhanced because her views coincided with the right-wing press, or maybe 
the increasingly Eurosceptic press supported her views that she expressed in her books. In 
interviews and on book promotion tours she happily supplied journalists with eye-catching 
headlines because of her controversial views.  
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Chapter 5: 
The indirect influence via Eurosceptic, Thatcherite groups 
and Eurosceptic newspapers 
 
5.1: Think-tanks and Thatcherite Eurosceptic organizations  
 
This chapter is mainly about indirect influence. Some right-wing Thatcherite or Eurosceptic 
groups shared Margaret Thatcher’s views on policies in general or on the issue of further 
European integration. As will be discussed later, some of the groups were explicitly guided by 
what they perceived to be Thatcher’s ideas on certain issues; for instance the Bruges Group, 
the Conservative Way Forward and the No Turning Back group. Other groups were more or 
less discreetly supported by Thatcher, as could be the case of the 92 Group and the Fresh Start 
parliamentary group. Before the 1997 general election Thatcher donated money and supported 
the European Foundation and the Referendum Party. Some voters would probably find it 
remarkable that a former Conservative premier voiced direct support for a party that posed a 
threat to the Conservative Party in the coming election.  
 Thatcherite groups influenced the House of Commons to a considerable degree in the 
rebellious period from the 1992 general election until Labour won the next general election in 
1997. The groups mentioned above claimed their resistance against the Maastricht Treaty and 
a single currency and typically supported the demand for a national referendum over the same 
issues. These issues seemed also to preoccupy Thatcher a lot of the time – they were repeated 
frequently in speeches, debates, and in her books. Seen in isolation, each group might not 
seem influential. Some were only parliamentary groups, others were established outside 
Parliament, and a third variety included people both from Parliament and outside Parliament. 
However, many prominent Conservative politicians were members of several of these 
organizations at the same time. Thus, when seen in conjunction they constituted quite a 
powerful network of people who probably all had direct or indirect access to the politicians in 
the House of Commons. Members of these organizations could be important lobbyists to the 
various select committees that were responsible for research and policy-making and indirectly 
their influence could be substantial. Anthony Forster says that ‘… there was growing if 
tentative convergence among Conservative sceptics after 1988.’339 It is conceivable that this 
caused many of the sceptics to organize in target-oriented groups, even if they had different 
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reasons for their scepticism. Figure 1 on page 105 lists the presumably most prominent 
members of several right-wing groups or think-tanks. It is supposed to illustrate the 
considerable overlap in membership of different Thatcherite or Eurosceptic groups that 
existed in the 1990s. A few groups that are neither Thatcherite nor Eurosceptic are added to 
the list as well. Figure 2 on page 106 lists the different groups with the honorary offices that 
were given to many of the same politicians. These two figures are by no means complete; 
only a few selected prominent Conservative politicians are included.  
 Political journalists would also meet politicians and lobbyists in the House of 
Commons on a regular basis, and they also constituted a network. The last part of the chapter 
discusses the role of political journalists in the British press after Thatcher resigned, 
especially those who worked in the right-wing or conservative newspapers.  
 
5.2: The Bruges Group 
 
In her Bruges speech in September 1988 Thatcher voiced her opposition to the implicatios of 
further European integration. Her backdrop was the new-found dynamic within the EU340, 
generated by the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in the mid-1980s.341 Thatcher 
may have come to the conclusion that other EU countries planned to exploit the agenda of 
market integration to promote integration of related policy areas. The Bruges Speech led to 
the creation of the Bruges Group, a London-based think-tank established in February 1989. It 
set out  ‘… to promote the idea of a less centralised European structure than that emerging in 
Brussels.’342 It does not necessarily promote ideas or policies in support of any party, but in 
its mission statement is says that it ‘… aims to promote discussion on the European Union 
and to advance the education of the public on European affairs.’ Furthermore it states that the 
group will be ‘… equipping politicians, key opinion-formers and the media with the 
information needed for a complete restructuring of Britain’s relationship with other European 
countries.’343  
The Bruges Group also had a ‘Friends of Bruges Group’ in the House of Commons. 
More than 100 MPs belonged to this group at the end of the 1980s, and it has been said that it 
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is like a party within a party.344 Assumedly the ‘Friends of Bruges Group’ was actively 
campaigning to have their MPs elected in important committees, for instance on foreign 
affairs or Europe. 
Through the Bruges Group (and the ‘Friends of Bruges’) Thatcher found a lot of 
support for her declared scepticism of the integration that the EU planned to develop further. 
The group constituted a sounding-board for Thatcherite Conservatives, especially after her 
resignation as prime minister. They have kept the European issue at the forefront of 
discussions both outside and in the House of Commons. 
Bill Cash was chairman for the Friends of Bruges Group as well as an outspoken 
founder and leader of several groups or think-tanks that have been established to propagate 
opposition to the European Union and further integration. Cash has been a prominent 
Eurosceptic and a Conservative MP for many years. It is worth noting that he had the 
reputation of being more rebellious in his voting behaviour and in his eagerness to propose 
amendments to the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.345 He alone proposed 240 
amendments to this bill and in 47 instances he voted against the government on so-called 
three-line whips – these were regarded as the most important to the parliamentary party in 
order to secure majority in the House of Commons on a proposition.346  He founded the 
European Foundation in 1993 and is currently involved in the European Reform Forum.347 
Cash is still actively involved as a speaker at meetings arranged by the Bruges Group – in 
2008 he campaigned against the Lisbon Treaty.348 
Even though the Bruges Group claims to be independent of any political party, the 
majority of politicians who are listed as speakers on their meetings are Conservative present 
or former MPs who are known to be Eurosceptical. These include for instance Michael 
Howard, Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Portillo, John Redwood, Nigel Farage and Norman 
Tebbit. Several MPs have written Bruges Group publications –Tebbit and Lamont have been 
very active contributors.349  
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It is worth noticing that the vice-president of the think-tank is Norman Lamont, who 
was chancellor when Britain was forced out of the ERM in September 1992.350 Apparently he 
became much more of a Eurosceptic after this debacle. In a cabinet re-shuffle in 1993 he was 
replaced as chancellor with the more Eurofriendly Kenneth Clarke, and as a backbencher 
Lamont was a fierce critic of the Major government in general, and the European policies in 
particular. He argued that Britain ought to leave the European Union in his book Sovereign 
Britain, which was published in 1995.351  
After the general election in 1997, the Bruges Group published a paper entitled “John 
Major and Europe: The Failure of a Policy 1990-1997”. Dr. Martin Holmes stated that Major 
became increasingly Eurosceptical in his premiership as well as the Conservative Party.352 
However, Major was throughout the period criticized by several Thatcherite MPs, among 
them Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley and John Redwood, undeterred by the fact that they were 
cabinet members. Major talked about three ‘bastards’ in an off-the-record remark after a TV-
interview on 25 July 1993.353 Even though Major did not mention any names, journalists 
seemed to agree about who the ‘bastards’ were. The remark created havoc in the media. The 
effect was no appeasement of the Eurosceptics.354 
A fringe meeting entitled ‘The Conservative Party, Where Next?’ was advertised at the 
Bruges Group homepage in October 2005.355 One of the speakers was John Redwood, who 
has been very busy writing pamphlets for several right-wing groups including the Bruges 
Group. He has authored several books, among them Just Say No: 100 Arguments Against the 
Euro.356 He worked for Margaret Thatcher in her Policy Unit in the first half of the 1980s and 
he was known to be a dedicated Thatcher supporter. Redwood resigned Major’s cabinet in 
order to stand in the leadership contest in 1995. He has later participated in shadow cabinets 
1997-2000.  
The Bruges Group is still active today; arranging meetings, publishing papers 
advocating their Eurosceptic views. The present chairman Robert Oulds sums up 10 key 
successes for the group since 1989 in his paper “All you need to know about the EU”, which 
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was probably published in 2005.357 According to Oulds, the Bruges Group has played a 
significant role, as it has: 
 
Bolstered anti-EU feeling amongst the nation. Instigated the election of more EU-sceptic politicians. 
Assisted successful anti-EU campaigns in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the French and Dutch EU 
Constitution referenda. Gained a great deal of media coverage and won many debates with Europhiles 
on the radio and on television.358 
           
 
This list of achievements illustrates how the group works in trying to influence both 
politicians and the public. Still held in high esteem, Margaret Thatcher’s portrait is displayed 
on the front page together with a map of Europe. Thatcher’s significance is still visible today, 
also because she is honorary president of the group. On 26 October, 2008 the 20th anniversary 
of her Bruges Speech was celebrated by the Bruges Group. Norman Tebbit and the president 
of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, were the main speakers at the event. Margaret Thatcher, 
aged 83, attended the dinner. In his speech Norman Tebbit advocated a referendum on the 
EU, claiming that it might be necessary to withdraw from it and said as well: ‘We need to 
show Thatcherite courage and determination to lead the country along that path.’359  
 Among several prominent politicians mentioned as guest speakers and contributors of 
many Bruges Group papers are Bill Cash, Norman Lamont, Norman Tebbit and John 
Redwood. They all criticized John Major and his government and all of them, maybe except 
Norman Lamont, were described as ‘Thatcherites’. The Bruges Group seems to have been 
quite influential when it came to advocating resistance to further integration of the EU 
countries. 
  
5.3: Fresh Start 
  
At least 27 organizations were established both within and outside the House of Commons 
that were dedicated to fight the Maastricht Treaty after the Maastricht European Council in 
1991.360 Members of these groups did not want Britain to ratify the treaty, so they did 
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everything they could in order to avoid this. One of the ardent Maastricht Treaty opponents 
was Margaret Thatcher. She left the House of Commons just after the Fresh Start group was 
established, but she played a vital role in her support for the group as a Baroness in the House 
of Lords. 
Michael Spicer promoted two Early Day Motions (EDMs) during the Maastricht 
Treaty debates in the House of Commons. The EDMs can signify disagreement with 
government policies, for instance, and even though they do not have any formal significance 
they are important because they can be said to tell the general feeling among MPs on a certain 
issue. If an EDM gets popular support among the backbenchers, it predicts how the eventual 
debate on the issue will turn out. Ministers, whips and parliamentary private secretaries are 
not allowed to sign it, however. 
The first EDM from Spicer called for a ‘fresh start’ for the EC on 3 June 1992. This 
motion gave name to the substantial group of MPs that felt very negative about the 
advancement of European integration and the aims for the European Union. This motion was 
signed by more than 100 Conservative backbenchers.361 This number constituted nearly a 
third of all Conservative MPs at the time, and a majority of the backbenchers.362 The ‘Whip-
less Nine’ were all members of the ‘Fresh Start’ group.363 
Other members included George Gardiner, Bill Cash, and Iain Duncan-Smith. Some of 
them had been negative towards the EU for a long time, while others had become more 
hesitant about the planned development in the early 1990s. Teresa Gorman says that Fresh 
Start members were not all necessarily Thatcher supporters, but they all shared Thatcher’s 
declared scepticism about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.364 The Fresh Start group 
had around 26 ardent supporters in the early 1990s, and then the number increased to over 50 
in the mid-1990s.365 According to Gorman, this group deliberately sought to sabotage the 
Maastricht Treaty.366 
Spicer’s second EDM called for a ‘fresh start’ on economic policy on 24 September 
1992. Britain had been forced out of the ERM on 16 September, which was labelled ‘Black 
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Wednesday’ by politicians who thought Britain ought to be a member of the ERM and ‘White 
Wednesday’ by the antagonists. This new EDM was signed by more than 60 MPs.367 
Members of the Fresh Start group were against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as 
well as the single currency. They wanted a referendum on both these issues. Since 1991 
Norman Tebbit and Margaret Thatcher had argued for the case of a referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty. In Denmark the treaty was voted down on 2 June 1992, which was 
applauded by Thatcher.368 The group was organized almost as a party within the Conservative 
Party, with Michael Spicer as their leader. They openly rebelled against their own party by 
voting against proposals by the government 985 times and abstained 1,515 times in votes 
concerning the Maastricht Bill. Occasionally they voted with the Labour Party instead. 369 The 
prominent Conservative MP Norman Tebbit became a member of the House of Lords after 
the general election in 1992 together with Margaret Thatcher, among others. They both 
supported the ‘Fresh Start’ alliance after they left the House of Commons.370 The 
Conservative MP Woodrow Wyatt wrote in his diary in August 1992 that Tebbit had teamed 
up with Thatcher and ‘stirs her up’.371 This was a comment relating to the Maastricht Treaty 
debate.  
Denmark arranged its second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on 18 May 1993, 
since the result of the first referendum in June 1992 was ‘no’ to the actual treaty. This time the 
result was ‘yes’, which was a blow to the British Eurosceptic politicians. Two campaigns 
were carried out regarding a referendum in Britain. One campaign which was organized and 
launched by Bill Cash and James Goldsmith was a petition that collected signatures for a 
referendum. The other campaign was organized by Margaret Thatcher, David Alton and 
Bryan Gould in which people were asked to declare yes or no to a referendum in a telephone 
poll. Neither campaign was a huge success.372 Thatcher’s contribution apparently did not 
make a big impact in this connection.  
The slight majority for the Conservative MPs made it increasingly difficult to win in 
divisions for the government, especially with so many rebel politicians openly defying the 
whip. The government was defeated on three occasions, and John Major had to announce a 
vote of confidence twice in order to make the rebels comply with the government’s proposals.  
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The Conservative Party was deeply divided over the European Union in the 1990s. Under 
John Major the Conservative majority was small as a result of the general election in April 
1992, and the number was decreasing due to a series of defections and by-election losses. In 
this situation it did not take a large number of people to influence power over the party and its 
policies. Francoise Boucek says in her paper: “When a faction becomes decisive in bringing 
about some outcome, the bargaining power of its members is strengthened particularly if their 
votes become critical to a party’s survival in government. This was the case for a minority 
faction of Conservative ‘Euro-Rebels’ under John Major.”373 Gowland and Turner describe 
how the number Eurosceptic Conservative politicians grew and how support for their 
activities was reflected in a number of pressure groups. They argue:  
 
What they lacked in numbers, however, they more than made up for in obsessiveness, energy and flair 
for publicity. Their views on Europe had a strong following among Conservative activists in the 
constituencies, and they also attracted growing support from within the parliamentary party.374  
 
 
Even though an MP is associated with a group, either within or outside Parliament, it is 
important to underline that this does not mean that the MP supports all the ideas of the group. 
The different groups and organizations also differ in that some groups only advocate for or 
against one issue, while others actually have a whole range of issues that they want to support 
or propagate. 375 ‘Fresh Start’ is an example of a single-issue group (against further European 
integration as proposed in the Maastricht Treaty), but even so, some of the group members 
sometimes voted with the group (against the government in most cases), other times they 
voted against the declared wishes of the group’s leader – or they abstained from voting.  
 
5.4: No Turning Back 
 
Within the House of Commons there was a fairly large group of politicians sympathetic to 
Margaret Thatcher and her policies at the time of her resignation in 1990. One group was 
called ‘No Turning Back’ (NTB) and it constituted MPs who actively supported Thatcher’s 
radical ideas. They agreed with Thatcher that privatization of the public sector was necessary. 
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The name of the group refers to what Thatcher said at the Conservative Party Conference in 
1980: ‘You turn if you want to. The lady’s not for turning.’376 Her predecessor, Edward Heath 
was accused of making U-turns due to his repeated revision of economic policy in the face of 
popular and trade-union pressure. 
Most of the politicians that belonged to the NTB shared Thatcher’s views on European 
integration and the Maastricht Treaty. Among the professed Eurosceptics were Peter Lilley, 
Michael Portillo, John Redwood, Iain Duncan Smith, David Davis, Liam Fox and Eric 
Forth.377 The No Turning Back group met regularly for dinner every four weeks and 
published pamphlets, helped by Ralph Harris, who also was a devoted Eurosceptic.378 The 
NTB members played a considerable role in supporting the Eurosceptics outside Parliament – 
not necessarily lining up in support with the more militant Fresh Start-members in the House 
of Commons. Teresa Gorman claims that NTB influenced the Major government to a large 
degree.379 
 A considerable proportion of the NTB group were ‘hard-liners’, willing to challenge 
the government and the prime minister. They adopted the hardline approach of their heroine, 
Margaret Thatcher, willing to fight in order to have influence in the House of Commons. John 
Redwood challenged John Major in the leadership challenge in 1995 and 1997; Iain Duncan 
Smith was elected leader of the Conservative Party after Hague resigned in 2001 and David 
Davis participated in the leadership challenge in 2005. They all were members of the NTB 
group and can be seen as the most ambitious of Major’s colleagues in the House of Commons. 
 
5.5: Conservative Way Forward 
 
Yet another right-wing group was established shortly after Margaret Thatcher resigned, which 
stated adherence to her ideas about how society best should be organized for the benefit of the 
individual. Conservative Way Forward (CWF) was established in 1991, ‘to defend and build 
upon the achievements of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, and 
to adapt the principles of her era in government to modern concerns and challenges.’380  
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Politicians that support several organisations share their thoughts and probably 
influence each other. Powerful ideas are reinforced and might create an agenda outside the 
organisations as well. CWF does not have a parliamentary equivalent, but there are four 
Eurosceptical Conservative MPs in its council at the time of writing, including Iain Duncan-
Smith. 381 Margaret Thatcher is honorary president and the honorary vice-presidents are David 
Davis, Liam Fox, William Hague, Cecil Parkinson and Norman Tebbit.382  
Margaret Thatcher is still regarded as a significant force for the Conservative 
parliamentary party, according to an article in the Forward! magazine published by the CWF 
published in the spring of 2007.383 The CWF arranged a 25th Falklands War Anniversary 
Dinner on 7 June 2007 with Thatcher present.384 Britain’s victory in the Falkland War in 1982 
strengthened Thatcher’s standing in the Conservative Party as well as on a national level. It 
has been said to have ensured the majority for the Conservatives in the 1983 general election. 
The chairman of the group today, Christopher Chope, says about her: ‘During her years in 
Downing Street, Margaret Thatcher did so much to turn her vision of individual ownership 
and freedom of choice into reality, and the torch she lit is now carried forward by us.’385  
In an article published in the magazine Forward! William Hague argued against 
further European political integration and for transatlantic trade without trade barriers. He also 
spoke about the need for a flexible labour market, with as few regulations as possible. He 
referred to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, which gave John Major enormous 
problems to have ratified as an amendment to the treaty in Parliament more than a decade 
ago.386 Daniel Hamilton, editor of Forward!, echoed Thatcher in his editorial about the EU, 
when he talked about ‘layers of senseless bureaucracy’ as a characteristic of the EU, and he 
paid a tribute to Thatcher by saying: ‘We need to be the Party of radical ideas and reform – 
the same kind of Party the British people elected in 1979.’387 Thatcher was labelled a radical 
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Conservative, because her policies led to big transformations of British society during the 
1980s.  
 
5.6: The 92 Group 
 
The parliamentary 92 Group was established as early as 1979 by Sir Patrick Wall. The group 
is described as Thatcherite and right-wing in different sources, even though it is hard to find 
proof of any direct link to Margaret Thatcher.388  Members of the group shared the same view 
on a range of issues: Scepticism about the European Union, concern about rising crime levels, 
the importance of family values and the restoration of authority in schools.389 The members 
were backbenchers and the group was very effective in promoting and electing candidates for 
different leading positions in committees in the House of Commons.  
The chairman of the 92 Group in the years 1984-1996 was the Eurosceptic George 
Gardiner. He was a staunch Thatcher supporter, although he never served in her government. 
John Barnes in the Independent writes about him in his obituary ‘Certainly he thrived on 
rebellion and was very good at organising it.’390 Gardiner was involved in other Conservative 
groups in addition to the 92 Group, as the Conservative Monday Club, Fresh Start, and 
Conservative Group for Europe. He was deselected from his constituency in 1996, and he was 
a candidate for the Referendum Party in 1997, but failed to be elected.  
The 92 Group constituted around ninety MPs in the early 1990s, and had thus a fairly 
big influence on the composition of the different committees if they agreed on how to vote.391 
The chairman of the Conservative Party (1992-1994) Norman Fowler acknowledged in an 
interview that the 92 Group was quite powerful, and that the 92 Group often shared the views 
of the No Turning Back group. He further stated ‘… they want this radical approach and 
that’s why the Government’s kind of run up against the buffers.’392 
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Anthony Forster claims that there has been considerable overlap of the No Turning 
Back group and the Bruges Group.393 Several members of the 92 Group were simultaneously 
members of the NTB group (Gerald Howarth, David Maclean and Edward Leigh); George 
Gardiner was also a member of Fresh Start, whereas Christopher Chope and Norman Tebbit 
were prominent members of Conservative Way Forward.394 
The 92 Group has been regarded as an only moderately influential group among the 
Eurosceptical groups, even though it had a lot of members in the middle of the 1990s. The 
advantage of voting together in a ‘block vote’ was demonstrated for instance in the leadership 
election in 1995. Gardiner’s 92 Group pooled behind the candidacy of John Redwood and 
showed the strength of the opposition to John Major.395 The 92 Group shared many of 
Thatcher’s views on several issues, including her scepticism to the European Union. 
 
5.7: The European Foundation and the Referendum Party 
 
The Great College Street Group started out at the time of the Maastricht Treaty debates in 
Parliament, in October 1992. This transformed into the think-tank called the European 
Foundation, which was established by Bill Cash, the devout Eurosceptic who also played an 
influential role in several other right-wing organizations, as previously mentioned. The group 
advocated a careful review of the different EU treaties that Britain has ratified; namely the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty.396  
James Goldsmith contributed money to the European Foundation. At the same time he 
also had founded the Referendum Party, which intended to fight for seats in the 1997 general 
election. This was seen as rather embarrassing, because the Referendum Party would then 
compete for the same seats as Conservative Party candidates. Therefore, the Conservative 
Party protested the funding from Goldsmith. Margaret Thatcher took over as patron to the 
European Foundation, while she secretly also supported James Goldsmith and his 
Referendum Party. The support was channelled through one of the Referendum Party’s 
candidates, George Gardiner.397 Gardiner had been deselected by his Reigate Conservative 
constituency before the general election, which quite seldom has occurred in the party.   
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The Referendum Party wanted a referendum in Britain about what kind of future the 
electorate envisioned for the EU. The party emphasized the importance of sovereignty for 
each EU member and that a federal Europe was clearly not the desired option.398 The 
Referendum Party did not manage to get any seats in the general election 1997. It received 
811,829 votes nationally, which constitutes about three per cent of all votes cast.399 There is 
some disagreement regarding what impact the party did have in the election, for instance 
whether the party contributed to any loss of seats for the Conservative Party. The estimate is 
that only about 3 Conservative constituencies would have secured a candidate from the 
Conservative Party, if the Referendum Party had not intervened.400 It is possible to argue that  
in the 24 constituencies where the Conservatives held marginal seats (with a very low 
majority) the Referendum Party votes led to victory for 19 Labour seats and five Liberal 
Democrats seats.401 The Referendum Party transformed into the Referendum Movement, 
which in 1999 merged with the Euro Information Campaign and became the Democracy 
Movement.402 As patron Thatcher played a role in the European Foundation, and could to 
some extent probably influence the think-tank. She secretly also supported the Referendum 
Party in her vigorous fight for a British referendum on the EU and a single currency. 
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Politician NTB403 BG404 CWF FS 92  EF Other groups 
Margaret 
Thatcher405  
 X X (X)  X  
Michael 
Portillo 
X X      
John 
Redwood406 
X X     Selsdon Group, 
Conservative 2000 
Peter Lilley X      Bow Group 
Norman 
Lamont407 
 X     Bow Group 
Iain Duncan 
Smith408 
X X X X  X Social Justice Policy 
Group, Centre for Social 
Justice 
Norman 
Tebbit409 
 X X (X) X  Selsdon Group  
Michael 
Howard 
 X     Bow Group 
Bill Cash    X  X  
James 
Goldsmith410 
     X Referendum Party (later 
the Democracy 
Movement) 
David Davis X  X   X  
Nigel Farage  X     UK Independence Party 
Robin Birley      X Democracy Movement 
George 
Gardiner 
   X X  Conservative Group for 
Europe, Referendum 
Party 
Liam Fox X  X     
Michael 
Spicer 
   X   European Reform Group 
 
Figure 1: Influential members of several right-wing groups/factions/think-tanks411
 
                                                 
403
 NTB: No Turning Back; BG: Bruges Group; CWF: Conservative Way Forward; FS: Fresh Start; 92: 92 
Group; EF: European Foundation 
404
 Persons marked as members have been invited to speak or written pamphlets which have been published by 
the group and the politicians on the list are supposedly sympathetic to the general aim of the BG. 
405
 Thatcher: honorary president of the Bruges Group + Conservative Way Forward; honorary patron of the 
European Foundation; support for Fresh Start. 
406
 Redwood: honorary president of the Selsdon Group 
407
 Lamont: vice president of Bruges Group 
408
 Duncan Smith: chairman of the Social Justice Policy Group in 2005 
409
 Tebbit: honorary patron Selsdon Group + vice president of Conservative Way Forward. Support for Fresh 
Start. 
410
 Goldsmith: honorary patron of the European Foundation 
411
 The sources are quoted elsewhere in this chapter. The survey is not complete. The purpose is to show the 
amount of overlap between the membership of different groups. The politicians were not members or supporters 
at exactly the same time; however in most cases this is true for some part of the 1990s.   
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Group or 
think-tank 
Eurosce
ptic 
Thatcher-
ite 
HP 
VHP 
P412 
Prominent MPs who are or 
have been members 
Fresh Start X   M. Spicer, G. Gardiner, I. Duncan 
Smith, B. Cash,  
 The ‘Whipless Nine’,  
No Turning 
Back413 
X X  J. Redwood, I.  Duncan Smith 
(until Sep. ’01), P. Lilley,  
M. Portillo, L. Fox, D. Davis 
92 Group X X  N. Tebbit, G. Gardiner 
 
Conservative 
Way Forward 
X X M. Thatcher 
(HP),  
N. Tebbit (HVP) 
L Fox, D. Davis,  
I. Duncan Smith, W. Hague 
Bruges Group414 X X M. Thatcher 
(HP),  
N. Lamont 
(HVP) 
M. Portillo, J. Redwood,  
M. Howard, I. Duncan Smith,  
N. Tebbit, N. Farage  
European 
Foundation 
X  M. Thatcher (P),  
J. Goldsmith (P) 
B. Cash, J. Goldsmith, I. Duncan 
Smith, D. Davis, R. Birley 
Referendum 
Party 
X  A. Goldsmith 
(HP)415 
J. Goldsmith, R. Birley,  
G. Gardiner 
UK 
Independence 
Party 
X   N. Farage 
Conservative 
Group for 
Europe 
  M. Thatcher (P), 
J. Major (P),  
W. Hague (P)  
G. Gardiner 
K. Clarke (was president at one 
time) 
European 
Reform Group 
   J. Aitken, M. Spicer 
Selsdon 
Group416 
  J. Redwood (HP),  
N. Tebbit (P) 
 
Bow Group    P. Lilley, N. Lamont, M. Howard 
G. Howe 
Centre for Social 
Justice 
   I. Duncan Smith (chairman in 
2005) 
Social Justice 
Policy Group 
   I. Duncan Smith 
Conservative 
2000 
   John Redwood 
 
Figure 2: Membership in a few Eurosceptic or Thatcherite organizations/think tanks established in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In addition are some older and some newer groups included because of their membership. 
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5.8: British newspapers and their support for Thatcher and her 
Eurosceptic views 
   
The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics gives the following definition of ‘mass media’: 
‘The various agents of mass communication and entertainment: newspapers, magazines and 
other publications, television, radio, the cinema, and the Internet.’417 One of the functions of 
mass media can be to entertain people. Since this dissertation is about political influence, the 
political functions of mass media are especially interesting. According to Ian Campbell in the 
Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics this includes ‘ … the collection, organization, and 
transmission of news and information, the formation of opinion, and, in more or less open 
societies, some contribution to public debate.’418 There are many choices available to those 
who collect and organize the news and political debates. A democratic country will generally 
accept that all citizens have the freedom of speech and the freedom of print. An important 
function of mass media will then be to ensure that everybody’s voice can be heard or 
presented, in order to inform and to influence others. In a representative democracy it is vital 
that the inhabitants are given the possibility to learn about the different policy alternatives 
before they cast their votes in any local or national election. Equally important is the role of 
the media to function as a watch-dog on behalf of the citizens, to keep an eye on how the 
elected representatives govern the country. The media also function as a corrective if 
government fails to perform its duties as it should – in other words, how well the public 
institutions serve the public or how for instance schools, hospitals, universities and public 
offices meet the standards that have been set. Thus, to briefly sum up the non-entertaining 
functions of the mass media: they are agenda-setting, informing and criticising the public 
institutions and those who govern the country. 
 The agenda-setting function of for instance newspapers has been briefly discussed in a 
previous chapter. The press does not merely report the political debates that are taking place 
in Parliament or in local councils. Journalists can also initiate a public debate which can have 
political consequences. A contentious issue can be brought to attention, and then politicians 
can be forced to take a stand in the ongoing debate. More often than not newspapers present 
controversial cases where voters strongly disagree as well as public figures, for instance 
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politicians. The latter presumably want to talk about issues that are important to their party, 
and they would very much like to initiate a debate.  
During John Major’s first government, from November 1990 to April 1992, Major 
experienced a largely favourable Conservative press. Although he was perceived to be nice, 
smiling, non-aggressive; a welcome change from his predecessor in terms of personality. He 
had been the chancellor and the foreign secretary in Thatcher’s cabinet since July 1989, Major 
had been seen as self-effacing in his previous offices. After the 1992 general election, when 
he had secured a small majority in the House of Commons, the Conservative press seemed to 
appreciate his style and leadership less than before. Margaret Thatcher had already declared 
her lack of faith in him as a party leader, and when Britain experienced the fatal exit of the 
ERM in September 1992 the Eurosceptic Conservative press joined the critical voices of the 
governing party and its leader.419 Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon say:  
 
Many newspapers gave full rein to Conservative Eurosceptics or member of the Thatcher entourage 
who attacked Major for weakness or allegedly betraying her legacy. Attempts, pressed on him by aides, 
to court the proprietors and editors of these papers were rarely successful. He regarded the exercise as 
beneath his dignity, having little respect for most of them, and indulged it reluctantly and 
infrequently.420 
 
Thatcher had become increasingly Eurosceptic during her last years as premier, and she 
aggressively attacked the views of John Major who declared that Britain wanted to be at the 
heart of Europe. The Maastricht Treaty had been signed in December 1991 by all the EU 
members, and the next two years saw rebellions escalating in number the Conservative MPs 
in the House of Commons, when the treaty was going through the legal process in order to be 
ratified by Parliament.  
 Major’s relationship with the press became more fraught as it became apparent that 
criticism of Major and his government had a depressing effect on him. Political journalist and 
editors were informed by Conservative MPs and civil servants hostile or critical to his 
policies; there were leaked information and documents that often found their way to the 
press.421 Kavanagh and Seldon state:  
  
cabinet, particularly after the ERM exit, gradually ceased to be a collection of ‘chums’…. Mischievous 
leaks increased; many were inspired by divisions on Europe, the core issue splitting his government, 
some by a wish to undermine John Major, and some to advance the prospects of would-be successors. 
By early 1993, the Eurosceptic press (The Times and the Telegraph group, as well as the Mail and Sun) 
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seemed intent on replacing him; he complained increasingly of the ‘poison’ emanating from cabinet 
‘bastards’. 422 
 
 
Those who worked closely with John Major in Number Ten could report about how Major 
reacted during the 1990s to those forces that seemed rather hostile towards him and his 
government. Kavanagh and Seldon summed up the negative influences: ‘… the disloyalty of 
cabinet and parliamentary colleagues, the backbiting from Mrs Thatcher and her entourage, 
and the unfairness of the press.’423 Unlike his predecessor, Major seemed to worry more about 
negative press and criticism. His worsening relationship with journalists and editors could be 
seen as a consequence of ‘hypersensitivity to criticisms’, according to Seldon and 
Kavanagh.424 The fact that he was preoccupied with unfavourable reports in the newspapers 
could trigger political enemies to use this against him. One example here might be how the 
‘Whipless Nine’ used every opportunity to ridicule the Conservative government during the 
period they were excluded the party whip in 1994 and 1995. They were quite eager to arrange 
press conferences to enlarge on the Conservative infighting in the House of Commons, with 
Thatcher’s unreserved support.    
The Conservative press turned ever more critical towards John Major. There was a 
huge swing from 1992 to 1995, when Major suddenly decided to resign as party leader in an 
attempt to unify the Conservative Party. In 1995 it was reported that the Daily Mail was the 
only Conservative newspaper that still declared their support for Major.425 
One might discuss whether the newspapers set the agenda in the case of criticizing 
John Major and his government, or whether they reported the disagreement and divisions 
within the Conservative Party to inform the public. Another debatable issue is whether 
newspapers have any influence on voters in general. Hugo Young says in his book that the 
press is falsely assumed to speak on behalf of the public.426 He continues to describe Major’s 
difficulty with the press: ‘… it was the perception of public opinion, and its effect on him as 
leader, that weakened the message he was constantly trying to get across to the Europeans.’427 
In this particular case it might have been articulated in connection with the ‘mad cow-
disease’-debacle, or it could have been related to the single currency discussion. 
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Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon have drawn the attention to Major’s fate when 
he took over as prime minister in 1990, seen in relation to the press coverage that he was 
given. They say:  
 
It is difficult to recall any other prime minister in the post-war period who has been subject to such a 
bitter and sustained media attack as John Major. … Any leader taking over from such a dominant 
personality as Mrs Thatcher would have suffered by comparison and a parliamentary majority of 21 at 
the 1992 election, cut to 15 after the Eastleigh by-election in June 1994, has not provided a platform for 
heroic leadership.428  
  
Peter Oborne in his book The Triumph of the Political Class analyzes how the role of political 
journalists has changed during the last two decades. He refers to ‘… how the Political Class 
set out to sideline, to replace or to capture the main institutions of the state and civil society 
which has governed Britain in the twentieth century.’429 According to Oborne, ‘It consciously 
set out to weaken representative democracy and replace it with a novel system of government 
offering direct engagement between the governing elite and the British people.’430 Oborne 
dismisses the claim that the function of the press has been to take on a critical role in its 
opposition to Parliament. The Political Class has in fact ‘… sought to give an almost 
constitutional role to the British media by building it up as an alternative to existing state 
institutions.’431 His comments ought to be seen in the perspective of the huge reform process 
that changed the ideology and image of the Labour Party while John Major still was prime 
minister in the 1990s.  
 Since previous chapters have discussed the political influence exercised by Margaret 
Thatcher, the following extract is adding another perspective as to how she actually was able 
to attract so much attention from different media in general. Peter Oborne states: 
 
During the final years of opposition in the mid-1990s, a large number of journalists privately put 
themselves at the disposal of New Labour, in many cases because they felt an ideological sympathy, in 
not a few cases because of a self-interested desire to ingratiate themselves with an incoming 
government. Often self-interest and ideological convenience coincided. Right-wing journalists who for 
many years had celebrated Margaret Thatcher while demonising the Labour Party, and therefore may 
have felt they had a great deal to prove if they were not to be starved of access by the incoming Blair 
regime, provide an interesting study. One Tory political commentator purchased entry to the Blair circle 
by handing over wholesale the contents of personal briefings from cabinet ministers to the New Labour 
machine. This was why in the final, dying months of the Major regime New Labour press officers were 
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able to achieve the puzzling feat of providing political journalists with much more comprehensive and 
colourful descriptions of cabinet meetings than the official Downing Street machine.432 
 
In other words, Margaret Thatcher’s motives for seeking media attention coincided with the 
motives from parts of the press to voice attacks on the Conservative government in the period 
1990-1997. The motives were presumably quite different, but the publication of negative and 
critical articles served the same aim: To weaken John Major as prime minister and to change 
the direction of the Conservative Party. 
 A few words must be said about the owners of the Conservative newspapers in this 
connection. Rupert Murdoch controls the Sun, the Sunday Times, The Times, and the News of 
the World. Another proprietor, Conrad Black, controls the Daily Telegraph, the Sunday 
Telegraph and the Spectator. The Times-titles and the Telegraph-titles represent the so-called 
‘quality’ newspapers and are seen as the most conservative of all British newspapers. Andrew 
Geddes argues in his book The European Union and British Politics that Murdoch and Black 
both were expressly Eurosceptic. This has influenced politicians and has led to a more 
Eurosceptic attitude being expressed in order to soften up the newspaper proprietors and 
consequently gain a more favourable coverage in newspapers controlled by them.433 Geddes 
says also: ‘Quality newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph and The Times have made 
particularly important contributions to the development of Eurosceptic thought on the right 
wing of politics and provided space for columnists eager to develop these new strands of 
Conservative thought.’434 By 2002 the newspaper the Daily Mail also was perceived to be 
clearly Eurosceptic, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulation.435 This newspaper is owned 
or controlled by Lord Rothermere, who is a third powerful newspaper proprietor. It could 
have been interesting to examine the motives of the different proprietors for their 
Euroscepticism; presumably the motives can differ.  
 
5.9: Conclusion  
 
The Europe issue dominated to a large degree the Major governments, especially after the 
1992 general election. The Conservative Party had a very small majority in the House of 
Commons, only 21, in April 1992. Since then, due to several unfortunate circumstances for 
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the Conservatives, this majority decreased as the years went by. The Conservative Party was 
dominated by a lot of in-fighting within the party itself, and Major had to resort to ‘strong-
arm-tactics’(votes of confidence) twice in decisive votes in order to force the rebellious 
Eurosceptics to close ranks and vote with the party. There were a number of organized groups 
in the House of Commons that collaborated to stall the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and later, to make their voices heard in matters regarding the single currency and the EU in 
general.  
Margaret Thatcher’s influence was seen and heard, not least after she took up a seat in 
the House of Lords. She directly influenced the Fresh Start group, and indirectly she 
influenced several other groups that were established specifically to support her ideas and to 
continue her fight against the enhanced political and social integration of the EU. She was 
emphatically against the Maastricht Treaty and the concept of a single currency. The Bruges 
Group, the No Turning Back Group and the Conservative Way Forward had members who 
were all dedicated Thatcher supporters, and Thatcher was made honorary president in two of 
these groups. In addition she was made honorary patron of the European Foundation.  
Thatcher apparently pulled many strings behind the scene both as an MP and after she 
accepted a peerage to sit in the House of Lords in July 1992. Among the Lords she had some 
heavy-weight supporters like Norman Tebbit and Norman Lamont and Ralph Harris from 
1998. Tebbit and Lamont joined in with Thatcher in their flagrant attacks on John Major’s 
government and policies on Europe. Tebbit was very prominent in a number of pressure 
groups, and was able to influence debates, both within the Conservative Party and the media. 
The Eurosceptics John Redwood, Michael Portillo and Peter Lilley served in Major’s cabinet 
while at the same time devoting time as members of different pressure groups, especially the 
No Turning Back-group.  
The Conservative Party’s infighting continued after the 1997 general election to the 
2001 general election when the Labour Party won another landslide victory. The defeat was 
repeated in 2005, when Labour won a 66 seat majority in the House of Commons. Major’s 
succeeding party leaders were all members of different Thatcherite or Eurosceptic 
organizations in the 1990s or later. William Hague was related to Conservative Way Forward 
whereas Duncan Smith was a member of No Turning Back, Conservative Way Forward, 
Fresh Start, the European Foundation in addition to actively engaging in the Bruges Group. 
Michael Howard was also a supporter of the Bruges Group and was also active in the Bow 
Group. These three Conservative Party leaders failed somehow to appeal to the electorate, 
since they did not secure enough votes in the general elections. The issue of the EU has 
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played a big role in this failure, in addition to other factors. After 1997 the importance of the 
different pressure groups outside the House of Commons seems to have decreased somewhat. 
When it comes to discussing how public opinion is influenced it can be very difficult 
to establish the agent and the cause. During the 1990s right-wing newspapers became clearly 
more Eurosceptical since ‘Black Wednesday’and the forced exit out of the ERM-mechanism 
for Britain. The economic competence of the Conservative government was perceived to be 
severely weakened as a result of the event. Margaret Thatcher and other Eurosceptic 
politicians used this to attack both the government and the planned monetary union of the EU. 
The former premier frequently criticized her successor and was given favourable front page 
headlines by editors who worked for the Eurosceptic newspaper proprietors Rupert Murdoch 
or Conrad Black. Apparently many of the journalists and editors working in right-wing 
newspapers supported Thatcher’s demand for a new leader of the Conservative Party as well 
as different policies. Debate has not been concluded regarding newspapers’ role in influencing 
public opinion, or whether the journalists have taken an independent role in their newspapers, 
setting the agenda for the debate or for criticism. 
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Chapter 6:  
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has analyzed to what extent – and through what channels Margaret Thatcher 
has influenced the course of British politics in the twelve years following her resignation as 
prime minister in 1990. The empirical data provided are evaluated to decide whether the three 
hypotheses can be said to be true. Finally the conclusion sums up the answer to the research 
question. 
 
6.1: Margaret Thatcher’s influence on the Conservative Party in 
general and the parliamentary Conservative Party  
 
The presented material regarding the first hypothesis revealed how Margaret Thatcher  
influenced backbenchers directly by supporting those who wanted to vote against the 
government in crucial votes over the Maastricht Treaty. After she had accepted a seat in the 
House of Lords, she exerted some influence behind the scenes to persuade ‘Fresh Start’ 
supporters how to vote. In addition she voiced opposition against John Major and further 
European integration. Her presumably biggest impact can be said to be her open display of 
disloyalty to the party leader and the Conservative Party. Thatcherite MPs in the House of 
Commons were encouraged by Thatcher to rebel. Several books and articles that have been 
examined in this dissertation document this influence. 
Thatcher displayed a wavering attitude to the Conservative Party during the 
premiership of John Major. She shifted her allegiance from the Conservatives to the 
Referendum Party and back again. There are several reports of her praise of Tony Blair, the 
leader of the Labour Party – whereas she warned the electorate of the Labour Party and urged 
people to vote for the Conservative Party now and then. Assumedly it sent a strong signal to 
the electorate that she declined to support John Major and preferred the Labour candidate 
instead. She was even invited to Downing Street 10 after the 1997 general election to advise 
Blair.  
Thatcher was extremely critical of her successor during the years 1990-1997. Her 
repeated attacks on his leadership style and his policies damaged his authority as party leader. 
Before the leadership contest in 1997 Thatcher voiced strong support for the Eurosceptic 
William Hague, and she also supported the Eurosceptic candidate in the next leadership 
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contest in 2001, Iain Duncan Smith. Thatcher’s backing might have increased the tension 
within the Conservative Party and contributed to make the issue of Euroscepticism more 
prominent. The Conservative Party remained severely divided since this issue was promoted 
both before the 2001 general election and after by Hague and Duncan Smith. Whether Hague 
and Duncan Smith could have won the leadership without Thatcher’s support in the leadership 
challenge has not been discussed in this dissertation. All the candidates that stood for election 
in 1997 and 2001 were decidedly more or less Eurosceptic, except Kenneth Clarke. If the 
Conservative Party had wanted to unite behind him, the result of the 1997 general election 
might have been different. He was an experienced politician who was popular among the 
electorate, but his Eurofriendly attitude made him unpopular with the Eurosceptic 
Conservatives in the House of Commons. 
At party conferences Thatcher’s presence was problematic, especially for the party 
chairman and the party leader in the years 1990-1997. She attracted negative publicity at 
several conferences because of her book publications and articles that were published. Her 
declared support for Augusto Pinochet probably caused some embarrassment on the party 
conference in 1999, although this effect is not well documented.  
Peter Lilley’s attempt to modernize the Conservative Party ideology inspired by 
Thatcher was unsuccessful, and led to several resignations from Hague’s government in 1999. 
The issues in question were privatization and public services. Thatcher and other Tory MPs 
reacted furiously to what Peter Lilley suggested in his lecture. The BBC film The Return of 
the Mummy was very critical about Thatcher and her interventions in the Conservative Party’s 
policy-making. Thatcher’s influence on her own legacy can be questioned – it is not even 
likely that Thatcher was solely responsible for the continued Thatcherite ideology to govern 
the policies of William Hague as party leader. The Return of the Mummy was presumably not 
a film that showed Thatcher in a favourable light. The film has not been a part of the research 
material, so this conclusion is somewhat uncertain. 
To sum up the evidence regarding the first hypothesis: The claim that Margaret 
Thatcher influenced the Conservative Party in general and the parliamentary Conservative 
Party both directly and indirectly is validated, particularly when it comes to influencing the 
party negatively with respect to publicity. The party division became more evident over the 
EU-issue, even if this was something that many others also contributed to. Thatcher’s open 
display of disloyalty encouraged several other Eurosceptic politicians to voice their 
opposition. Thatcher’s willingness to encourage rebellions in important divisions in the House 
of Commons had a devastating effect on the prime minister and his government. The 
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conclusion to the first hypothesis might not come as a big surprise; however, her ‘behind the 
scenes’ activity in the House of Commons and also the effect of her presence at party 
conferences has been little focused on in previous research.  
 
6.2: Margaret Thatcher influenced public opinion through her public 
appearances, books and articles. 
 
Public opinion can be said to belong to anyone – in a democracy everyone is entitled to 
express his or her opinion publicly. Implicitly the second hypothesis entails that Thatcher 
tried to influence any member of the electorate to change his political opinion or to support 
Thatcher’s expressed ideas. Presumably any voter should be regarded as an important target 
to impress; however people with power or authority are the ones who need to be persuaded in 
order to attract attention to new political ideas. The key persons here could be people in 
leading positions of large companies or organizations, journalists, advisers, ‘experts’ in 
various fields – in other words people that are in a prominent position to influence others.  
The material available to prove Thatcher’s influence of public opinion is enormous, so 
the choice of speeches and articles had to be narrowed down. Thatcher’s speeches can 
arguably be regarded differently by different researchers. Presumably some scientists would 
claim that other speeches were more influential or caused more debate. Whether it was the 
Thatcher Foundation or Margaret Thatcher herself that categorized some of her speeches ‘key 
speeches’, is unclear.436 They could have been chosen for specific reasons, for instance to 
show the eloquence of Thatcher, or they could have been selected because they had the 
biggest audiences. However, there is a possibility that some speeches were highlighted 
because they caused a lot of debate and thus potentially influenced many people. Thatcher’s 
The Hague-speech was seen quite controversial because of its focus on the enhanced role of a 
united Germany within the EU. The speech could have led to a difficult diplomatic climate for 
John Major as prime minister in 1992, because he already had strained the goodwill of the 
other EU members when Britain demanded an opt-out of the social chapter and the single 
currency before the Maastricht Treaty was signed in December 1991.  
 The timing of the CNN-speech and the ‘fresh start’-EDM in the House of Commons 
could be regarded as a coincidence, since these events happened only days apart. It can also 
be claimed that Thatcher’s CNN-speech prompted the EDM regarding a demand for a fresh 
start for the Maastricht Treaty. The issue was very contentious, and the debate that followed 
                                                 
436
 The Margaret Thatcher Foundation was set up by Margaret Thatcher in 1991. 
 117 
in the House of Commons was bound to be extremely difficult for John Major and the 
Conservative Party anyway since it was the first debate after ‘Black Wednesday’ when Britain 
had to leave the ERM-mechanism. Since the Conservative Party only had a small majority in 
the House of Commons after the 1992 general election, the huge support of an EDM signalled 
opposition to the government’s policies. The speech might have triggered debate and 
opposition in the House of Commons. 
 The next two selected speeches, the Prague speech and the Keith Joseph Memorial 
Lecture, both attracted a lot of attention because of their content. The Prague speech was seen 
to be fundamentally negative to the EU, and Thatcher talked about her nightmare vision of a 
European federal superstate. The Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture led to a public debate about 
the future of the British welfare state. It also discussed the future ideology of the Conservative 
Party. Major’s ‘One Nation’ ideology was ridiculed by Margaret Thatcher, who claimed that 
this was more like a ‘No Nation’ ideology instead. Major’s authority as party leader was 
challenged. 
 The Plymouth election rally speech in 2001 could have become a publicity disaster, if 
Thatcher’s allegedly racist remark in an interview on the day of the speech had been 
broadcast. The tumultuous discussions that took place involving several prominent MPs 
before her appearance at the election rally can be taken as proof of her potential liability to the 
party. 
 Margaret Thatcher did exert some positive influence in Hong Kong before the colony 
was returned to the Chinese in 1997. Everything was carried out in accordance with Chris 
Patten, the British governor in Hong Kong, and prime minister John Major. Her personal visit 
and assurances helped solve a diplomatic knot. Thatcher also proved to be a positive influence 
for British firms in several Asian countries, by attracting publicity and encouraging contracts. 
This was carried out on an informal basis, and the effect might not have been achieved if 
Thatcher had stayed in Britain. The political influence here might be negligible since it has 
not been mentioned by anyone else than John Campbell in his book Margaret Thatcher. 
Volume Two: The Iron Lady.  
 Thatcher’s own books resulted in a lot of publicity for Thatcher’s views. The Downing 
Street Years was very critical to Major and his government, in addition to most of Thatcher’s 
former colleagues. The party conference in 1993 was negatively influenced when the book 
was published just as the conference week started. The Path to Power in 1995 encouraged 
Conservative MPs to contest the party leadership of John Major. It was not necessarily the 
book alone that contributed to the surprise resignation of Major, but potentially the book 
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proved to be the last straw for him. He declared ‘put up or shut up’ to his critics and won the 
leadership contest, however, his authority was not restored. This authority might have 
decreased both within the party and among the electorate.  
 Thatcher’s third book, Statecraft, which was published in 2002, questioned Britain’s 
membership of the EU. Thatcher talked about Britain on the point of no return. Her views 
seemed to offend many members of the Conservative Party and they were considered to be 
more populist than ever. Constituency chairmen declared that this time she had gone too far, 
and Thatcher was indirectly attacked for being xenophobic and nationalistic by Conservative 
MP Francis Maude. Thatcher was prohibited from taking part in further public discussions 
because of her declining health.  
 The three selected articles written by Thatcher were published in The European, 
Newsweek and the New York Times; all of them in 1992. The first had a disastrous effect on 
the party conference, since it was timed to coincide with this. Both Major, the government 
and the Maastricht Treaty were attacked, and the potential positive publicity in the mass 
media about the conference disappeared. A few months earlier, in April, the Newsweek article 
was published which attacked both John Major and his government. This happened shortly 
after the general election, and the Conservative Party had a precarious majority in the House 
of Commons. The difficult debates for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty were under 
way, and the first serious rebellion took place in May, when the government was defeated by 
Tory rebels. The third article in New York Times about Bosnia might have helped to highlight 
the plight of the Bosnians. Another interpretation might be that Thatcher interfered in 
Britain’s foreign policy, and forced John Major and foreign secretary Douglas Hurd to 
participate in a public debate about Britain’s role in this conflict.  
 The last proofs regarding Thatcher’s influence on public opinion stem from the 
repeated front page headlines that Thatcher was able to make. Her anger and bitterness with 
John Major and his policies were given prominent coverage in the Eurosceptic newspapers 
that apparently agreed with Thatcher; otherwise the headlines might be said to attract more 
readers and also create publicity in other media, for instance television.  
 To sum up the evidence regarding the second hypothesis: Thatcher’s initiatives to 
influence public opinion were numerous, and the claim that she did exert influence is 
validated. The different speeches, books, articles, newspaper reports and interviews took place 
outside Parliament, but on close inspection this indirectly influenced her party colleagues in 
Parliament. Many of Thatcher’s initiatives can be interpreted as agenda-setting in the public 
debate – with headlines on the front pages of newspapers or with television interviews. 
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Indirectly the public esteem for the Conservative Party might have been severely damaged, 
with all the displays of criticism and party division. Thatcher’s books and articles seemed to 
have had profound influence on how the party was perceived in mass media, although this can 
not be said to be proven in this dissertation.  
 
6.3: Margaret Thatcher’s influence on Eurosceptic organizations 
contributed to increased Euroscepticism in Britain in the 1990s 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s ideas were explicitly the motivation for the foundation of the Bruges 
Group (BG), the No Turning Back group (NTB) and the Conservative Way Forward (CWF) 
group. The Fresh Start group (FS) did not want a ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
House of Commons, or a single currency imposed on Britain as a result of this treaty. This 
group enjoyed the direct support from Thatcher before the important divisions, when Thatcher 
egged all Eurosceptics to rebel and vote against the government. The European Foundation (a 
think-tank) and the Referendum Party were against further European integration or for a 
referendum regarding the single currency in Britain. The BG shared Thatcher’s Eurosceptic 
views, whereas the NTB group and the CWF supported several of Thatcher’s values and 
ideas, not only against closer European integration.  
 Many of the Conservative MPs and peers were simultaneously members of the same 
Eurosceptic organizations or think-tanks. They were supported by several networks that 
shared many of the same ideas regarding the EU, even though their motivation for doing so 
could be very different from one group to another. Several of these groups were directly 
inspired by Thatcher when they were established; others were able to attract her support 
directly or indirectly, for instance by offering her an honorary office as patron or honorary 
president. Then the Eurosceptic MPs could meet with members of the different organizations 
for instance in different advisory committees in the House of Commons. Several of these 
groups had resourceful members who studied all aspects of different EU-matters in great 
detail and proved to voice strong resistance based on thorough research of the EU 
organizations.  
 Right-wing Eurosceptic newspapers also contributed to the Eurosceptic cause, together 
with Margaret Thatcher and many other Conservative politicians. The fact that influential and 
powerful newspaper proprietors like Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black were decidedly 
Eurosceptic, probably also was important for how different editors and journalists faced the 
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question of the EU and how the different EU organizations were described in relation to 
Britain’s interests. 
 To sum up the last chapter: The research material for this chapter was found to be 
quite sparse or difficult to obtain. Since this chapter mainly deals with indirect influence from 
Thatcher on several Eurosceptic organizations and think-tanks, the conclusions have to be 
drawn with caution. There is no doubt that the issue of further integration of Britain and the 
rest of the EU members played a fairly important role during the 1990s and the first half of 
the next decade in British politics and especially for the Conservative Party. However, 
Thatcher’s influence on the Bruges Group and the Conservative Way Forward is easier to 
establish than on other think-tanks or groups. Some of the groups mentioned above seem to 
have been influential in the House of Commons whenever the debates were about EU-related 
matters, especially during the Major governments in the 1990s. This seems to be especially 
the case of the Fresh Start group and the parliamentary Friends of Bruges group.  
 Whether some newspapers supported Thatcher because she was critical to the Major 
government or because she did not want further EU integration is an open question. Some 
newspapers shifted their allegiance just before or after the 1997 general election to support the 
Labour Party (as for instance the Sun did). The Labour Party seemed to be less Eurosceptic 
than the Conservative Party in the 1990s. The role of the newspapers, however, is far from 
clear-cut. The potential political influence is a debatable issue which was only very briefly 
discussed in this dissertation.  
 The reasons for increased Euroscepticism in Britain in the 1990s can be attributed to a 
variety of factors. Eurosceptic politicians and others had different reasons for their scepticism. 
Margaret Thatcher was not alone in her Eurosceptic views; there were several other prominent 
politicians who fought against further European integration, not least in the Thatcherite and 
Eurosceptic organizations that were discussed in chapter 5. The evidence for the third 
hypothesis does to a certain degree support the stated claim, but it seems that many aspects 
related to increased Euroscepticism have not been discussed thoroughly enough to validate 
the claim. 
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6.4: Final comments 
 
The research question was: To what extent – and through what channels – did Margaret 
Thatcher influence the course of British politics in the twelve years following her 
resignation as Prime minister in 1990? It appears that Margaret Thatcher was very active 
during her twelve years since her resignation in order to influence public opinion as well as 
the Conservative Party. A selection of her speeches and articles set the agenda in newspapers 
and television programmes, and consequently can be said to have a fairy huge influence on 
public opinion. Her books had some profound influence on events in the Conservative Party, 
and her intervention in the leadership elections helped the Eurosceptic candidates William 
Hague in 1997 and Iain Duncan Smith in 2001.  
 Arguably there were other possible alternatives of exerting political influence for 
Thatcher when she resigned. She could for instance have established her own political party 
instead of being accused of trench warfare within the Conservative Party. This dissertation 
could have examined the substance of her speeches and articles in order to analyze whether 
her ideas contributed to influence the political content of the party manifestos in the years 
after her resignation. Thatcher’s influence on other Eurosceptic Conservatives could have 
been more thoroughly discussed. The influence might also have come from other sceptics and 
given Thatcher the arguments that she used in many of the speeches that she gave. This 
dissertation has not been able to provide a complete discussion on this theme. 
Thatcher’s unique position as former prime minister qualified her to continue a 
political life after her resignation, and her vast network gave her opportunities to travel all 
over the world advocating her political views. Her role as a destabilizing force in the 
Conservative Party might have influenced the general decreased support for party political 
membership and a lower turn-out in general elections. This responsibility is by no means 
Thatcher’s alone, but her frequent attacks on her successor and on the government’s policies 
might have led to in-party fighting which attracted a lot of media publicity, but repulsed 
voters in general.  
Thatcher contributed to a debate in the party about the welfare state in addition to the 
increasingly divisive question of the EU and its aims of political and monetary union. The 
end-note in the last controversy that she caused was accusations directed at Thatcher for being 
xenophobic and nationalistic. Then she was forced to retire from the public debate on the 
doctor’s orders.  
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The concluding answer to the research question is that Margaret Thatcher influenced 
the course of British politics in the twelve years following her resignation in 1990 to a great 
extent directly through her books, articles, speeches, party conference participation, television 
interviews and indirectly through media coverage and Thatcherite or Eurosceptic 
organizations.The discussion of important concepts, as for instance ‘influence’ and ‘politics’, 
constitutes a crucial part of the dissertation. Some newspaper proprietors, and the journalists 
and editors working for them, seemed to sympathize with Margaret Thatcher and her political 
views in the 1990s, and gave her a chance to attract attention through headlines and front-
page coverage. This was especially true in the years before the 1997 general election, when 
the Conservative Party was heavily defeated by the Labour Party after 18 years in 
government.  
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